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SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ACTION 
by Patricia D'Andrade
Adviser: Professor Lindsey Churchill
This dissertation analyzes environmental arguments for 
their stance toward science. It is a sociology of knowledge 
investigation of arguments made primarily by environmental 
scientists in the United States in the 1960s and 70s.
The environmental crisis puts science in question but 
at the same time looks to science for information and 
solutions. Thus, science is a center of contention around 
which arguments develop and oppositions are established. 
Science is beginning to take the place of political thought 
in providing legitimating concepts for arguments intended to 
effect social change. Major environmental books and 
articles by American authors of the 1960s and 70s judge 
postwar science and technology from the opposed positions of 
"science skeptic" and "science truster."
The guiding theory for this research is from Karl
Mannheim, especially from his interpretive, cultural 
analysis of conservative thought, in which he uses the term 
"style of thought" for a coherent argument intended to 
persuade toward a course of social action. Thought styles 
develop oppositionally around a common center of contention 
during periods of great change; conservative and liberal 
thought styles developed with the rise of modern politics.
This study concludes that there is an environmental 
style of thought organized around questions about science in 
society, that its current form originated among biologists, 
and that it is the main argument to have introduced 
skepticism of science to the public.
The influence of science imparts to politics a new 
identity which does not accord with older political 
concepts. A "conceptual shift" is occurring, in Western 
societies, in legitimating arguments for social and 
political action. This shift is from arguments that rely on 
political-frame concepts of a just society, to arguments 
that rely on scientific-frame concepts of truth and 
factuality, and it is particularly evident in the 
environmental debate.
Works analyzed; Silent Soring. Science and Survival.
The Population Bomb. "The Tragedy of the Commons," "The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," Post-Scarcitv 




Much more goes into a dissertation than happens at 
thecomparatively late stages of research and writing, so I 
shall be roughly chronological in acknowledging those who 
have influenced me along the way.
My thanks to George Fischer for his initial help in 
acquainting me with the CUNY Sociology Department and his 
subsequent observations on the process of producing a 
dissertation. Bill Kornblum encouraged my application to 
the program and gave me good advice about being a student in 
it.
The influence of Michael Landmann on my investigations 
of knowledge, through his course, The Philosophical 
Foundations of the Social Sciences, given at The New School 
Graduate Faculty in 1983, is far greater than my brief 
experience with him would suggest. To him I owe my 
introduction to the great body of German social thought, and 
a conviction that social theory is relevant to our present 
condition. His own love of knowledge gave impetus to my 
decision to begin graduate study.
My committee allowed me the freedom of intellectual
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questioning that I sought, and I thank them for their 
confidence in me. Stanley Aronowitz has contributed a great 
deal to my years of graduate study through courses, 
conversations, opportunities to work, general good humor, 
and most of all, through his intellectual grasp of 
sociological theory. Roz Bologh gave me detailed, 
thoughtful and useful criticism, not only on this 
dissertation, but on all the work I have done with her. My 
interest in the problems addressed by the dissertation began 
in independent study with Lindsey Churchill, who then became 
an unfailingly calm guide through the dissertation process, 
one who intuited my purpose, ignored my divagations, and 
never imposed his sociological understanding on mine.
Bob Alford made a thorough and concerned critique of my 
early efforts at framing the dissertation and set a 
scholarly standard which I hope I have not forgotten. Bob 
Horn encouraged my research for the dissertation and fed me 
current information on environmental activities. My thanks, 
too, to Pat Gorman for helping me sort through my categories 
while holding on to my overall design.
David Johnson's unfailing support made it all possible, 
and without him this work would not have been begun, let 
alone completed. David gave me the gift of time.
* ★ *
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Finally, there are others, unknown to me and now gone, 
who helped me through this dissertation. In the course of 
writing it, I took up birdwatching —  as a distraction, as a 
way to get out of the house and away from the desk, as a way 
to get exercise and distance. Since I live in Manhattan, my 
recourse was to Central Park. My birding began in late 
October, went through the winter months, and began to 
develop into a passion in the spring. I have often been a 
walker in the woods and wished that I could identify what I 
saw and heard. I now found that learning the names and 
habits of one group of beings in this natural world opened 
up that world as having a depth and design I had previously 
felt but had only the smallest knowledge of. On my walks I 
entered a world of beauty, complexity, vitality, and 
spaciousness and minutiae combined.
This very different activity from writing the 
dissertation was sustaining and restorative. That I was 
able to pursue it less than half an hour's walk from my 
apartment, in the most densely populated part of the biggest 
city in the United States is a tribute to those who had the 
vision and determination to put a people's park the size of 
the Kingdom of Monaco in the center of a real-estate hungry 
urban island. Central Park is a magnet for migrating birds, 
for overwintering birds, for any bird that has somehow come 
to the city and is looking for lakes and streams, woods and
fields, hills and hollows. There is greater variety in its 
small compass than can be found in many square miles by 
birders in many other parts of the country. The park's 
layout was intentionally and cleverly designed to produce 
the illusion of greater distance and more space than its 
objective measurements indicate. It is landscaped with a 
variety of plants and trees that provide changing texture 
and color across the seasons. I feel real gratitude to the 
makers of this park, and I would like to express it here, 
approximately one hundred years after its beginnings. They 
had an appreciation of natural beauty, and they passed on to 
us both a place where that beauty could be felt and the 
civic value that a great city should provide such a space 
for all its citizens.
Not all of my forays into the park were thoroughly 
enjoyable. On many trips, thickets and small streams were 
choked with trash. Plastic bags and deflated balloons hung 
in ugly tatters from splendid trees unmatched in any of the 
unprotected woodlands of the countryside outside of New York 
City. Homeless people on the edge of desperation occupy the 
park's rustic, small, pergola-like open wooden shelters; 
they huddle in the arched passageways that take the park 
walker under the vehicular roads; they camp without shelter 
or fire in the Ramble, the park's most wooded and least 
groomed section (and the area most favored by its birds).
Muggings and gay-bashings in the part of the park I 
frequented were reported to me by acquaintances. Economic 
recession has caused cutbacks in park maintenance and 
cleanup, and heavy use of the park has thus subjected it to 
environmental degradation, destroying both wildlife habitat 
and places where people can find the lawns, gardens, and 
relief from city concrete and grimct that they hope for.
The park, then, is not •separate from the social world. 
In this way it is a metaphor for our time, when Nature 
itself is no longer a place apart. The natural world 
everywhere bears our mark and suffers a combination of 
overuse, neglect, and misuse. And yet it keeps on living 
and thrusting and burgeoning, cycling through its sequences 
of life, death, and new life as if it would all go on 
forever. Whether that forever happens is now up to us.
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The Case of Science and the Environment
Knowledge is so integral to society that it often 
functions as unnoticed background. Like the physical 
environment that we organize for our purposes, knowledge is 
something that we make and then make use of but that we only 
occasionally wonder about. We are aware that knowledge 
changes in content and guantity, but are not alert to 
changes in its form. The exception, in our modern society, 
is that we distinguish between scientific and pre-scientific 
knowledge. Yet even this change is widely considered to be 
mostly a matter of knowing more. For the sociology of 
knowledge, however, it is a matter of knowing differently.
Science is now central to our concepts of knowledge, 
and as a practice, has a powerful influence on economy and 
politics. Today, 'science' is achieving equal status with 
'the state' as a conceptual focus for public discourse, and 
as a source of legitimation for action on social and 
political issues.
This conceptual focus is evident in sociological 
analysis, political debate, and philosophical argument about 
social change and public policy issues. These debates are 
directed as much toward the presence of science and 
technology as they are toward the presence of government and 
law. This is especially evident in the debate over what to 
do about environmental problems.
The environmental movement in the United States 
includes a wide variety of organizations and groups acting 
to defend the environment against degradation: against 
pollution, against overuse, destruction of ecosystem, 
extinction of species, elimination of wilderness, nuclear 
threat, global warming, and a host of other damages. The 
common term for the movement to preserve the environment, 
change our use of it, and establish ecological awareness is 
"environmentalism"; some activists now say that 
environmentalism is a failed and co-opted movement of the 
past, which has to be replaced by an "ecological" movement.
Despite its diversity, it can be argued that the 
environmental movement generally shares a view of science 
that is skeptical of its benefits while relying on its 
findings. This does not mean that the environmental 
movement is against science; it must depend upon science in 
many of its efforts to convince the world to change. What 
environmentalism does challenge, however, is the traditional
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notion of how science should 'be' in society. Within 
environmental arguments is a skepticism about the benefits 
of science, a critique of the direction of its efforts, and 
sometimes the claim that it should be in service to specific 
societal goals.
The focus on science occurs not only in the 
environmental movement, but throughout society in the United 
States. We often think of our publicly-debated problems as 
political issues, but many of them are now also science 
issues. Much of the argument about problem issues —  
environment, medical technology, nuclear power, and other 
areas of conflict mentioned earlier —  centers on the role 
of science in society. This concern is not always 
immediately apparent, and showing that it exists is what the 
following chapters are about. The orienting theory for my 
analysis comes from the sociology of knowledge developed by 
Karl Mannheim, which traces bodies of thought to their 
social origins, and relates different styles of argument to 
central social concerns.
Argument of the Dissertation
Mannheim's analysis of conservative political thought 
serves as a model for this study,1 in which I argue three
4
main points:
1) Science —  both as practice and as knowledge —  has 
become central in debates over social action in the United 
States. The centrality of science is shown by a developing 
polarization over how science should 'be' in society, with 
those who trust science to take a direction that benefits 
people and planet on one side, and those who are skeptical 
of its uses on the other. Both sides accept the validity of 
scientific knowledge; it is how science is used and where it 
is going that is a source of division. The polarization 
develops because a threat exists to perceived interests, 
namely the threat to environment and human health (and 
ultimately, survivability), which comes from the power of 
scientific developments to harm, whether with atomic bombs 
or with pesticides.
2) The sociology of knowledge developed by Karl Mannheim 
provides a method that points to this centrality and a model 
for analyzing it. The arguments about science and its 
social, economic and political aspects develop as Mannheim 
said styles of thought develop, in his work on conservative 
thought. A style of thought
- develops in a context of large-scale, "oriented" 
change
5
- is a response to polarizing event(s)
- solves a key epistemological problem
- is motivated by a basic social intention
- requires an effective group to sustain it.
3) There is a particular response to science in arguments 
about the environment, a coherent environmental stvle of 
thought. which is where the critique of science, or the 
doubt about how it is pursued and used, is especially 
evident.
My argument is parallel to much of Mannheim's analysis 
of conservatism, by which:
1) The centrality of politics is shown in polarized 
arguments over the relationship of citizen and state, and 
over the philosophical basis of politics (i.e., over an 
autonomous sphere of politics, not tied to religious 
justification or theories of divine right). The 
polarization develops because of the threat to old landed 
interests stemming from the French Revolution and 
Enlightenment thought.
2) The arguments develop (as in #2, above) contextually: 
they are responses to polarizing events; take
epistemological positions; grow out of social intentions; 
are carried by identifiable groups.
3) There is a conservative stvle of thought which is where 
the critique of the autonomous political sphere/abstract 
natural law/Enlightenment thought is especially evident.
In addition, I propose that the broader context of the 
centrality of science shown in the appearance of an 
environmental style of thought is a conceptual shift in how 
we understand and explain social action. The dominance of 
science as a form of Knowledge leads me to believe that we 
are shifting from the use of a political framework of 
explanation for what society requires and does to a 
scientific framework. Science has become basic to the 
legitimation of social action, and politics can no longer 
base its arguments only on a philosophy of social contract. 
"Individual and science" have become as relevant to our 
personal and political lives as "citizen and state." This 
evaluation of the influence of scientific knowledge cannot 
be fully developed in this dissertation, but it contributes 
to my discussions of knowledge, worldview, and science-based 
argument.
Applying Mannheim
In his study of conservatism, Mannheim, while doing 
empirical research, also proposed "style of thought" as a 
category of cultural and political analysis. A style of 
thought is a coherent argument intended to persuade toward a 
course of social action. It has its roots in the social 
experience of a particular social group, and has a 
characteristic content and expression. Opposing styles of 
thought, representing opposed social groups, have a common 
center of contention. Using these and other categories, 
Mannheim argued that a major discourse became organized 
around political events and concepts in early 19th-century 
Germany, resulting in conservative and liberal (progressive) 
styles of thought which supported different social agendas.
Mannheim's analysis serves as a model for my 
examination of environmental arguments organized around 
post-World War II scientific and technological developments. 
Though Mannheim's analysis of conservative thought is 
generally considered his best empirical work, it has not 
been taken as an example to follow. There have been many 
commentaries on the theoretical aspects of Mannheim's work, 
but few attempts to apply his method, which is thought to 
provide little more than a general injunction to seek 
interests in arguments. This dissertation is the first
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application of Mannheim's theory and method of "style of 
thought" since his own application of it, in the 1920s, to 
19th-century conservatism.
The dissertation analyzes a subset of environmental 
arguments for their stance toward science, primarily those 
arguments made by scientists themselves. It is a sociology 
of knowledge investigation into the content and social 
context of these particular environmental arguments that 
developed in the United States in the 1960s and 70s.
This research attempts to identify for environmental 
thinking the elements that Mannheim identifies in the 
development of conservative thought. Mannheim is not 
explicit about all these elements; I have abstracted them 
from his analysis. Such a specification of contributing 
elements has not been done before. I use it experimentally 
as specifying the reguisites for the development of anv 
style of thought, not just conservative thought. These 
style-of-thought elements provide the outline for the 
analysis made in the dissertation.
Mannheim is credited as a founder of the sociology of 
knowledge, but is often criticized for failure to make it 
either sufficiently critical or sufficiently operational. 
This dissertation argues that the application of Mannheim's 
method for analyzing public discourse, which he did 
retrospectively, can be done in the present to alert us to
9
emerging changes in societal priorities w h tch accompany the 
use of and belief in certain types of knowledge.
What the Dissertation Is and Is Not
Because the sociology of knowledge is less familiar in 
American sociology than the sociology of social movements, 
and because the empirical reference point of this study can 
be considered a social movement, it may help to explain what 
the dissertation is and what it is not.
It is not a history of the environmental movement in
the United States, an attitudes survey, or a demographic
survey of who environmentalists are. It is not a political 
study of environmental groups, or an account of where they 
stand on different single issues, e.g., whales, nuclear 
power, forests, water pollution, or global warming. It is 
not a score sheet of successes and failures of the 
environmental movement. In short, it is not a sociological 
or political analysis of a social movement.
It is an analysis of how arguments and intellectual 
positions have as their conceptual magnet a dominant concern 
spread across many social issues over a significant period 
of time —  in this case: How should science be in society?
How can it balance autonomy and responsibility?
10
It is a sociology of knowledge —  an analysis of how 
the legitimacy of institutionalized science as guide to 
truth and action becomes an issue in various areas, the 
example here being environment. It is a look at a piece of 
the process whereby great change means an intensification of 
polarization in interests and ideologies.
The Organization of the Material
I begin with an introduction to the study of knowledge 
and to science as a distinct type of knowledge. I next 
propose that scientific knowledge also provides an orienting 
framework for us now, one that is replacing an older 
framework of political concepts when it comes to social 
action. I then discuss some organizing concepts and 
theoretical issues related to Mannheim's sociology of 
knowledge. A detailed study of Mannheim's analysis of 
conservative thought follows. I go on to consider what is 
involved in using Mannheim's work as a model for analyzing a 
style of thought where science is the focus of attention.
Part II reviews important environmental books by 
American authors of the 1960s and 70s, most of whom had 
scientific training. Their views of science are evaluated, 
and I take a brief look at some of the events that were the
social context of these environmental arguments. The 
conclusion relates these works to Mannheim's sociology of 
knowledge.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
1. Two versions of Mannheim's study are now in print: 
"Conservative Thought" in From Karl Mannheim, ed. Kurt H. 
Wolff (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), and 
Conservatism, ed. David Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr 
(London/Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). See note 





Science as a Dominant Form of Knowledge
Knowledge is something that we make, as well as 
something that we discover. This means that it bears the 
imprint of our making. For example, we discovered centuries 
ago that the earth revolves around the sun. From that 
analytical discovery by Copernicus, and its later supporting 
theory and mathematical explication, we have built knowledge 
with different purposes. The mechanics of planetary motion, 
at first an enterprise of theory, has, centuries later, 
become integrated into national space programs with both 
military and commercial applications. From the starting 
point of celestial mechanics there have also developed 
abstruse theories of the origin of the universe, with no 
"practical" applications. And in still another direction, 
the discovery of the solar system has been developed into a 
heliocentric astrology, an updated version of the old earth- 
centered astrology.
A given discovery, then, can be elaborated into a
variety of different knowledges, with different assumptions 
and intentions. The same discovery can even be the basis of 
contradictory claims to knowledge —  as is the case with an 
astrology revised but still based on assumptions inimical to 
today's astronomy, which takes the Copernican revolution as 
exclusively its own special heritage.
We can see a historical development of knowledge, as 
discoveries, theories and applications build one upon the 
other. So we have gone from precise observation of the 
skies (which, however, allowed us to conceive of the earth 
as the center of the universe), to mathematical theories 
which shifted the center of observed planetary motions, to 
the combination of physics, astronomy, engineering, and 
massive-scale bureaucratic administration which enables us 
to put space shuttles into orbit, and to place human beings 
on the surface of the moon. The shift from an earth- 
centered to a sun-centered view of our world is generally 
considered to be a useful point for marking the beginning of 
the scientific era, although many other factors contributed 
to the rise of a scientifc approach to the world.
It is commonplace to contrast science with religion, 
and sometimes the comparison between the medieval world and 
the modern one is made, for purposes of simplification, in 
these opposed terms.1 But the development of a 
scientifically oriented society has taken centuries, as did
15
the development of a society organized to meet the 
requirements of the Christian faith. Christianity was, of 
course, not the only organizing principle of medieval 
society, any more than science is the only organizing 
principle of ours, but just as we devote substantial 
resources to the maintenance and growth of scientific 
endeavors, the medieval world devoted substantial resources 
to the maintenance and growth of the Christian faith.
The forms of knowledge —  religious and scientific -- 
of these different eras can be called dominant in their 
pervasiveness and in their political support or connection 
with ruling power. In its pervasiveness, a dominant form of 
knowledge shapes our understanding of the world. 
Understanding is not wholly individual; it is shaped by 
society through education, example, precept, law, custom.
It is not necessary to be a scientist to have a science- 
influenced understanding of how the world works.2 Perhaps 
the influence of forms of knowledge is clearer in the case 
of religion, because we are less immersed in it as a society 
than we are in science, and can view it from some distance. 
Many Americans who do not actively attend religious ser/ices 
nonetheless identify themselves as Christian, Jewish,
Muslim, or of some other faith, and hold beliefs about life, 
morality, and sanctity that come from the tradition of that 
faith. It is not necessary to be a church-goer to have a
16
religion-influenced understanding of life.
Dominance of a form of knowledge has nothing to do with 
its intrinsic worth (if that can be judged). It also is not 
directly related to power over the conscience or aspirations 
of the individual, where, for example, religion may eclipse 
science. It is not pervasiveness alone that makes for 
dominance, for just to take the case of the United States, 
religion (as religiousness) remains pervasive, but in 
different spheres of action from science. It is the 
connection of a form of knowledge with the educational, 
political, commercial, governmental, and legal institutions 
of society that give it dominance.
It has taken time for science to become central to our 
lives. Western society did not immediately give up religion 
for science as central to institutions and knowledge, and in 
the intellectual debate over secularization, it moved from 
an emphasis on religion as the guiding force of society to 
an emphasis on politics, nationhood, and statecraft, on 
contractual agreements as the basis of what we now call 
political and economic stability. It did not go directly to 
an emphasis on science. This change became particularly 
evident with the Enlightenment,3 and our (liberal- 
progressive) idealization of society as a joint effort 
toward equality and justice dates to that time. That 18th- 
century political understanding of society, however, based
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on a concept of what I call a "just society", no longer 
seems to us to be an explanation or description of society. 
It is now seen as more inspirational than realistic; it 
continues to inspire the desire for democracy, but does not 
provide an accurate picture of its 20th-century form. The 
just society is one for which justice is considered both a 
cause of its coming into being (since the social contract is 
to assure liberty and equality, and the lack of these is 
injustice) and an end to be pursued; justice is to be 
assured by a combination of rational interest, natural 
rights, and the rule of law.4
From Just Society to Scientific Society
But we are now shifting from a classically political 
attitude in Western society to a scientific attitude, from 
the notion of a just society to the notion of a scientifc 
society. We still do politics, just as we still have 
religion, but just as we once justified politics with 
religious arguments, we now justify it with scientific ones. 
The justification we have used since the rise of the nation 
state and the development of political science —  that of a 
philosophy of the relation between citizen and state —  is 
giving way to to a reliance on scientific (or putatively
18
scientific) validation for legitimacy. The shift from 
politics to science could also be called the shift from 
social contract to science. That is a more specific way of 
naming it.
The contrast between politics and science is not as 
clear to us as the contrast between science and religion, 
because the shift is still occuring, and we have less 
historical distance on the difference, and thus less 
experience with the effects of the change. Also, we often 
ignore contrast if it is not outright opposition. On many 
points, science and religion are opposed, but science and 
politics, though contrasting, are not so often clearly in 
opposition. One very important point of opposition between 
science and politics, however, is that in principle science 
is directed toward the universal and impersonal; in the 
interests of truth it must adopt disinterest, and this has 
been expected to be the practice of scientists themselves. 
Politics, on the other hand, is the negotiation of 
particular interests; even if it is theoretically aimed at 
the general interest, it is rarely expected of politicians 
that they act disinterestedly. Politicians have 
constituencies; scientists have principles to answer to.
The Scientific Attitude
What is the scientific attitude? There are many 
enumerations of the characteristics of scientific endeavor, 
but for the purpose of studying forms of knowledge as 
competing claims to truth, the primary characteristic of 
science is that it has as its goal objective knowledge: 
knowledge that is so whether or not we like it, agree with 
it, or believe it. Scientific knowledge is supposed to be 
uncolored by personal input and to be the same for 
everybody. It is usually described as requiring 
observation, experiment, and the possibility of being either 
verifed or falsified by test, especially a test by persons 
other than the one originally making the claim.5 Over the 
past generation or so, considerable debate has developed 
over whether science meets its own criteria for objectivity. 
One part of the critique of scientific objectivity is that 
science does not achieve in practice what it professes as a 
principle; another part is that the mind can never be sure 
that it has grasped the world objectively.6
In modern society we see our understanding of and 
approach to the world as substantially different from that 
of pre-scientific society. Now we have fact; before, we had 
belief and ignorance: that, in its simplest terms, is our 
understanding of the changeover to scientific knowledge.
20
Even if our previous knowledge was valuable, and even if it 
was right, we believe, it was not as complete or as 
substantial as scientific knowledge, which can be 
universally proven, whereas unscientific knowledge can only 
be personally validated or taken on faith.
This conviction that we have advanced over time to a 
superior knowledge is a major characteristic of knowledge in 
our time.7 The conviction that science "knows more" is 
part of our education and part of our presentation of our
achievements and problems in the news, on talk shows, and
in soap operas (in which the unavoidable factuality of 
scientific medical knowledge may itself be an 'actor').
(This conviction, of course, is not the same thing as being 
scientifically knowledgeable.) At the same time, we have 
the sense that there are many areas of our life where 
science does not apply —  family life, personal 
relationships, religious conviction, enjoyment of music and 
art, and what goes on inside our heads generally (i.e., when 
we are not thinking analytically —  and especially in our 
dreams).
Yet even in these areas, science pervades our lives. A 
family may be started with a child's conception and fetal 
growth scientifically mediated by genetic counseling and 
surgical intervention. Or the survival of a premature 
newborn may depend on technological monitoring. Personal
relationships are affected by scientific tests that reveal 
the AIDS virus, and personal behavior may be moderated by 
psychiatric therapies that are based on a scientific model 
and often include the use of behavior-modifying drugs. 
Organized religion is constantly in the position of having 
to contend with or integrate scientific knowledge —  the 
theory of evolution and the use of medical techniques are 
two examples. The music most of us hear is electronically 
transmitted, and sometimes electronically generated. Art 
restoration is technologized with sophisticated techniques 
of materials analysis, and artistic creation often relies on 
new technologies and non-natural materials that are 
scientific spinoffs. Only inside our heads do we seem to 
live in a non-scientific world.
Even here, we have a scientific habit of mind which 
takes the world as data to be organized for analysis; even 
if we don't bother to do the analysis, we assume that things 
can be figured out —  that we can calculate distances, 
times, sizes, weights; that we can move things around, 
increase or diminish them; that we can connect cause and 
effect, and prove that connection in a way that invalidates 
contending but incorrect explanations. We also extend this 
attitude of calculation about the physical world to the 
psychological world, "weighing" psychological states, but 
being less successful in assigning cause and effect.
Lending Authority to Knowledge
Besides being pervasive in our lives, science gives 
authority to knowledge. By comparison, in the medieval 
Western world, religion gave authority to knowledge. The 
institutions that preserved and transmitted knowledge were 
religious ones, and the arguments that one type of human 
action was to be preferred over another were made from the 
authority of religious scripture as interpreted by the 
Church. This does not mean that everyone was devout, or 
that no one calculated weights and measures, that no one 
made political calculations, or that poetry and song had 
only religious content. What it does mean is the influence 
of religion was inescapable. Religious imagery was the 
dominant symbology; the stages and duties of life were 
defined in terms of the sacraments, from baptism to extreme 
unction, because life was to be directed toward salvation. 
Today, stages of life are marked off physiologically and as 
points on a path of career and family responsibilities. We 
have a multitude of symbols, but the foremost are material 
wealth as a symbol of status and personal achievement, and 
sophisticated technology as a symbol of societal 
advancement. Emphasis is more on fulfillment in this life
than on salvation in the next.
In matters of law and governance, medieval secular and 
religious authority had different jurisdictions, but 
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction in matters of 
heresy —  that is, control over contending knowledge.
Rulers competed politically, just as we have political 
struggle today, and they fought with the pope as well as 
with one another, but they justified their actions or were 
made to answer for them according to the dictates of 
religion, not in the language of politics.8 Not until 
Machiavelli did anyone make a formal and widely publicized 
statement of the argument for coldly calculated personal and 
political power. Merchants traded, and commerce had periods 
of growth and decline, but the guiding economic principle of 
trade was supposed to be the Christian one of "just price," 
or profit limited to the maintenance of the producer's 
status quo. The pursuit of profit itself was considered 
against Christian principles.
Today, science has taken the place of religion as the 
organizing and inescapable force of our modern Western 
and/or industrialized society. Not everyone does science, 
any more than everyone 'did' religion by becoming a monk or 
a nun in medieval society, but everyone is affected by the 
institutions and knowledge of science, as in the medieval 
world everyone was affected by the institutions and faith of
24
religion. The effect of a dominant form of knowledge such 
as science or religion is not evenly distributed across 
society; there are gaps and bumps, valleys and mountains in 
the terrain of its influence. Other types of knowledge are 
always present, to contend with the dominant form in varying 
degrees of success or non-success.
The power of science to lend authority has two major 
bases: one is its institutional presence and power; the 
other is its epistemological claim to objectivity. Science 
owns facts, and facts are to us as the words of the Bible 
were to the medieval world —  they are treated as 
foundations of formal knowledge. (Whether they are 
foundational or not is another question.) We can 
distinguish formal knowledge —  the knowledge we are given 
formal instruction in, are educated to —  from personal 
knowledge, the knowledge we gain from our experience of 
life, which cannot easily be articulated or put into a 
formal statement. Science could also be part of our 
personal knowledge, if we are scientists, but will not 
necessarily be so.9
Analyzing Knowledge across History
Grouping historical periods and knowledge in this broad
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way —  medieval and religious, modern and scientific —  is 
an exercise in making categories that can never entirely fit 
events. The medieval world, the modern (post-Renaissance) 
world, our contemporary world (sometimes called post-modern) 
are constructs that help us see difference and change across 
time, but they are imperfect because they cannot fit the 
variety of human life and thought that is always present. 
These historical eras are ideal types, specifications of 
major characteristics which can mark off categories of 
things, but which are never all matched by the examples 
picked to exemplify the category. Max Weber is famous in 
sociology for his use of the ideal type as a way to analyze 
"the market", or "bureaucracy” , neither of which exist in 
their pure form. Also, social scientists disagree on what 
that pure form could be, on what characteristics should 
define the ideal type of the market or of many other 
elements of society and economy.
But the social sciences are not the only place where
ideal types are found. Clothing sizes are a very mundane 
example of the ideal type: they are a perfect fit for no one 
but an imaginary person, but a good general fit for 
different real people; some of the specifications overlap 
from one category (size) to another? and one manufacturer's
size will have different characteristics from another
manufacturer's size with the same name or number. Michael
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Landmann has called Weber's ideal type an intellectual 
picture that unifies historical events in a 
"contradictionless universe of context."10 This analytical 
requirement of a contradictionless context should be kept 
well in mind not only for the ideal types of historical 
eras, but for the other ideal types presented here —  
dominant forms of knowledge. Contradictionless contexts do 
not really exist in the course of history, or in the 
development of knowledge, or in ways of thinking.
When it comes to the classification and study of 
knowledge, the contradictions that are in question, of 
course, are the ones that are interior to a category —  
within the category of science or within the category of 
religion or of politics; the contradictions between such 
ideal types as science and religion are already clear. In 
fact, specifying the contradictory opposition is part of the 
idealization of types. But contradictions within categories 
cast doubt on whether the category is meaningful.11 
"Bureaucracy" is not just rational and efficient by virtue 
of its purpose and structure (as in its ideal type), it is 
also irrationally hampered by those same rules and form of 
organization. Thus, some analysts reject ideal types, and 
those who accept them argue over their contents.
All classification is for a purpose, and different 
systems of classification serve different purposes. The
purpose here is to understand our Western worldview, and to 
see how it has moved from one central concern to another. 
The attempt is to categorize broad and general ways of 
thinking that are both a response to and an influence on 
events in society at a given time. This sociological 
version of intellectual history connects ideas to social 
groupings, to life experiences in the context of social 
organization. At a time when the Western worldview is 
increasingly recognized as partial, it becomes increasingly 
important to understand what that partiality is, how it 
changes, and what it derives, from. Without such an 
analysis, we are left with descriptions of the Western 
worldview as either ethnocentric prejudice or sublime 
humanism. To the argument that there are not worldviews, 
this analysis responds that there are, and that despite the 
diversity and contradictory views present in any society, 
there is an arena of public discourse in which central 
concerns are evident.
Science as the Power to Legitimate
That science and its effects, including its associated 
technology, are a matter of central concern for us can be 
seen in the news, in political debate, in academic analyses,
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in change in the workplace, in health care, in calculations 
of advantage and disadvantage in the global economy, and 
with pressing urgency in matters of the environment.
Science dominates our society epistemologically and 
institutionally.12
As a way of thinking, science is especially linked to 
facts, or to claims of objectivity. By claiming knowledge 
that can be universally validated, science makes a claim on 
truth. Science becomes identified with truth, and in a 
complementary process, truth becomes identified with 
science, so that for a thing to be true, it must be 
scientific. For individuals in a scientific society, 
personal truths about the meaning of life are still true, 
but they are not provable in the way that scientific truth 
is. This is the epistemological power of science, a power 
advantage in claiming ownership to the most certain and 
stable ground for knowledge.
The institutional power of science is its integration 
into education, government and business, and its presence in 
the media and in the consumer marketplace. Although a 
convincing argument can be made that the educational system 
in the United States does not give the majority of high 
school students an adequate understanding of scientific 
reasoning,13 and that too few college students major in 
scientific fields, science is firmly in place in the
institutional structure of education. Though bachelor's 
degrees granted in the natural sciences, math, and 
engineering together hovered around just 16%-18% of all 
B.A.s in the 1980s,14 these fields of study get a primary 
share of resources at the college and university level. In 
the 1980s, about 60% of all federal aid to universities and 
colleges was for support of science and engineering. More 
specifically, federal financial support for research and 
development is heavily weighted toward the natural sciences, 
particularly the life sciences, which received approximately 
50% or more of such aid in the 1980s. Physical sciences, 
environmental sciences, and mathematics received 
approximately 25%, and engineering 15% or more, usually 
leaving less than 10% for the social sciences (including 
history), psychology, and "other sciences."15
In government, the allocation of federal money to 
scientific projects is a major annual budget exercise in the 
United States Congress, involving tens of billions of 
dollars committed over periods of many years.16 Science is 
integrated into business as research and development, as 
technology in manufacturing and in end product, and as the 
scientific approach of systems management. Science has 
media presence. Major metropolitan daily newspapers report 
daily on medical technology, or military technology, or 
manufacturing technology, or on environmental problems
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either traceable to scientific advances, or to be solved by 
scientific advances, or both. Twenty of the top one hundred 
daily newspapers (highest circulation) in the United States 
have weekly science sections of two to eight pages; The New 
York Times, one of the highest-circulation papers, averages 
12 pages in its weekly science section.17 Television makes 
a superior medium for the popularization of science because 
it can show physical change —  the stuff of science —  with 
all its movement, color and sound. It displays particle 
traces, distant nebulae, gives us the eye of a microscope to 
make journeys through the human body, shows the unfolding of 
a flower or the development of storm clouds in seconds of 
compressed time —  in short, offers visual "proof" of the 
factuality of science. Science saturates the consumer 
marketplace: the availability of computers, VCRs, CDs, video 
cameras, technologically sophisticated toys,18 fast-acting 
medicines, birth-control pills and home pregnancy tests 
immerses consumers in a world of scientific knowledge and 
its technological expression.
Both what we call "science" and what we call 
"technology" are evident in these examples. Although they 
may be reasonably distinguished from each other, they have 
become one thing in effects on our lives. The are also 
united by the interplay between them. Technology is not 
just the outcome of science, it also reacts back on science
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and affects the direction of scientific research, or shapes 
it in the first place.19 "Science and technology" has 
become one thing, although some scientists or public policy 
advisers still want to separate the two, sometimes to 
distinguish basic or pure research from applied research, 
sometimes to refute the assertion that science is 
responsible for its technological outcomes.20
To speak of "science" (or of "technology") is like 
speaking of "government" or "education" —  the word becomes 
the subject of a sentence, as if it were a unitary actor. 
"Science has brought us progress," "Science has led to 
destruction of the environment" are sentences like 
"Government must find a way to balance military and social 
needs," "Education is failing to prepare students for 
skilled jobs." In reality, the government is not a single 
actor, as the subject is in the sentence, "Joe must find a 
way to balance his budget." And science is not a single 
actor, either (inclusive of technology or not). This kind 
of grammatical construction is unavoidable; it is part of 
the "ideal typing" we do all the time in order to be able to 
speak of things. If we don't gather common though varied 
characteristics of a thing together in one word, we can't 
proceed with speech or thought.21
Similarly, in this analysis of science as a form of 
thought, I am gathering common characteristics together, and
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I will speak of science as if it were some abstract thing 
that has a self-existence and the power to act on us. While 
it often seems that that is the case, I am not claiming that 
"science" exists like a Greek god dwelling on a mountain, or 
that like electromagnetism in our physical world, it is an 
invisible but actual and actively felt force. I do not wish 
to reify science, to "thingify" it, but this tendency of 
speech and thought is unavoidable in ordinary language.22
The dual strength of science —  institutional and 
epistemological —  gives it the power to legitimate social 
and political action. Before government makes decisions on 
social policy, it requires scientific surveys of social 
problems. Whether undertaken by government or industry, the 
damming of rivers, the mining of land, the regulation of 
deep-sea fishing, all require scientifc validation of the 
actions proposed or taken. The same is true of the 
acceptability of new drugs, of potentially hazardous 
manaufacturing processes, of military defense technology, of 
agricultural techniques, and of innumerable other projects 
affecting our present and future. Science legitimates 
action epistemologically by associating it with truth, with 
the facts of the matter, and institutionally by being 
integrated into society's organization of knowledge- 
gathering and decision making.
The concept of epistemological legitimation that I am
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using is akin to the concept of a philosophical basis of 
legitimacy for the course taken by a society in a given era, 
examined by Hans Blumenberg. The legitimacy concept turns 
around the question of whether the modern age in the West is 
only a secularized version of the earlier Christian 
religious age (with philosophical premises that are stolen 
and distorted to fit concerns that are material rather than 
spiritual), or instead, has its own, legitimate 
(Enlightenment) basis for its political culture.23 There 
is another sense in which "legitimation" is used, more 
common in American social sciences, to refer to the 
legitimizing of state power by establishing conditions of 
consent among citizens of the state. Both concepts refer to 
the political course of society, but one examines the 
techniques of politics and another examines the 
philosophical basis of what we would call politics and 
ideology.
When I say that we have shifted from the notion of a 
just society to the notion of a scientific society as 
central to our debates over what is the right course of 
social and political action, I am proposing a perspective 
related to Blumenberg's (which is that there has been a 
genuine and philosophically sound change), but I am not 
discussing the "legitimacy" of our age. Rather, I am 
discussing conceptual frameworks that organize
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understanding, and I am convinced that this "conceptual 
shift" is the wider meaning of the centrality of science to 
much public debate.
How Should Science 'Be* in Society?
Science and technology have contributed a new level of 
comfort, security, and longevity to human life. At the same 
time, they have presented humanity with a host of problems 
associated with the ability of our technological domination 
of nature to outrun our understanding of nature. Now we are 
faced with air pollution, water pollution, ozone layer 
depletion, greenhouse warming, rainforest destruction and 
consequent species and oxygen loss, hazardous chemicals in 
the workplace, the threat of nuclear destruction or 
radiation contamination by accident, groundwater depletion, 
the vulnerability of single crops produced on a massive 
scale to destruction by pests or disease, problems of 
accelerating population growth, species extinction, and many 
other environmental abuses and imbalances.
In addition, we face ethical issues for which we cannot 
find the grounds of decision in our scientific worldview: 
medical technology that prolongs life beyond any quality or 
desirability; manipulation of the genetic instructions that
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govern human, animal and plant growth; the use of animals in 
"scientific" research that benefits only an industry based 
on the luxury needs of consumers (cosmetics); the control of 
behavior through psychoactive drugs, and the identification 
of individuals at behavioral "risk" by analysis of 
neurochemical brain function; intervention in fetal 
development, whether by an abortion pill or by corrective 
surgery (and the attendant issues of who shall have access 
to these interventions); and, not least, the seemingly 
insurmountable gap between the science-and-technology rich 
nations and the poor ones, between starving peoples and 
people overwhelmed by choice of foods in semi-automated 
supermarkets.
None of these problems, particularly the last, can be 
laid at the feet of science alone, but they are, unarguably, 
one of its outcomes —  even the gap betwen rich and poor is 
tied in with a dominatory use of natural resources in which 
the "industry of science" has been prominent. Engaging in 
such use exploits nature without accepting responsibility 
for long term consequences in the natural world, and affects 
the economic future of many of the world's people while 
denying the interaction of science with politics.24 Both 
scientific and political institutions are relatively weak in 
mechanisms for taking responsibility for long term 
consequences of scientific research and technological
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developments. Western scientific thinking itself has been 
critically analyzed as historically permeated with a 
dominatory bias.25
Science is not free of the culture it grows up in; it 
is not only materially constrained or aided by that culture, 
it is epistemologically structured with its elements. Since 
no form of knowledge is everywhere and at all times the 
same, it is as true that ecologically conscious and humanly 
responsible attitudes can be located in the scientific 
tradition as ecologically blind and humanly irresponsible 
ones can. These interior-to-science contradictions in 
attitudes toward the object of scientific study clearly 
exist; what is at issue is which attitudes have held sway, 
and whether a dominatory approach to nature and persons is 
inherent in the scientific worldview that we are heir to.
The (feminist) charge that Western science shares the 
(masculinist) bias of Western culture toward analysis and 
dominatory control is based on a reinterpretation of texts 
and historical events which opposes the abstraction that 
presents science only as an ideal type, science as objective 
and neutral in a realm separate from historical and cultural 
processes. To the picture of what science should be is 
opposed a record of what science has been.26
The existence of interlocked problems arising from 
scientific knowledge and technological development, and the
threat of overwhelming environmental damage that could end, 
forever, human life, has resulted in serious questioning of 
how science should 'be' in society. Should it be a special 
endeavor, with a legally and politically protected autonomy? 
Then, goes the argument, it can do the pure research it 
requires for true knowledge, without having to answer to 
popular pressure for better drugs or better brains, or to 
government pressure for better missiles and remote spying 
techniques. Or should science instead be directed toward 
specific social goals, so that it does not produce a 
plethora of unplanned and unintended consequences which 
endanger our health and survival? This issue of how science 
should 'be' in our society will increasingly dominate our 
public concerns.
Changing Knowledge
The turn from pre-scientific to scientific knowledge is 
our primary example of a change in knowledge.27 Why did 
this change occur, and why did it happen when (approximately 
the 17th century) and where (Europe) it did? This is one of 
the great questions of intellectual history, and it is not 
yet answered.
Knowledge is not simply idea-driven; it is rooted in
conditions of life. While we can trace the influence of one 
idea upon another, this does not give a complete picture of 
the development of knowledge. Knowledge has material 
conditions, and this is true of intellectual knowledge and 
abstract ideas as well as of practical knowledge of how to 
do things. By intellectual knowledge I mean knowledge that 
is speculative, self-aware, and not necessarily tied to 
utilitarian purposes. One of the conditions of intellectual 
knowledge is that thinkers have time to engage in it, and 
the opportunity and means to communicate with one another. 
This condition can be met at very simple levels of material 
development, so long as not all of available time is spent 
at survival activities, and people regularly come together 
to talk. For this condition, the thinker in a village of 
hunter-gatherers can have an advantage over the modern urban 
worker who holds two jobs and has no extra time. But at 
some point, an intellectual and speculative development of 
knowledge requires written communication, which allows rapid 
transfer of ideas among a large and differentiated number of 
people, gives the opportunity to compare different accounts 
at the same time, allows accurate translation, and can put 
diagrams, pictures, and mathematical formula alongside 
words. In medieval Europe, this need was first met with 
manuscripts (as it had been in earlier centuries); the use 
of the printing press after the mid-15th century quickly
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increased the circulation of texts, and was a major factor 
in the expansion of knowledge.
The invention of the printing press was in turn 
something that required town life to support it, and towns 
required agricultural surpluses as well as relatively 
complex systems of commerce, law and government. A money 
economy and mercantilism encouraged exploration and travel 
for the increase of national wealth through trade. 
Exploration of the new world, and the navigational needs 
that went with it encouraged technological developments. 
Trade with the Arab world and the East brought with it new 
ideas. Capitalism and free markets were a spur to 
technological development in pursuit of profit, and 
technology gave impetus to scientific theories. All of 
these material conditions contributed to the devlopment of 
science. Whether or not they are all necessary 
preconditions is still being argued. But it is clear that
science requires a certain space in which to operate,
certain forms of social organization, and institutions of
support —  it is not a development of ideas alone. Yet
knowledge is also not just materially driven, and the 
development of scientific reasoning and the emphasis on 
objective knowledge based on observation, measurement and 
test of physical phenomena, and directed toward prediction 
and control, has had many twists and turns in Western
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thought (including influences from outside the West) since 
the Greek philosophers first speculated on the fundamental 
constitutents of matter.28
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1. For more on this comparison, see Roland N. Stromberg, An 
Intellectual History of Modern Europe (New York: Appleton- 
Century-Crofts, 1966), Suggested Reading for Chapters
1 and 2.
2. Science-influenced understanding is not the same as 
being able to reason scientifically, nor is it necessarily 
knowledge of scientific findings. Surveys of U.S., British, 
and Japanese citizens have shown considerable unevenness in 
scientific literacy, but in none of these countries is it at 
much more than minimal levels by the terms of the surveys. 
However, this type of literacy is not what is meant here by 
having a science-influenced understanding or scientific 
attitude. It is instead the more general belief that 
science can understand the world, and that benefits of 
science outweigh the costs. The same surveys that find low 
scientific literacy find that this belief is present.
For U.S. and British surveys, see National Science 
Board. Science and Engineering Indicators - 1989 (NSB 89-1). 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
(NS 1.40) for summaries and further references. For 
comparisons of the U.S. and Japan, see Science and 
Engineering Indicators - 1987.
3. For the relationship of our current ideas of society to 
the 18th century, see entry under "society" in Raymond 
Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
4.4. The 17th and 18th century concept of natural and 
inalienable rights of individuals, with the state having the 
function of safeguarding these rights but not owning them 
(Locke and the philosophes), though attacked by other 
thinkers then and since, still exerts a strong pull in the 
popular demand for "democracy" —  in the established 
democracies of Western Europe, in Eastern Europe and the 
USSR as shown by the recent changes on government, and in 
China as shown by student protest. This widespread 
insistence on basic rights is briefly discussed by Burns H. 
Weston in the entry "Human Rights" in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. 15th edition, Vol. 20, pp. 714-717 (Chicago: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1987). Also see, in the same 
edition of the Encyclopedia, the entry "Philosophy, The
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History of Western” (section on "Modern Philosophy" by 
Albert William Levi), Vol. 2, p.762 ("Social and political 
philosophy") for the political problem of the Enlightenment 
as the revolt against injustice.
5. This common educated understanding of science is so 
taken for granted that it is hard to find any specific, 
condensed discussion of it. Science textbooks do not bother 
to spell it out. Philosophies of science debate or support 
this understanding, but do not provide any synopsis of it, 
instead going right to the details. I was suprised to find 
that among my many books on science, I could find no simple 
statement about observation, experiment, and verification.
6. For recent critiques of scientific objectivity, see: 
Gernot Bohrae and Nico Stehr, eds., The Knowledge Society;
The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social 
Relations (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1986); Martin 
Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); Karin Knorr-Cetina and 
Michael Mulkay, eds., Science Observed (Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage, 1983) ; Stephen Toulmin, "The Construal of Reality: 
Criticism in Modern and Postmodern Science" in The Politics 
of Interpretation, edited by W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983) Alan Chalmers discusses 
the arguments about science in Science and Its Fabrication 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990). Steven 
Yearly provides a review of critiques, particularly by 
British scholars, in Science. Technology, and Social Change 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
7. Progressive knowledge, and the contemporary age as most 
advanced, is a concept often traced to the Enlightenment.
In a sentence I read long ago and can no longer locate, a 
concise author said that The Enlightenment (or 18th century) 
was the first era to conceptualize itself in terms of 
thought. It is this kind of self conscious knowledge that 
its owners see as in advance of previous forms. Hans 
Blumenberg discusses a similar idea in The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Aae (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 1983); see (for brief 
comments) p.97, pp. 462-63.
8.6. In hindsight, we can see much of the history of the 
middle ages as a sparring between religious authority and 
secular politics, but this is a theoretical distinction made 
in our time, not in theirs. The 11th century provides an 
example of the weight given to religion. Holy Roman Emperor 
Henry IV (1056-1106) contested Pope Gregory VII's (1073- 
1085) ending of lay investiture of bishops, i.e., 
appointment of bishops by the emperor, who also granted them
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land and the equivalent status of nobles if they did not 
already have it, and thus gained their allegiance. Henry 
called a council of German bishops to depose Gregory;
Gregory responded by excommunicating the emperor and 
absolving his subject nobles (and bishops) from allegiance 
to him. Henry made penance, standing barefoot in the snow 
at the gates of the pope's residence in the Apennines. If 
Gregory were to refuse absolution to Henry, the emperor 
would be successfully deposed, but the pope's spiritual 
authority would be undermined by his failure in the priestly 
duty of absolving the penitent. Gregory absolved Henry, and 
the struggle between pope and emperor continued.
This event is presented as a dilemma for Gregory by 
Gerald Kurland in Western Civilization I (New York: Monarch 
Press, 1971), pp.134-36. But James Viscount Bryce in The 
Holv Roman Empire, a 19th-century history, views Henry's 
penance as an abasement of the crown, since it confirmed the 
pope, rather than the emperor, as the "highest power on 
earth, created by and answerable to God alone." (London: 
Macmillan, 1961; reprint of 1904 - 5th - edn., pp.154-63).
9. On scientific practice as personal knowledge, see 
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962).
10. My lecture notes for the course "Philosophical 
Foundations of the Social Sciences," New School Graduate 
Faculty, New York, 5/7/83. The complexities of typifying 
the aspect of knowledge that we call reason are examined in 
Michael Landmann, Alienatorv Reason (Normal, IL: Applied 
Literature Press, 1978).
11. Doubt over internal contradictions arises under the 
strictures of Aristotelian formal logic. If the dialectical 
logic of "unity and struggle of opposites" is accepted, 
internal contradictions are a matter of course.
12. For an analysis of the interaction between these two 
bases of scientific hegemony, see Stanley Aronowitz, Science 
as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society 
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and government decision-making. The way in which science 
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technical division of labor. The 'objectivity' of science 
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16. William J. Broad, "Heavy Costs of Major Projects Pose a 
Threat to Basic Science," The New York Times. 5/27/90, p.l: 
"New projects now planned for completion in the 1990's will 
cost more than $60 billion to build. More than $100 billion 
will be needed to operate the instruments over their 
lifetimes...." These projects include the space stations 
($30 billion to build); the human genome project ($3 
billion); Saturn and Mars probes, and a comet rendezvous 
($2.1 billion); earth-orbiting satellites —  EOS and 
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accelerator ($8.7 billion); an advanced photon source, an 
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($665 million).
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"biology's first foray into big-ticket science"), p.Cl; 
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19. As argued by Robert Merton, the commercial need for 
improved technological devices for navigation was a major 
influence on the direction of development of 17th-century 
science in England. Science, Technology and Society in 
Seventeenth-Centurv England (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970. 
Orig. pub. 1938 in Osiris, vol. 4, Pt. 2) . Derek de Solla 
Price asserts that the growth of science follows technology, 
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philosophies of science, in the analysis of Anne L. Hiskes 
and Richard P. Hiskes, Science. Technology and Policy 
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Logical empiricism emphasizes objective knowledge and 
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social forces implied by technological goals. The new 
philosophy of science (since the 1960s) takes the 
historically supported view that science has never been 
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scientists when they want "'to get money', 'to get out of 
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Science. Technology and Public Policy (Washington, DC: CQ 
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For Durkheim, common understanding or shared 
intellectual and emotional representations of the world are 
the sine qua non of social life. At the level of 
conceptions about time, space, cause, number, etc., meaning 
is not continually negotiated, as in Garfinkel's analysis,
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but at the level of totem and symbol it is the outcome of 
social interaction.
Moscovici takes Durkheim's collective representations 
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unidentified a social identity.
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outline of the notion of domination are difficult to see in 
the book without that context, which now must be 
reconstructed around several diverse essays whose meaning 
was further developed in intellectual discussion following 
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which he considered the final achievement of "positive" 
knowledge. Scheler (first to use the term "sociology of 
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classifications of knowledge by form or type, but did not 
develop a systematic sociology of knowledge.
28. For a comprehensive history of the development of 
science and scientfic reasoning, see Sir William Cecil 
Dampier, A History of Science and Its Relations with 
Philosophy and Religion (London: Cambridge University Press, 




The previous chapter discussed science as a dominant form of 
knowledge and the shift in Western society from a political 
attitude to a scientific attitude, with the attendant 
question of how science should 'be' in society. This 
chapter continues the discussion of change in knowledge and 
understanding, with the environmental movement as an example 
of a social and historical condition to which scientific 
knowledge is essential.
The Environmental Movement
The environmental movement is now visible to the point 
of being ordinary. At the same time, however, the movement 
signifies a major change taking place in how we 
conceptualize the economy, the state, and the individual. 
This conceptual change is a subject for the sociology of 
knowledge, which has, from its beginnings, concerned itself 
with the relationship between knowledge and politics.
The environmental movement encompasses a wide variety 
of groups whose two basic purposes are to defend the 
environment against degradation and to defend human beings 
against the health-threatening or life-threatening effects 
of the technological disruption of the natural world.
Damage to environment and humans is seen, by critical 
environmentalists, as the outcome of rampant technology, or 
of the dominatory purposes of science, or of the ideology of 
economic growth, or all of these. Yet, not all 
environmentally concerned voices are critical in this way, 
and from Earth First! monkey-wrenchers who have spiked trees 
so that they will be useless for lumber to scientists 
observing minute interactions in natural environments, the 
movement is so broad that it is hard to say what it is.
The breadth of the environmental movement, the 
complexity of environmental problems, and the relative 
newness of the political presence of environmentalism has 
resulted in opposed evaluations of the political character 
of the movement. Some see it as left, others as at least 
partially right, while still others say that left/right 
definitions cannot be made to fit.1 The movement is 
conservative in its Nature philosophy (which is tinged with 
conservative 19th-century thought) and in its emphasis on 
local control; it is radical in its reguirement, explicit or 
implicit, for economic restructuring. This problem of
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definition is an interesting problem for the sociology of 
knowledge, because it indicates the failure of a general 
framework of thought in modern society —  a framework into 
which the left/right opposition fits. That failure in turn 
indicates the occurence of a "conceptual shift" in our 
collective approach to explaining our society to ourselves. 
It is not just that the complexity and newness of the 
environmental phenomenon make it difficult to classify; it 
is that the framework that we are accustomed to using for 
classification lacks the elements for a proper fit to the 
issues. To understand conflicting interests in society we 
have long used a political framework; politics has been the 
center of this discourse. But for some time, a new center 
of discourse has been emerging, and has now taken a central 
place: that center is science.2 With this new center, the 
old left/right polarity no longer works to explain or 
classify many social and political developments. As a 
result, we lack a simple and commonly accepted analytical 
framework for evaluating these developments or for acting on 
them.
We often turn to the use of left and right labels for a 
quick and simple explanation of where a group or idea fits 
on the current scene. If you ask whether environmentalists 
(or any particular group of them) are conservative or 
liberal, you are assuming these terms can fit their
52
concerns. But conservative/liberal or right/left labels 
grew up along with a particular concept of politics, or 
rather, a group of concepts forming a framework, which no 
longer fits the facts of a world of environmental problems 
linked to scientific and technological developments.
Conservative and Liberal Political Philosophies
The political framework which encompasses the 
conservative/liberal terminology dates from the 18th 
century, and was further developed in the 19th century. It 
incorporates a relationship between citizen and state, and a 
balancing of rights and responsibilities based on some 
philosophy of the nature of man. Men (and we must note that 
women were left out of these political philosophies) are 
either individuals of a universal, generic type with 
inalienable rights and the rational capacity to steer a 
course toward liberty (liberalism); or they are particular 
individuals, localized and without universal rights —  
although with rights established by local custom —  
requiring the boundaries of community or nation to contain 
their irrationality as well as to assure them benefits 
(conservatism).
The right and left political categorization can be
looked at in several ways. One way is to define the content 
of their respective political philosophies. Another is to 
identify their social context: who is it that is left, and 
who right?3 Here I only consider philosophies. The terms 
conservative/liberal and right/left are not an exact match, 
especially in the European context, but they are often used 
interchangeably. These terms are tied to concepts whose 
origins are in historical developments that have been 
superseded. The terms shift in meaning, and they differ 
between Europe and the United States.
To the classical, 19th-century form of conservatism, 
with its emphasis on tradition, institutions, and the 
establishment has been added, in the 20th century, support 
for the free market and capitalism, along with opposition to 
state intervention and public expenditure. To the 
classical, 19th century form of liberalism, with its 
emphasis on freedom, individual rights, and limited 
government has been added, in the 20th century, an agenda 
for social justice and support for the welfare state. As a 
result of these additions, the classical British liberal has 
his equivalent in the modern-day American conservative. As 
one dictionary puts it, in the United States, progressives 
(that is, those in favor of the welfare state) "have 
captured the 'liberal' label, and the older liberals are now 
called 'conservatives'."4 Another dictionary says of
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liberalism that "a term that meant small government and low 
taxation in the last century has in this century come to 
mean big government and high taxation."5
Obviously, conservative/liberal terminology is not 
fixed in meaning, and it changes over time. In general, 
yesterday's liberals are today's conservatives, sometimes 
called neo-conservatives (and occasionally called paleo- 
liberals). Today's liberals are sometimes called neo­
liberals, to distinguish them from those liberal forerunners 
who would not accept a welfare state. A simpler way of 
keeping this straight is that today's liberals like to think 
of themselves as for social justice, while today's 
conservatives like to think of themselves as for the freedom 
of the individual from interference by the state. But what 
has not changed as characteristically conservative or 
liberal is the respective concept of human nature. If 
you're a conservative, whether neo or old-fashioned, you 
doubt the perfectability of human nature? if you're a 
liberal, paleo or neo, you take it that altering people's 
circumstances alters their behavior.
Human Nature
Human nature is a basic component of the political-
thought framework of the conservative/liberal terminology. 
Philosophically, for both, human nature determines the best 
arrangement for governance. For liberals, human nature is 
basically good, or at least not fundamentally flawed; it has 
a universal character not conditioned by time or place; all 
men (ideally all people but in originally in effect all 
property-owning males) are equally endowed with basic rights 
to life and liberty, and these rights can be vested only in 
individuals, not in the state; human will and reason can 
shape human destiny; social evils arise out of the structure 
of society, not out of human nature. Thus, government is to 
be by consent of the governed, and —  for classical liberals 
—  that government is best which governs least. Government 
is not a natural development; it is a contractual 
arrangement.
For conservatives, human nature is essentially flawed, 
or at least unavoidably irrational some of the time, and the 
problems arising from the limitations of this nature can 
only be ameliorated, not abolished. We are to be skeptical 
about the perfectability of society through the application 
of human will and reason. There is nothing in humans or in 
human nature which gives grounds for the belief in universal 
equality. Liberty does not exist as an abstract right, but 
only as the hard-won gain of many generations of human 
experience, preserved in traditions and institutions which
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are necessarily local, not universal. Thus tradition, and 
traditional rulers and institutions, are to be respected and 
not overthrown by revolution, which will only leave room for 
new excesses of irrationality. Government should be limited 
in its extent, but not limited by popular sovereignty, since 
this gives room to the irrationality of the passions of the 
moment. Limits on government should be by rule of law which 
is itself a repository of custom, or practices proved worthy 
over time. The institutions of the state are an organic 
development; attempts to design government according to 
abstract and universal principles (such as liberty and 
equality) are only "Utopian blueprints" which have no basis 
in empirical reality.6
The social psychologist Serge Moscovici has summed up 
the differences between left and right explanations of the 
reasons for social phenomena by saying that personality is a 
right-wing explanation; situational causality is a left-wing 
explanation.7
Frameworks
Does this political philosophy have anything to do with 
a world of environmental problems linked to science and 
technology? I have gone into some detail over the
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philosophical content of conservatism and liberalism in 
order to show that there is a framework of linked ideas for 
political philosophy, each idea depending for meaning on 
several others. The distinctions made between conservative 
and liberal, or between right and left, are part of a 
framework of understanding for politics that is different 
from the framework of understanding that we increasingly 
apply to environmental problems. This other framework is 
the one that we have for science. The lack of fit between 
these two frameworks —  political and scientific —  makes 
left/right distinctions inapplicable to many (if not most) 
scientific and technological issues, even though science and 
politics are inseparably connected in modern life.
The political framework has four main elements: the 
state, the citizen, human nature, and the economy. In the 
framework, state and citizen are linked by rights and 
obligations; the nature of this relationship is determined 
by human nature. The economy flanks state and citizen. The 
economy supports the state, and the state safeguards, at 
least minimally, the economy. You are a citizen in respect 
to the state, but an individual in respect to the economy,
i.e., on your own.8 This framework holds for both 
conservative and liberal. Other relationships can be 
specified, and excluded non-citizens noted, but they are 
left out of the basic framework.
58
This framework is not meant to be an accurate 
representation of how politics works in society. It is not a 
working diagram for social and political engineers; it is a 
conceptual framework for thinking about politics and 
society, for handling information, for making sense of 
events. The relationship of its elements has been theorized 
at high levels, but the framework also has its place in 
common understanding. Many elements are left out; the 
framework is simplified for the purpose of being able to 
deal with many variants. I am proposing this framework both 
as an analytical tool, to help us see a change that is 
occuring in our society; and as a model of how, as members 
of our society, we actually do understand it. In the latter 
sense, it is kind of a cognitive prototype. Like the 
prototypical mental chair that allows us to recognize both 
Barcaloungers and folding metal chairs as chairs, it allows 
us to recognize many kinds of societal phenomena as variants 
of a familiar political and economic form.
In the framework that I see developing for thinking 
about science in society, science occupies the place that 
the state does in the political framework. Then, instead of 
the citizen, there is the utilizer or passive recipient of 
science. This includes utilizers of scientific method as 
well as users of the products of science. Instead of human 
nature, there is the natural world; and again, there is the
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economy.
The rights and obligations between science and 
utilizer/recipient are yet to be worked out, so the relation 
is not yet established (unlike the relation between state 
and citizen). The natural world does not determine 
obligations between science and its recipients as human 
nature does for state and citizen. Instead it determines 
only what science should be (at least in the classical model 
of scientific endeavor). So far, the only obligation 
established for science is to the truth of this natural 
world, and at the highest reaches of science, to truth in 
general, thus truth among human beings. (This obligation of 
science to truth is something like the obligation of the 
Hegelian state to the highest expression of mind.) The 
economy flanks science and its utilizers/recipients as it 
does state and citizen, with technology as mediator. This 
framework for science doesn't have the state or government 
in it. However, once again, what's at the bottom is an 
individual, this time even more on his or her own than in 
the political framework, because, here, no rights and 
obligations are established.
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Note that both these frameworks use ideal types, and 
are also presentations of the way things are conventionally 
said to be, not necessarily the way they actually are. 
Although the state is not in the framework for understanding 
science, there is empirically a relation between them; this 
is a fault in the model we have for thinking about science. 
There are, of course, theories about the relation between 
science and the state (or its expression, government) among 
academics and ordinary citizens, but we still at the same 
time have this contradictory model of an autonomous science.
What has happened is that we have developed a way of 
thinking about science that has left out politics. Use of 
this autonomous-science model means that terms are lacking 
for certain developments. The attempt to use left/right 
labels for many scientific and technological issues doesn't 
work either, because the political-thought framework, for 
historical reasons, doesn't include science.
Environmental Issues
In particular, many commentators have noted that it is 
difficult to classify the environmental movement on the 
whole as left or right, despite left claims by some Greens.
I would say that the issues of environmentalism, as well as
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its activist groups, cannot adequately be captured by the
left/right characterization. Rather, they call for
characterization by a polarity that expresses differences
among various social groups over how science (and its
associated technology) should 'be' in society. This
polarity in its extreme form is autonomous science/servant
science. and the dispute is over what controls, if any,
should be placed on science. Science skeptics doubt that
science can be free of interests. The extreme argument of
skepticism is that, since science serves particular social
goals anyway (military and industrial, for example), we
should straightforwardly direct it toward human benefit and
ecological balance, and not be taken in by claims for the
need to have scientific autonomy in order to serve
scientific objectivity.
Science and politics are entwined in environmental
issues. For examples, I have taken some newspaper and
magazine reports from the last few years. What follows are
headlines, leads, quotes, or brief summaries.
California growers say "we are not going to let 
the environmental community put an arbitrary 
scientific standard on the chemicals we can 
use.1,9
"rapid changes in global environment caused by 
human activity demand urgent corrective action on 
an international scale"10
The Green Belt tree-planting environmental 
movement headed by Wangari Maathi is labeled 
"subversive" by the Kenya government.11
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"World Lenders Facing Pressure From Ecologists —  
Activists Urge Banks to Halt Harmful Projects."12
"Ivory Trade Is Banned To Save the Elephant"13
"U.S. Court Says Industry Polluters Should Pay 
Full Environmental Cost"34
A mothers' group in East Los Angeles stops a 
planned above-ground oil pipeline that would go 
through their neighborhoods, "bypassing affluent 
white coastal communities."35
"Save the Rain Forests, Eat Ice Cream, Meet Ben" - 
- 40% of profits from Ben & Jerry's Rainforest 
Crunch ice cream will go to rainforest groups.16
"The greening of the church"17
"Does Your Cup of Coffee Cause Forest Fires?"18
"Traditional definitions of national security are 
shaken by global environmental threats."19
Women's group meets at U.N. to plan for "full 
participation by women in environmental policy at 
all levels."20
East German authorities at a huge chemical complex 
say "the region was poisoned willfully in a scheme 
to raise money for the state." Government 
officials refused funds to plant managers for 
antipollution technology, then skimmed off 
millions of dollars worth of fines when the plants 
dumped chemicals into nearby rivers.21
"University's Choice: Stars or Squirrels."
Astronomers are pitted against biologists over 
plans for a mountain-top observatory that would 
endanger a dwindling subspecies of squirrel.22
In these examples, as contending players in the unspecified
relation of science-utilizers and recipients to science as
the fount of truth, we have growers (industry) resisting
environmentalists and "arbitrary" science; mothers against
oil companies which rely on scientific technologies;
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astronomers against biologists. Acting in the field 
established by scientific knowledge, but not included in the 
conceptual framework for it, we have a democratic government 
trying to assess industry for environmental costs; a 
communist government forcing industry both to pollute and to 
pay for polluting. Then, in regard to the free market and 
the nation state, international trade is restricted to save 
the elephant; international action to save the environment 
is said to be urgent; international lenders are called upon 
to help preserve ecological balance; global environmental 
threat makes traditional definitions of national security 
inadequate. Additionally, women are a particular class of 
environmental advocate; savvy businesses and progressive 
churches go "green"; seemingly inconsequential individual 
actions on coffee break have far-reaching, possibly 
disastrous, consequences. (Literary theorists and cultural 
analysts can observe an environmental drama being written in 
these reports.)
At issue here are the reliability and useful —  which 
is to say, timely —  predictive power of scientific 
information about the environment. Also at issue are the 
"ownership" —  if any —  of the natural environment and 
thus of the corresponding rights and obligations concerning 
it; the fact that national boundaries cannot contain 
environmental problems or be manned in defense against them;
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the free market as a threat to ecological stability.
Conservative and Liberal on the Environment
Today's conservative position is that the private 
sector, rather than government, should solve environmental 
problems. In support of this position, conservatives can 
refer back to either classical conservatism for the argument 
that social ills cannot be solved by social engineering 
according to abstract principles, or to classical liberalism 
for the argument that the least government is the best 
government. But neither of these classical notions of 
limited government —  whether limited by conservative 
caution or by liberal insistence on individual liberty —  
specify anything about "rights" of the natural world and 
other species, or about human "obligations" toward nature.
At the same time, each tradition assumes, but does not 
specify, the rights of humans to dominate nature in the very 
way that has led to environmental damage.
"Conservative" and "liberal" used as labels for 
positions on environmental issues are only patches on a 
conceptual framework that no longer works to help us see the 
whole picture in a society shaped by science. They may tell 
us where politicians, corporations, and environmental
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activists stand on the free market, but they don't explain 
the changed relationship of the market to the social and 
political structure when science begins to supplant certain 
functions of the state. These so-called liberal and 
conservative stances on the environment are dependent on a 
political-economic framework of thought. But environmental 
issues go beyond this framework.
Without factoring nature into the equation of rights 
and obligations, how will we determine courses of action to 
maintain a sound environment? Relying on the old equation 
is not enough. What do the liberty and equality of human 
beings have to do with the mountain-dwelling red squirrels 
of the newspaper report cited earlier? What is the value 
and meaning of 'private' property if actions thousands of 
miles away and possibly many years previous in time 
contaminate it —  if it is land, water, crops or livestock? 
Or, if the private property is capital, what value does it 
have if it cannot be invested on the assumption that 
economic growth is, in principle, unlimited?
Can the environmental problem be solved outside of 
government? The conflict between growers and 
environmentalists in California over pesticides could be 
theoretically relegated to civil society, that sphere 
supposedly separate from the state, if it were still 
possible to believe in such a sphere, but state regulations
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and federal farm policy already apply to the farm industry 
there. Yet despite the involvement of the state, the key 
relationship here is not citizen and state, flanked by the 
economy and driven in some way by human nature, but is 
utilizer and passive recipient of science/technology, 
flanked by the economy and constrained by the ecosystem of 
the natural world. The terms conservative and liberal can 
be grafted onto the relationship, but they suggest roles for 
citizen and state that are no longer adequate to the 
situation.
Comparing Frameworks
We can compare frameworks of understanding for the 
California growers versus environmentalists over pesticides. 
In the framework for thinking about science and society, the 
California growers are utilizers of science, and a major 
factor in the economy. Environmentalists are a segment of 
the recipients of science —  in this case of the chemical 
science of pesticides and the rational science of crop 
management —  who are unwilling to be in the position of 
recipient. Science sets standards for safe pesticide use, 
ultimately derived from studies of how the natural world 
works. In the framework for understanding politics and
society, both growers and science-recipients are citizens of 
the state, and individuals in civil society —  producers and 
consumers in the economy. But science is not in the 
traditional political conceptual framework, and its 
standards are not relevant, nor is the condition of the 
natural world a conceivable part of any negotiation of 
rights or powers. Correspondingly, the state is not in the 
science conceptual framework, and scientific standards are 
assumed to be, by those who accept them, rationale enough 
for taking action, and legitimacy enough. Both science 
trusters and science skeptics accept the knowledge claims of 
science, but science skeptics, while referring to science 
for environmentalist arguments, are not willing to separate 
science from special interests, power alignments, or 
ideology.
Accepting the claims of science as the most valid 
report on reality shifts players to another framework from 
the familiar political one, whether they are critics of the 
current uses of that science, or proponents of it. The 
claims that global changes in the environment require 
international action; the reports that world lenders face 
pressure from ecologists; the labeling of a tree-planting 
movement as subversive; the banning of the ivory trade to 
save the elephant —  all occur within a conceptual frame in 
which science tells the truth about nature, and we are all
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recipients of this information, with the need or obligation 
to respond to it, rather than primarily citizens responsible 
to different nation states.
A U.S. court's judgment that polluters must pay 
exemplifies the complexities of the cross-overs between 
science, politics, and the economy. In a challenge to rules 
formulated by the U.S. Department of the Interior as its 
interpretation of environmental laws passed in Congress, a 
federal appeals court concluded that the restitution that 
should be made by an industry which has polluted the 
environment extends to restoring the environment to its pre­
polluted condition, not just to paying the market value of 
damaged natural resources. In the case of the Valdez oil 
spill, for example, Exxon would not just pay the market 
value of seal pelts damaged by oil, but would also be 
liable, perhaps, for the deaths of sea birds with no 
commercial value (presumably having to somehow pay or 
arrange for their replacement),Z3 The court said: "From 
the bald eagle to the blue whale and the snail darter, 
national resources have values that are not fully captured 
by the market system."24
Here is an environmental problem that starts off 
positioned within the traditional political frame but then 
is found to fall outside of it in respect to the economy.
In the political framework, the state, through the
judiciary, partially regulates the economy by the assessment 
of fines upon the violation of some standard. There is a 
considerable body of environmental law developing around 
such issues, but the political framework has to be bent in 
order to fit the issues. Value is not just market value; 
standards are given by science, not by political philosophy 
or economic theory. Restitution is, ultimately, not made to 
individuals or classes, but to Nature. The legitimation for 
social action —  in this case, the action of restitution for 
damage —  comes not primarily from the established rights 
and obligations between citizen and state, but from science 
as the source of truth about our survivability and quality 
of life.
The New Identity of Politics
Because politics is always with us, we can easily go 
along thinking it's still the same politics it always has 
been. All the assumptions that accompanied the formation of 
our idea of politics —  citizen and state, economy and human 
nature —  are in our attempts to understand our political 
situation, but they no longer advance our understanding. 
Instead, these assumptions remain fixed, while reality moves 
ahead. We find it necessary to develop a new framework of
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understanding•
The conceptual shift from the traditional political 
framework to a science-oriented framework does not remove 
politics as an empirical reality. Politics remains in 
place, but it is taking a new identity, an identity in 
relation to science.25 Newly framed environmental issues 
offer evidence that it is now scientific knowledge that 
legitimates much of social action, rather than the concept 
of a just relation between citizen and state.
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WORLDVIEW AND STYLE OF THOUGHT
The previous chapter discussed a "conceptual shift" to 
reliance on scientific legitimation for social action. The 
difficulties of integrating scientific and political 
concepts were briefly considered. This chapter considers 
how the arguments about science and society can be examined 
using the concepts and methods of Mannheim's sociology of 
knowledge. A central concept is "style of thought." The 
concept does not stand alone, but is part of a theory of 
knowledge as socially situated. The categories of this 
theory are discussed below.
Knowledge and Traditions
One of the sources of knowledge is tradition —  not the 
traditional practices that are quaintly old-fashioned, but 
the ways of living, economically and socially based, that 
are reproduced with each generation and that influence 
outlook on life. Not just what is known, but what is
considered worth knowing, what counts as knowledge, and how 
to go about becoming knowledgeable —  these are passed on as 
information, practices and attitudes from one generation to 
the next, or from old hands to newcomers.1 It is not just 
aristocracy or gentry who have such traditions; all social 
groups have them, and the groups need not be descended 
through family relationships. Even when the original social 
and economic conditions that strongly supported a way of 
life are weakened by change, the older complex of 
information, practices and attitudes can be maintained in 
modified form. Certain beliefs may have to be held 
underground, or in determined resistance to prevailing 
currents of opinion and political realities, but they do not 
disappear. Democratic convictions are held by subjects of 
dictatorships; racist convictions are held by citizens of 
equality-affirming democracies; creationist convictions are 
held by people in a scientific world who reject the 
evolutionary account of life. All these convictions are 
tied into their respective traditions of outlook on life, 




Another major influence on knowledge is existing 
conditions. It may not be only a tradition of belief in 
democracy that supports democratic convictions in a country 
become a dictatorship, but the oppressive conditions 
themselves that fuel the desire for democracy. Or, on the 
side of acceptance of the status quo rather than resistance 
to it, prosperity and relative class mobility could make 
believers in capitalism out of American workers when their 
European counterparts were turning in large numbers to 
socialism. Tradition and conditions interact, so that the 
same scientific worldview which is adopted by most Americans 
because it is the contemporary one, is exactly what requires 
determined resistance by Americans who have adopted or 
inherited the tradition of religious fundamentalism. As 
deterioration occurs in the natural environment, these 
changed environmental conditions reactivate traditions of a 
desire for emotional harmony with Nature on the one hand, 
while giving rise to rationalist systems of environmental 
management based on new technologies on the other.
Tradition, Conditions, and Styles of Thought
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These twin influences on knowledge and thought -- 
tradition and conditions —  combine in styles of thought, in 
analytical and persuasive arguments that each have their own 
noticeable style because of the concepts they refer to, the 
language they use, and the outlook on life that they 
display. Styles of thought are the intellectual products of 
particular social groups, which can be economic classes, or 
generations, or adherents to a religion, or any other group 
that shares a combination of traditions and conditions which 
acquire vital importance because of the course of events.
The concept of such styles of thought was developed by 
Karl Mannheim, a founder of the sociology of knowledge —  
the study of the connections between groups of people and 
ideas, between societal purpose and intellectual endeavor. 
Mannheim analyzed 19th-century conservative thought as a 
response in opposition to the French Revolution and liberal 
Enlightenment thought. Conservative thought had its social 
base in a landed class threatened by the ideas of the 
revolution. Today, accelerated change in the environment is 
an event that can push various views on the relationship 
between humans and Nature to opposing poles. It can bring 
out an 'environmental' style of thought supported by a 
social group that is positioned to take the change as a
79
threat. Inevitably, such a style of thought must take a 
position on science.
Science as a Center of Contention for Styles of Thought
The question of how science should 'be' in society is 
the issue at the center of many arguments that are intended 
to affect social action, to make something happen or not 
happen which requires concerted effort and commitment by 
private groups, or government agencies, or business and 
industry, or by all sectors. The environment, medical 
technology, energy use, consumer goods, education —  all 
involve the uses of science and the making of choices guided 
by the scientific attitude. There is a spectrum of 
differing arguments concerning science in society, and as 
mentioned in the Introduction, at one extreme are those who 
trust science to take a direction that benefits people and 
planet, while at the other are those who are skeptical of 
its uses and wary of its direction.
The focus on science is particularly evident in the 
environmental debate, and it is just in this area of 
environmental position-taking that the traditional political 
categories of right and left are proving most difficult to 
apply.3 The conservative/liberal polarity applies to
stances taken on the market, and thus to the economics of 
the environment, but not to deeper environmental issues. We 
are at a point where the left-right categorization of public 
debate on issues is often no longer adequate or, in some 
cases applicable at all. It may be that we have a science- 
truster/science-skeptic spectrum developing, because the 
concept-organizing center of much debate is no longer a 
notion of a just society based on contractual agreements and 
philosophical ethics, but is instead the notion of a society 
able to determine its best course through the application of 
science to all its problems. The arguments which legitimize 
action are no longer only about citizen and state, but are 
also about individual and science, and planet and science. 
It's not that we don't argue anymore about the just 
distribution of social good, but that the terms under which 
and by which we argue about those goals have changed. The 
identity of our politics is changing.
Science as Worldview
To some extent, in a society where science is a 
dominant form of thought, we all think scientifically.
Thus, even critics of science will use scientific reasoning 
and scientific findings to support their positions.4
Science as a dominant form of thought is the intellectual 
part of a scientific worldview. Worldview is knowledge and 
attitudes that are organized into an outlook that serves as 
an orienting device in many different situations for the 
individual. That outlook, however, is collectively formed, 
not unique to the individual. It is acquired through 
socialization —  partly through formal education, partly 
through informally received attitudes. With a scientific 
worldview, we view things through scientific eyes, through 
scientific assumptions and habits of thought. We are 
scientific, however, in comparison to a pre-scientific 
time —  in a very general way, not as if we were 
scientifically trained. Along with this intellectual 
predisposition, we have values that are related to science 
(putting a positive value on change and progress, for 
example).
The scientific worldview is more general than the 
appearance of science as a central issue for opposed 
arguments. Historically, it began to take shape earlier, in 
the 17th century or in the Renaissance.5 It has become a 
view that the world is something to be measured, understood, 
acted upon, and mastered. The scientific worldview has not 
always had science itself as the organizing center of 
argument and public debate. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, in 19th-century Germany, according to
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Mannheim, politics was the center of contention for styles 
of argument/thought, because of the preceding polarizing 
event of the French Revolution.
Science as a Form of Thought
Science is also a form of thought —  as described
earlier, a dominant form of knowledge. "Knowledge" and 
"thought" are used interchangeably here, with "thought" 
referring, not just to the process of thinking, but to the 
intellectual product of a historical time and place.6
Science is a form of thought or knowledge because it 
differs from pre-scientific thought in form as well as in 
content. It is not just guantity of facts which 
distinguishes science, but an approach of objectivity and
calculation. There are other examples of differences in
form which may make this distinction clearer. There is a 
difference in form between computer information and book 
information —  not only is content within a given physical 
space increased, but access is changed. The variety of 
routes of access is much greater by computer, because the 
information is in a different form from the printed form. 
Computer information is digital and electronically 
accessible; it is compact; it is highly manipulable. These
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things distinguish it from the printed book form. This 
difference in form engenders a difference in attitude toward 
information, toward the content of the form —  content 
becomes something to manipulate, fragment, and integrate in 
a new way. In a somewhat more abstract way, science is a 
form in which knowledge and information can be put and 
accessed in a different way from non-science. To give 
another example, life experience is a form of knowledge.
Our awareness of this form of knowledge, even if we don't 
have a name for it, often gives us the feeling that it's not 
what you learn in books that's important in life. In this 
way, personal or experiential knowledge seems different in 
both content and form from book knowledge.
Classifying Knowledge
How do all these things fit together —  style of 
thought, center of contention, worldview, form of knowledge 
or thought? The scientific worldview is a historical 
phenomenon that we can trace back only a few centuries, but 
it is often observed that scientific reasoning, or science 
as a form of thought, had its beginnings in ancient Greece, 
although for many reasons, it did not develop there into the 
inductive method that is so important to modern science.7
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Science as a dominant form of knowledge is a recent 
development on a historical scale, and science as an 
organizing center for arguments (or styles of thought) is a 
current event.
Some of these terms for speaking about knowledge and 
thought are also categories at different levels of 
generality, like Linnaean categories for living things: 
Kingdom (animal or vegetable, for instance) is more general 
than Phylum (e.g., the chordates among animals) and so on 
down through a series of classifications. Thus, humans and 
dogs are both in the chordate Phylum and, less generally, 
both are in the Class of mammals. However, in the next less 
general classification, dogs are in the Order of carnivores, 
and humans are in the Order of primates. Within the Order 
of primates, humans belong to the hominid Family, while 
chimpanzees and gorillas, which are also primates, do not 
belong to this Family. Each category is followed by a 
subgroup that is more specialized.
In a similar way, worldview is more general than 
whatever is the center of contention in styles of thought; 
that center is more general than the specific styles of 
argument. A scientific worldview can have politics as a 
center of contention, because the center organizes 
intellectual activity at a different and more specific level 
than worldview. Politics can have either conservative or
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liberal styles of thought, because these arguments are 
varieties of political thought —  sub-versions. Different 
major worldviews exist concurrently, although one may 
dominate the others.8 This classification of thought and 
knowledge is not exactly like Linnaean categories, however, 
for several reasons. One important reason is that the 
contents of Linnaean categories make an array of 
evolutionary stages, but worldview and thought style do not 
have higher or lower evolutionary forms.9
Form of thought (e.g., scientific or religious) is a 
characteristic that, with some qualifications, has the
possibility of running through the levels of generality. It
can be part of worldview or of style of thought. If
worldview and thought style were horizontal lines, form of 
thought would be a vertical line that weaves between them.
These categories are not necessitated by some 
unchangeable characteristics of knowledge; they are simply 
aids to trace a history and sociology of intellectual 
concerns. What is important is not so much the terms as 
that there is more than one dimension of classification. 
Thought or knowledge not only covers an area which can be 
defined either broadly or narrowly, it also has different 
forms and, thirdly, different historical durations.
Worldview - The Broad Term
"Worldview" is a translation of the German word 
Weltanschauung. This term was given its theoretical 
development by Wilhelm Dilthey, the 19th-century philosopher 
and historian of ideas. His concept of worldview was more 
philosophical than the concept that has evolved with use of 
the term by others. "Worldview" is now used more 
sociologically than philosophically. For Dilthey, a 
worldview "undertakes to resolve the enigma of life."10 it 
is not the product of thinking per se, but emerges from life 
experience in general, from the totality of our 
psychological existence (called "lived experience" —  
Erlebnisl.11 From it derive ideals and principles of 
conduct. A worldview is a systematic relationship of views 
rather than a single view.
Worldviews are ephemeral in the individual, changing 
with life stages, time, place and experience, but they fall 
into a few major cultural formations within any historical 
period. While worldviews are historically conditioned, they 
have basic types, all of which can emerge within the 
different "cultural systems," identified by Dilthey as 
poetry or literature, religion, and philosophy. Mannheim 
took the concept of worldview from Dilthey, and proposed 
that it appears in "styles of thought," which present ideas
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at a theoretical level, but not necessarily as philosophy. 
Neither Dilthey nor Mannheim spoke of a scientific 
worldview.12 Science, for them, was the pursuit and 
accumulation of objective knowledge, separate from knowledge 
with psychological and metaphysical elements, as found in 
the worldview.
Dilthey's theory of worldviews is complex, combining 
philosophy, psychology, hermeneutics and attention to 
history. Like Kant, he thought that there are categories of 
mind behind which you cannot go for their causes. The 
"attitudes" underlying worldviews are such mental 
categories. These are not attitudes of the kind polled in 
opinion surveys, but fundamental responses of mind to 
external reality, to the question of the meaning of life, 
and to one's own course of life. Thus worldview has 
considerable depth. A knowledge and attitudes survey would 
only touch the surface of the total complex of the worldview 
held by any of the survey's respondents, or alternatively, 
of the historical worldview which the survey findings, on 
average, represent.13 There therefore must be other ways 
to get at worldview than to ask people what they think; 
survey methods are not sufficient for analysis.
Style of Thought - The Narrower Term
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Using the category of style of thought is one of 
several ways to take the broad category of worldview and 
break it down. Dilthey studied worldview itself, and 
classified worldviews into philosophical types and 
historical examples. Mannheim investigated how worldviews 
act in society. Society develops through both cooperation 
and competition, and since knowledge is a social effort, it 
too develops both cooperatively and competitively. When a 
significant and change-making event occurs in society (a 
political revolution, for example), groups with contending 
views each develop their arguments about how to deal with 
it. The event polarizes. and becomes the "impetus" to a 
sharp differentiation of styles of argument, as opposed 
groups draw on different worldviews and refer to different 
material experiences in order to respond to new 
circumstances. This happens when the event occurs in what 
Mannheim called a matrix of "oriented change" —  wholesale 
change affecting all of society —  political and economic 
restructuring.
A thought style integrates some of the fundamental 
attitudes of its adherents (derived from a shared worldview) 
with a developing stance on events that are currently of 
pressing importance for them. It articulates elements of
the worldview and particulars of the group's material 
experience in ways that have not been necessary before, but 
are vital now because the group feels its material and 
philosophical position threatened or denigrated, or feels 
its own possibilities of power. Mannheim's analysis was 
that styles of thought develop oppositionally, the response, 
roughly speaking, of the "outs" to the "ins." On their 
side, the "ins" sharpen their arguments in turn. Styles of 
thought, Mannheim said, "crystallize" around a central issue 
of debate which has become important because of the 
polarizing event.14
A contested sphere of social activity (center of 
contention) becomes the center around which concepts are 
organized as opposing arguments develop. The opposed 
arguments (thought styles) draw on more general worldviews, 
and each comprises distinguishable but related lines of 
thought. The summaries below compare the levels of thought 















































Mannheim took the French Revolution to be the 
polarizing event that was the impetus for social and 
intellectual change. Intellectually, there was a change in 
the center for European styles of thought. With the French 
Revolution that center became politics. (Earlier, Mannheim 
says, it might have been religion, but he does not expand on 
this comparison.) With politics as a center of thought, 
conservative and liberal arguments each expressed some 
aspects of the differing worldviews of opposed social 
groups.
Different arguments were not only different in content, 
but had an identifiable style, analogous to styles in art 
that are identified by its different motifs —  recurring 
thematic or design elements. The thought style also had 
recurring themes and conventionalized ways of presenting 
them. Beyond this, the thought style also had an intention, 
comparable to the motivation behind an art style that was 
postulated by the art historian, Alois Riegl. This concept 
of Riegl's influenced Mannheim's construction of the concept 
of style of thought.15 That arguments had a style, that 
they didn't just have innumerable elements that didn't come 
together, rests on the fact that they articulate a 
particular set of circumstances, a bounded social 
experience, and a social intention, and do so with certain 
available intellectual materials. Not only were the
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political purposes of conservatives and liberals different, 
their outlook on life was also different, and their 
intellectual styles and the types of knowledge they referred 
to were different.
Different arguments about what society should do are 
rooted in different social and material conditions, in the 
different experiences of different groups. "The principal 
thesis of the sociology of knowledge," Mannheim said, "is 
that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately 
understood so long as their social origins are obscured."16 
For a style of thought to develop fully, it must have an 
effective group behind it. Groups can be classes —  
bourgeoisie vs old line aristocrats; proletariat vs 
bourgeoisie —  as in Marxist theory; or socioeconomic 
"lifestyle" classes; or as pointed out by Mannheim, they can 
be in other categories which were then often overlooked, 
such as generations. The group will have a "basic 
intention," for example, to hold on to a traditional way of 
life, or to initiate change in the name of progress. Their 
arguments will take up a "key problem"; this is not a 
particular social or political goal, but an epistemological 
problem, a question of what the valid grounds of knowledge 
are.
Mannheim does not provide a systematic identification 
of the elements of empirical reference and conceptual
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analysis of a style of thought as I have given them here. 
This presentation is my own synopsis, derived from his 
"Conservative Thought" essay. Summarizing (and using 
Mannheim's own terms in quotes), what is needed for the 
appearance and development of "styles of thought" is a 
"catalyzing" (polarizing) event, in a context of "oriented 
change," and groups at either end of the spectrum of 
responses to that event who can effectively argue their 
case. Their arguments, or styles of thought, can be 
characterized according to a polarity, e.g., 
conservative/liberal. Styles of thought have both a social 
context and an epistemological content. These can be 
analyzed as "basic intention" (social) and "key problem" 
(epistemological). The arguments will "crystallize" around 
a center of contention —  an issue central to the 
polariziing event (or it can be said that the event will be 
construed in terms of that issue. Thus, the French 
Revolution and Enlightenment thought were debated by the two 
sides as matters of politics and government, as the issue of 
whether the norm should be a just society realizing natural 
equality, or a stable society incorporating traditional or 
natural aristocracies. All of these social and conceptual 
elements must be identified in an analysis of a thought 
style.
The Center of Contention
The conceptual tools that Mannheim used to study 19th- 
century thought can help explain the late 2 0th-century's 
complex relations of science, ideology and power. I am 
applying the same methodology to contemporary environmental 
thought that Mannheim applied (retrospectively) to 19th- 
century political theory. What I have called "argument" he 
called "style of thought" (arguments made to convince as 
part of a debate about societal goals). Politics, Mannheim 
said, became the "crystallizing agency" for (European) 
styles of thought —  the center around which differences 
crystallized —  as a result of the French Revolution. 
Subsequently, Enlightenment thought and Conservative thought 
contended for the vision of social good that would guide 
organized action by people living in the nation state and 
the capitalist economy. What Mannheim called the 
"crystallizing " center or agency, I call the concept- 
organizing center, or center of contention. In comparison,
I am saying that the center of contention for styles of 
thought has now shifted from politics to science.
This central issue of debate organizes the arguments, 
but it is not always directly addressed by them. It is not 
always an explicit center of contention. In Mannheim's 
analysis, politics was a conceptual center which acted as a
focus for anti-Enlightenment thought, in which such diverses 
strains as Romanticism and Pietism contributed to the 
development of what became the conservative argument. 
Romanticism, a major influence inthe early stages of 
conservatism, did not make a direct political argument, but 
in its emphasis on unique individuals and the qualities of 
place, it implied a citizen and community very different 
from those posited by universalistic Enlightenment thought. 
Romanticism's celebration of the emotions and qualities 
ignored by rationalism provided material for the political 
argument against the Enlightenment. Similarly, there are 
celebrations of Nature, critiques of specific technologies, 
and fact-centered arguments which do not directly address 
the role of science in society, but which nonetheless imply 
different uses of science and a different direction for it 
than are now the outcome of a conventional view which posits 
a science autonomous and separate from social values.
With politics as a center for arguments, there 
developed "conservative" and "progressive" (or "liberal") 
styles of thought —  that is, specific styles of argument at 
each end of the politically-focused spectrum. With science 
as an organizing center for argument, we now get, for lack 
of better terms, "science truster" and "science skeptic" 
styles. In the environmental movement, there is a 
particular version of the science-skeptic style.
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Connecting Stvle of Thought to Worldview
The social context and the epistemological content of 
the thought style, combined and integrated, represented 
something theoretically similar to Dilthey's worldview. 
Mannheim did not use Dilthey's typology of worldviews, which 
was psychophilosophical, but made a sociological assessment 
of worldviews. Styles of thought were analyzed by Mannheim 
as very particular to a time and place, and he limited his 
investigation to "one period, one country, one social 
group"17 —  the first half of the 19th century; Germany; 
declining nobility (represented by four or five major 
theorists who spoke for them, if they were not of them).
His starting point was to analyze the conservative style of 
thought, and from that beginning, he went back to the social 
context. He did not start with the social group and try to 
find out how they thought; he started with the thought style 
and tried to link it with its social origins using the 
theoretical tool (from Dilthey) of worldview rooted in life 
experience.
Similarly, I am starting with a thought style that I am 
provisionally calling environmental, limiting my 
investigation to the United States in the 1960s and 70s, and 
taking a few theorists (or their contemporary replacement,
committed popularizers) for analysis. At the beginning of 
the analysis, it will not necessarily be clear who the 
"effective group" are, other than that they can be called 
"environmentalists." The analysis of the thought style will 
help to identify the group, by identifying what interests 
the argument represents. This application of Mannheim's 
methodology is a test of its usefulness both for identifying 
major societal concerns and for identifying the knowledge 
locations in society from which contending arguments 
originate. The question of who is represented by these 
arguments, and why certain groups support them, requires a 
historical investigation. Mannheim only touched on such an 
investigation in "Conservative Thought" and I only touch on 
it in the investigation of environmental thought.
A few studies suggest that environmentalists (that is, 
those members of the public who support or profess 
environmentalism) are white, middle class, service-sector 
professionals.18 These studies are attitude surveys, and 
as such they are methodologically suited to singling out 
groups characterized by a set of opinions, and to locating 
those groups socioeconomically. Like the survey approach, 
the sociology of knowledge approach links attitudes and 
social groups, but in Mannheim, its method and categories 
are directed toward finding the meaning and history that 
attitudes have for the people that hold them, rather than
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toward making a detailed specification of their social 
position.
Interpretation
The problem of interpreting what other people say, or 
what they present or accept as knowledge, has always been of 
concern in the social sciences. This concern is related to 
the historical fact that there are two major schools of 
thought in the social sciences on how to approach the object 
being studied, whatever it may be.
One is positivist —  "positive” knowledge is that, and 
only that, which can be objectively verified. The other 
finds positivism inadequate for or inappropriate to 
investigation of social life. The non-positivist position 
can be taken from several standpoints, among which is an 
interpretive one. As was the case with "scientific 
attitude" in Chapter One, "positivism" has many definitions.
For the purposes of discussing the social sciences, 
positivism can be considered to assume that the object being 
studied —  whether it is attitudes or the percentage of 
population living in urban as compared to rural areas —  is 
something that exists like the objects of the natural world. 
That is, the object has an existence or a reality of its own
that is not altered by our experience of it. The physical 
object of the natural world, even though it is mediated 
through our physical senses in order for us to perceive it, 
exists without that mediation taking place. But the object 
in guestion need not be a physical object; it can be an 
object of study, a goal of investigation, an objective to be 
reached. Even if the object is attitudes, it is assumed to 
exist in this same manner, and what we must do to gain 
knowledge of it is to observe it, and as in the natural 
sciences, to measure it in some way so that it may be 
included in calculations which may eventually accumulate and 
be theoretically ordered to reveal regularities and behavior 
according to general laws. Then knowledge of the object 
will be "positive" knowledge, and predictions and tests of 
the object's behavior will be possible. Positivism takes 
the method of the natural sciences to be to be the only 
route to valid knowledge; any other methods are metaphysics, 
resulting in unprovable assertions. Thus the social 
sciences must use the same methods as the natural sciences 
to achieve valid knowledge.
There are various standpoints from which to criticize 
this positivist view, most of them philosophical. Some 
reject positivism entirely, others resist its tendency to 
demand its method of all inquiries, but accept its 
usefulness for certain purposes. From within the social
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sciences, the approach that does not accept postivist 
strictures can be called an interpretive one. That is, it 
takes the objects of social science inquiry to be in some 
way unlike objects of the natural world, because they cannot 
simply be observed and recorded in mathematical (thereby 
universally valid) terms, but must be interpreted by rules 
that are open to argument, even in the initial stages.
Depending on what version of the interpretive approach 
is being used, this requirement for interpretation may be 
posited either because all knowledge is taken to be a 
process of interpreting the world, rather than observing it, 
or because things of the social world all occur through 
human mental effort, and are thus already interpretive 
constructions, are already something that has a human 
intention in it that must be read rather than recorded.
Each act is already part of a story being told? that story 
is the actor's interpretation of the world and of the 
actor's self. The social act, or interaction, has something 
beneath its surface appearance that can only be found by an 
interpretation that recapitulates the interpretive act that 
was part of its making. If just the surface appearance is 
recorded, that deeper part is missed.
The positivist approach in the social sciences uses 
natural-science-like techniques of investigation (along the 
lines of field observation in the biological sciences rather
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than along the lines of experiment in chemistry and 
physics). Surveys are an example of positivist social 
science: a bounded population is selected for study so that 
it can be clearly stated what the object being studied is 
and what it is not; statistical theory guides the selection 
of representative samples; the questions that elicit 
response from the people studied are designed to have 
simple, short answers whose meanings can be coded within a 
manageable number of categories; answers are coded so that 
they can be quantified, and thus measured mathematically, as 
is necessary for unequivocal statements in the natural 
sciences.
Mannheim's style-of-thought analysis is an example of 
the interpretive approach, and ultimately derives from 
Dilthey's philosophy of the human sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften), which he asserted were necessarily 
different from the natural sciences. Dilthey's theory of 
worldviews gives a descriptioon of the interpretive 
construction we all put on the world, and through which we 
both experience the world and act on it. Mannheim's thought 
styles are partial versions of worldview, specific and 
consciously constructed arguments meant to persuade to a 
course of action and to justify an interpretation of life 
and society.
These different methods —  positivist and
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interpretive —  are constructed around different theories of 
investigation and serve different investigative purposes. 
Both recognize, for instance, that attitudes have a social 
context, but they study the relationship between context and 
any individual component of it (such as attitudes) in 
different ways. Each method can offer description and 
explanation of the "object" to be examined here —  an 
environmental argument, but they will do so out of different 
traditions of research and with different methods.
Questions about Interpretation
Any interpretive method faces the difficulty that 
anyone can ask why one interpretation should be favored over 
another. Aren't interpretations, after all, different from 
facts in that they are not something that can be agreed on 
regardless of whether you want to accept them or not? There 
are two answers to this question, from the two versions of 
the interpretive approach: 1) facts are also 
interpretations; 2) interpretations too have standards.
The answer that there are standards comes from 
hermeneutics, a theory and practice of interpretation that 
goes back to the interpretation of the meaning of Biblical 
texts, and the comparison of varying copies of these texts.
Hermeneutics moved from theology to philosophy in the 19th 
century, but the goal of interpretation continued to be 
deeper meaning and authenticity. It would be possible to 
reach these goals because reader and writer of texts share, 
according to the theory, a common subjectivity (or common 
human nature) that allows for one person to perceive the 
meaning intended by another. The hermeneutic method takes 
meaning to be contextual; thus, the part can not be 
understood without relating it to the whole, nor can the 
whole be understood without reference to its component 
parts. So a sentence must be referred to the complete text, 
the text to its author and social and historical context, 
and all of these to the shared subjectivity of human beings. 
But just as the meaning of a sentence may be clarified by 
knowing the overall intention of the whole text, the 
intention of the text may be clarified by key sentences.
This way, interpretation follows a "hermeneutic circle" to 
reach fuller understanding. This philosophy of 
interpretation was developed by Schleiermacher early in the 
19th century.
Dilthey's contribution to hermeneutics was to refer 
meaning to lived experience, and to postulate worldviews in 
which this experience was a crucial element. Dilthey took 
the non-positivist position that an interpretive method was 
essential to the human sciences, which could not use the
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same methods of investigation as the natural sciences, 
because human sciences must deal with the subjectivity of 
their objects of investigation, while the natural sciences 
need not do so. Another way of saying this is that social 
scientists are part of the phenomena they seek to explain, 
while natural scientists investigate phenomena that are 
external to them.19
In the 20th century, Heidegger saw that the reader or 
interpreter brings so much of their own understanding to the 
process of interpretation that they remake, to some extent, 
what they are interpreting. Along the same lines, Gadamer 
calls the particularities of one's own understanding the 
"horizon" of the interpreter.20
Another answer to the question of the relative worth of 
interpretations comes from phenomenology (albeit in an 
indirect line). In this approach, even so-called facts are 
interpretations, because we see objects through states of 
consciousness. We can't make a distinction between our 
inner experience of an object, and its supposed external 
existence. The goal of phenomenology, as put forth by 
Husserl, is to explore subjectivity: the everyday world we 
live in in our consciousness (Lebenswelt), and the workings 
of inner experience itself (Erlebnisse). In this 
exploration, the thinker should set aside or "bracket" 
assumptions about the causes and consequences of these inner
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processes, in order to get at their essence. This 
philosophy was brought into sociology by Schutz as a study 
of how people comprehend, typify, and indeed "construct" the 
everyday life-world (Lebenswelt) as a process of 
consciousness. Rather than begin with social structure as 
the determinant of social interactions, Schutz suggested 
that these interactions might be the outcome of our "natural 
attitude" by which we take the everyday world for granted, 
and make our way through it by "common sense."
In an offshoot from this, the American sociologist, 
Garfinkel, conceived of people as continually constructing a 
version of the everyday world which they constantly check 
with one another in order to reach some kind of agreement 
about what is going on —  an agreement which will enable all 
to carry on in a normal manner. Other non-positivist 
sociologies which share some of the predicates of 
phenomenology and of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, although 
they are not directly derived from them, take all knowledge 
to be socially constructed, and facts thus to be colored by 
the social interactions which accompanied the investigations 
and findings by which the facts were arrived at. All facts, 
even those of the natural sciences, are then results of a 
process of interpretation at many levels —  socially common- 
sensical, linguistic, tradition-influenced, peer-influenced, 
paradigm-influenced (a paradigm being a body of accepted
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principles and practices within a science or discipline), 
and influenced by the material equipment of investigation 
(the tools at hand).
Whether the reference is to the historical and 
philosophical concerns of Dilthey, to the hermeneutic circle 
from Schleiermacher, the phenomenology of Husserl and 
Heidegger, ethnomethodology, or contemporary hermeneutics, 
all interpretive emphases counterpose different forms of 
thinking or knowledge: practical reason is counterposed to 
theoretical reason; a natural attitude to the world to 
imposed artifice; lived experience to conceptual abstrac­
tions; intersubjective "cultural" understanding to "scien­
tific" methodological understanding; everyday and common- 
sense knowledge to institutionalized knowledge. The 
problems of interpretation are not entirely resolved by 
these theories and methods, but neither are the problems of 
positivism resolved by theirs. These problems include the 
problem of induction (whether observation can be a reliable 
basis for knowledge; whether observations can be stated with 
words that map exactly to observations; whether we can 
predict from finite observations to infinite cases) and the 
denial of the influence of human subjectivity. The 
interpretive approach, and the positivist one, are 
expressions of different worldviews, and they remain 
antinomical to each other —  equally valid on their own 
terms but irreconcilable from either side.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. Pierre Bourdieu's work deals with such transmission in 
detail. See Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977) and Distinction 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) .
2. In addition, traditions are not necessarily fixed in 
what has gone on before. The Invention of Tradition. Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983) gives several examples from British 
history at home and in colonial lands of how present 
interests shape the meaning and even invent the content of 
the past.
3. The political, economic and social issues raised by 
environmental problems can appear to be made for solutions 
from the right, or the left, or both —  whether or not it 
is considered possible to characterize the environmental 
movement as at either end of the spectrum. More is said 
about this in later chapters.
4. Or it can be said that the criticism of science is 
itself science. Blumenberg (op. cit., Ch.l, note 23) says 
this, and comments: "That the difficulties we have, and will 
increasingly have, with science are always integrated into 
it as scientific difficulties is only one aspect of the 
outlook on the subject of 'theoretical curiosity': the 
inevitability of a failure to find an Archimedian point over 
against the reality of science... Science integrates into 
itself even the responsibility for the consequences of its 
consequences, by itself giving the alarm." (pp.229-30)
5. See Marie Boas, The Scientific Renaissance. 1450-1630 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962). For Renaissance and 
varied beginnings up to the 17th century, see Hugh F. 
Kearney, ed., Origins of the Scientific Revolution (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1964) Several such general histories 
of science were published in the 1950s and 60s, and remain 
standards; recent histories of science are more specialized: 
by time period, or discovery, or philosophical or 
sociological issues.
6. The use of the term "form of thought" is for 
convenience, to distinguish form from content? it is not 
especially related to Mannheim's analysis. Scheler
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distinguished qualitatively different "forms of thought" 
according to their purposes or motivations. The motivation 
of practical control characterizes science. See "The Forms 
of Knowledge and Culture" in Philosophical Perspectives by 
Max Scheler (Boston: Beacon Press, n.d. [1958]).
7. Classical statements of the importance of induction are 
made by Francis Bacon in his Novum Oraanum (1620), by J.S. 
Mill in his System of Logic (1843), and by William Whewell 
in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840, 1847).
For a general discussion of induction and its problems, see 
Stewart Richards, Philosophy and Sociology of Science: An 
Introduction (New York: Schocken, 1984).
8. "Thought style" is a direct translation of the original 
German for style of thought —  "Denkstil." It was 
introduced by Mannheim, and soon after, used by Ludwik Fleck 
in Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), a 1930s precursor to 
Kuhn's paradigm version of scientific development; see p.xv,
p.168.
9. Dilthey, the theorist of worldviews, did not rank them 
and did not take any one to be superior to or more 
comprehensive than another. One of his comments on this 
subject:
"As the botanist classifies plants and 
investigates the laws of their growth, so must the 
analyst of philosophy hunt for the types of 
Weltanschauung [worldview] and recognize the 
regularity in their formation. Such a comparative 
procedure raises the human mind above the 
conviction, rooted in its finitude, that in one of 
these Weltanschauungen it has grapsed the truth 
itself." Wilhelm Dilthey, The Essence of 
Philosophy. Stephen A. Emery and William T.
Emery, trans. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1969), p.41.
However, Dilthey did compare the competition between 
worldviews to the struggle among living things for 
"existence and room," (p.40) and said that "Worldviews are 
shaped by the same process that creates the variety of 
organic creatures." See Wilhelm Dilthev: Selected Writings.
H.P. Rickman, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976), p.139. They are fit or not to last because they give 
understanding and goals.
10. Rickman, ibid., p.25
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11. Emery and Emery (op. cit., note 9, in their 
introduction) trace this translation of "Erlebnis" to 
Herbert A. Hodges. It is widely used to indicate being 
"consciously affected" by an event rather than just being 
there to observe it, which is the kind of experience 
indicated by the German word Erfahrunq.
12. Though Dilthey did not speak of a scientific worldview 
per se, one of his three major types of worldview, 
"naturalism," has many of the characteristics of the 
scientific attitude, and is taken to its extreme form in the 
positivist practice of science.
13. For example, the scientific literacy surveys referred 
to in Chapter One, note 2.
14. Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in From Karl 
Mannheim, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), p.141? and Conservatism, ed. David Kettler, 
Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr (London and New York: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1986), p.51.
15. See Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," p.136, and 
"On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung," pp. 32-33, both 
in From Karl Mannheim.
16. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, n.d., first published in English in 1936),
p. 2.
17. Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," p.137.
18. See notes to chapter sixteen for more about these 
studies.
19. Or so it seemed until the revolutions in physics at the 
turn of the century, and the attendant proposition that 
human intervention affects the object studied as if observer 
and observed were one system. According to the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics introduced by Niels Bohr 
in the 1920s, entities such as electrons, which have 
characteristics of both waves and particles, display one 
property or the other according to the nature of the 
experiment, and thus can't be said to have a property apart 
from our observation of it. Reality can only be ascribed to 
our observations, not to the physical world. (See Brush, 
ref. below, pp.399-407.)
To this has been added Werner Heisenberg's 
indeterminacy principle, which states that the experimenter 
cannot measure one parameter of a system without disturbing 
the value of another parameter. Statistical laws describe
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quantum reality, and indetermininsm is a fundamental fact of 
that reality. "There is an uncertainty both of destiny and 
identity," says Heisenberg, and "basically it is only our 
knowledge of the [elementary] particles alone which we can 
make the object of science." (Quoted in Richards, ref. 
below, pp.74-75.)
See Stephen G. Brush, The History of Modern Science 
(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1988) and Stewart 
Richards, Philosophy and Sociology of Science: An 
Introduction (New York: Schocken, 1984) for summaries of the 
"new physics."
20. This summary of hermeneutic tradition relies in part on 
the definition of "hermeneutics" by Ellman Crasnow in & 
Dictionary of Modern Critical Terms. Roger Fowler, ed. 




MANNHEIM AND CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT
The previous chapter introduced Mannheim's interpretive 
approach to socially positioned arguments through what he 
called "style of thought." Mannheim studied a style of 
thought centered on politics; I am examining the possibility 
of a style of thought centered on science. This chapter 
reviews in detail what Mannheim did in his study of 
conservative thought, but begins with a better known work 
that also concerns the oppositional development of thought.
Knowledge and Interests
Mannheim's best-known work in the English-speaking 
world is Ideology and Utopia. This book introduces the 
sociology of knowledge through a series of essays. Mannheim 
observes that we only ask about our knowledge in certain 
specific situations, when social and political change makes 
existing verities uncertain. To query the social origins of 
knowledge is a modern phenomenon. Before society itself was
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recognized as an object of inquiry, questions about the
roots of knowledge did not include consideration of social
influences. Knowledge was a topic for philosophy. But when
the social origins of ideas did become an issue, it was not
because there was an academic attempt to explain them.
Rather, "The discovery of the social-situational roots of
thought at first... took the form of unmasking," that is, of
revealing the self interest in an opponent's political
philosophy.1 When religion framed thought, crises among
the intelligentsia took the form of religious conflict; when
politics frames thought, the state claims the right to
interpret the world, and "politics... use[s] its conception
of the world as a weapon."2 Arguments take increasingly
rationalistic and scientific forms as 'objective' support is
sought for the justification of political programs.
As the translators of Ideology and Utopia. Wirth and
Shils, point out, the German original was published at a
time when only intellectuals were questioning the ideals of
Western civilization (1929); the English edition appears
when such questions have become much more widespread (1936).
Mannheim had his own comment on the prevalence of doubt:
"It is imperative in the present transitional 
period to make use of the intellectual twilight 
which dominates our epoch and in which all values 
and points of view appear in their genuine 
relativity. We must realize once and for all that 
the meanings which make up our world are simply an 
historically determined and continously developing 
structure in which man develops, and are in no
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sense absolute."3 
It is not just previously accepted truths that are in doubt, 
but the motives of those that propound them. Wirth and 
Shils observe that we know very well now that different 
social groups have different interpretations of the facts of 
social situations, but that Mannheim goes beyond this 
generality and tries to show specifically what the 
connections are between knowledge and social existence. 
Interest is one of these connections, but not the only one.
Ideology and Utopia makes the connections between 
knowledge and society in two ways: with examples of 
arguments in modern society, and with theoretical 
propositions about the epistemology and ontology of a 
sociology of knowledge. In this book, Mannheim continues to 
speak about the centrality of politics, as he did in his 
earlier work on conservative thought. But he also both 
sharpens the distinctions between the thought of 'In' and 
'Out' groups in society —  ideology and utopian thought, 
respectively —  and emphasizes the common factor in both 
groups as they advance their interests: the attempt to keep 
their own blinders on while they "unmask" the thought of 
their opponents. Ideologists, with the intent of preserving 
elements of the past that, as part of the status guo, 
'maintain stability', can't see the negatives of the 
existing situation; Utopians, with the intent of changing
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the present, can't see the positives of the existing 
situation.
Ideology
In Ideology and Utopia. Mannheim has chosen the two 
"slogan-like concepts" of the title as symbolic of the 
intellectual crisis of the loss of a unitary worldview, and 
of the process of unmasking "situational motivations" behind 
thought.4 The tension between stability and change in the 
political and social order was the dominant concern of the 
Europe in which Mannheim lived. Born in Hungary in 1893, by 
the time he wrote the essays in Ideology and Utopia he had 
experienced the upheavals of the First World War, Hungarian 
independence from Austrian rule, socialist-communist post­
war government, its collapse, and the beginning of a 
repressive regime which decided him to live in Germany;5 in 
Germany he met the shifting political conditions of the 
Weimar Republic. Within four years of the publication of 
Ideology and Utopia he would be a refugee from Nazi Germany, 
living in exile in England. These experiences must have 
increased his sensitivity to the extremes of political 
thought and action.
Despite the separate naming of the two groups in the
title, it is clear that ideologists and Utopians both 
practice what we now consider ideology. "Ideology" has many 
meanings, quite a few of them derogatory, but in its most 
general sense it refers to the practice of unfailingly and 
programmatically (or unrelentingly and inflexibly) casting 
situations in a light that promotes the interests of those 
telling the story, while obscuring or ignoring whatever 
information would throw doubt on what is being said.
Mannheim is specific about how this is done on both the 
"ideology" aru the "utopia" side. The social and political 
positions of ideologists and Utopians are opposed, but the 
two groups have the same motivated approach to understanding 
the world and presenting their view of it. They both fail 
on some point of comprising the whole of the current 
situation in their thought, though they fail at opposite 
ends of the pole.6
This polar opposition of groups who wish to maintain 
the stability of the past as reflected in the status quo, 
and those who want change and a better future, is a central 
concept in the study of conservative thought which preceded 
Ideology and Utopia. Mannheim sets out to show, among other 
things, that styles of thought develop oppositionally. A 
necessary precondition for that oppositional development is 
a historical period of thoroughgoing change. Though 
Mannheim studies a period one hundred years back from his
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own time when he analyzes conservative thought, his 
observations are highly relevant to his contemporary scene.
Stvle of Thought
Mannheim's study of conservative thought, originally 
written in German, is now available in two versions in 
English, an early one called "Conservative Thought" and a 
more recent one called Conservatism. Because the versions 
vary, it is necessary to say something about them and to 
explain why I chose to work from the one I did, the earlier 
version. This background is given in a note to this 
chapter.
Mannheim begins "Conservative Thought" with a statement 
about "the recently developed sociology of knowledge": "at 
the heart of [its] method," he says, "is the concept of a 
stvle of thought."7 The idea of 'style' is taken from the 
history of art; a style is a distinctive form that 
originates at a certain time and place, and has formal 
tendencies which develop in a certain way. Mannheim's 
methodological goal is that it be "just as possible to 
'place' an anonymous piece of writing as an anonymous work 
of art. . . . "8
Mannheim contends that thought is neither ahistorical,
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as in some philosophies, nor derived from great 
personalities, as some literary historians would have it. 
Thinkers of a given period are representatives of different 
styles of thought, which are characteristic of time and 
place and comprise more than individual tendencies. And 
just as common elements will be handled differently in 
different styles of art, in styles of thought the same words 
will have different meanings for different social groups 
within a given period. Thus "the analysis of meanings will 
be the core of [the] technique"9 for identifying styles of 
thought and their connection to the social groups that bear 
them.
Meanings cannot be analyzed separately from the social 
groups who impart them to styles of thought. Those meanings 
in turn derive from a basic intention which underlies the 
thought's development.10 The intention, arising from the 
group's experience of life, is what it wants for itself in 
society. But the intention is not just narrow self 
interest; it is a view of life as a whole. It calls up a 
desired world (my term, not Mannheim's).11 "Basic 
intention" is used for Grundintention in the earlier 
translation of Mannheim's work?12 the more recent 
translation13 uses "fundamental design" in most cases, 
except where the translators find a more psychological 
meaning called for, when they use "fundamental
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inclination."14 They make this choice to emphasize that 
the term "can refer to an objective pattern as well as a 
subjective undertaking."15
For an example on which to carry out this method of 
analysis, Mannheim chooses the development of conservative 
thought in Germany in the first half of the 19th century.
In effect, this means a study of conservatism in Prussia, 
Germany's dominant territory at the time. He limits his 
analytical task to "one period, one country, and one social 
group."16 This limitation gives the advantage that all 
published and otherwise accessible utterances of the group 
can be acquired. Also, the French Revolution had produced a 
"polarizing tendency" in thought throughout western Europe, 
so that just after it, "styles of thought developed in very 
clear-cut extremes."17 Any analysis of the thought of the 
first half of the 19th century, Mannheim claims, must start 
with the fact that the French Revolution catalyzed both 
different types of political action and different styles of 
thought. There was a development of thought along party 
lines —  liberal and conservative —  and at the same time, 
the related development of Romanticism in literature, the 
arts and philosophy. Reviewing the political and 
philosophical differences between France, Germany and 
England in the early 19th century, Mannheim asserts that 
"Germany achieved for the ideology of conservatism what
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France did for the Enlightenment —  she exploited it to the
fullest extent of its logical conclusions." England
provided the stimulus for conservatism, but Germany did the
"'thinking through to the end'."18
Although he has chosen a "paradigmatic" example of the
development of a thought style in early 19th century German
conservative thought19 Mannheim notes:
"Our choice has the disadvantage, however, that it 
suggests that political action is always the 
centre around which styles of thought crystallize.
This is not necessarily the case. Our contention 
is only that in the first half of the nineteenth 
century politics gradually became the centre 
around which the differences in both the 
fundamental attitudes and the Weltanschauunoen of 
various social groups developed. "zo
In other periods, he comments, the "crystallizing agency"
might have been religion. A thought-style, then, will have
a center around which it develops its form, or crystallizes.
The Reaction to Rationalism
Before analyzing conservative thought itself, Mannheim 
discusses "Modern Rationalism and the Rise of Conservative 
Opposition." He starts with the historical context of 
conservatism as an intellectual trend: Conservatism was in
part a reaction to modern rationalism, which itself arose in 
opposition to medieval Aristotelian scholasticism and to the
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Renaissance philosophy of nature. Scholasticism emphasized
qualities and teleological aims; Renaissance philosophy
showed sympathy for magic and analogy. Qualities were too
vague for rationalism, ultimate aims unprovable, magic and
analogy unscientific. In turning away from rationalism,
conservatism did not return to magic, but it favored
arguments stressing the uniqueness of qualities.
Mannheim summarizes the basic attitude of modern
rationalism as "not to know more about things than can be
expressed in a universally valid and demonstrable form, and
not to incorporate them into one's experience beyond that
point." Its "clearest and most radical application" is in
the exact sciences.21 However, modern thought is not
exclusively the growth of rationalism; forms of thought that
have been repudiated have not altogether disappeared.
"Our problem begins at this point and the study 
of conservative thought takes on a practical 
importance. We want to know: what became of all 
those vital relationships and attitudes, and their 
corresponding modes of thought, which were 
suppressed bv the rise of a consistent 
rationalism?"22
Here Mannheim extends the history of ideas into the 
sociology of knowledge. The suppressed modes of thought, he 
observes, "did in fact persist," in social and intellectual 
strata outside the process of rationalization and 
capitalism: among peasants; within petit-bourgeois groups 
descended directly from earlier handcraftsmen; in the
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aristocratic tradition of the nobility; in Pietist religious
sects. Their pre-rationalist ways disappeared from public
and official life but not from intimate relationships. Max
Weber, Mannheim notes, calls such a development the
"recession into privacy."23 In this way "germs" of a style
of thought and life remain dormant until they become
relevant to social struggle —  in the case of conservatism,
to counter-revolution.
Romanticism provided expression to pre-rationalist
thought. Mannheim discusses its function as
"the historical opponent of the intellectual 
tendencies of the Enlightenment, in other words, 
against the philosophical exponents of bourgeois 
capitalism. It seized upon the submerged ways of 
life and thought... [and lent] them new dignity 
and value. . . .1,24
At the same time, however, because Romanticism was
conditioned by the thesis it opposed, in its attempt to
"rescue... repressed irrational forces... the mere fact of
paying conscious attention to them meant an inevitable
rationalization."25 Mannheim repeatedly draws attention to
the dialectical development of thought, and cautions that
opposed styles are not simple oppositions in which each
completely rejects all elements of the other. In addition,
different thought-styles, situated in the same historical
complex, share certain common concerns.
"No antithesis escapes conditioning by the thesis 
it sets out to oppose, and romanticism suffered 
the same paradoxical fate; its structure was
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fundamentally conditioned by the attitudes and 
methods of that very movement of Enlightenment in 
opposition to which it originally developed.1,26
The Emergence of Conservatism
After reviewing this background of the contending 
styles of rationalist and pre-rationalist thought, Mannheim 
sketches how historical developments enabled conservatism to 
emerge in opposition to rationalism and in some sympathy 
with pre-rationalism. Historical developments include 
thought as well as events, and Mannheim constructs the 
analytical type of "objective mental structure" to explain 
how this is so. The first historical question is, Is 
conservatism a new product or does it occur in all times?
The answer is both: There is 'traditionalism' as 
characterized by Max Weber —  clinging to old ways of life; 
and there is 'modern conservatism', the product of 
particular historical circumstance. What political form 
conservative action will take depends on concrete 
circumstances, whereas traditionalism is a general 
psychological attitude that takes relatively predictable 
forms.
But the politics of conservatism includes elements of 
the past as well as responses to the present, and "the
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individual is consciously or unconsciously guided by a way
of thinking and acting which has its own history behind it,
before it comes into contact with the individual.”27
..."Political conservatism is therefore an 
objective mental structure, as opposed to the 
'subjectivity' of the isolated individual. It is 
not objective in the sense of being eternally and 
universally valid...It is not an immanent 
principle.... But as compared with the hie et nunc 
experience of the particular individual it has a 
certain very definite objectivity."28
Mannheim says this type of objectivity is an alternative to
the extremes of nominalism (abstract terms are only names;
e.g., conservatism —  or any other style of thought —  is
only a convenient label for the subjective content inside
individual heads) and realism (abstract terms refer to
things that really exist, are external to us, and are
independent of our conception of them):
"[this type of objectivity is] a dynamic, 
historical structural configuration; a concept 
implying a type of objectivity which begins in 
time, develops and declines through time, which is 
closely bound up with the existence and fate of 
concrete human groups, and is in fact their 
product. It is nevertheless a truly 'objective' 
mental structure, because it is always 'there'
'before' the individual at any given moment, and 
because, as compared with any simple range of 
experience, it always maintains its own definite 
form —  its structure.1,29
The structure must not be regarded as static, though; it is
dynamic and historically conditioned.
"Within every dynamic historical structural 
configuration, we can discern a distinctive 'basic 
intention' (Grundintention), which the individual 
makes his own in the measure that his own
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experience becomes determined by the 'structural 
configuration' as such."30
Conservatism is just such a configuration? it is not just
political, but also "implies a... philosophical and
emotional complex...."31 And it takes a particular
historical form of traditionalism and develops it. This
happens in response to the development of progressivism.
"Traditionalism can only become conservatism in 
a society in which change occurs through the 
medium of class conflict —  in a class society.
This is the sociological background of modern 
conservatism. "32
Certain conditions are necessary for the rise of 
conservatism. First, there must be "oriented change" in 
society, in which every event assumes a function affecting 
the whole. The modern era has this dynamic process of 
oriented change; by comparison, in the Middle Ages, towns, 
though dynamic centers, existed within a static world. More 
specifically, traditionalism becomes conservatism in a 
society in which change occurs through the medium of class 
conflict, as shown by:
- social division into classes, some forwarding social 
process, some retarding it
- differentiation of ideas along social lines; 
antagonistic styles of thought
- social differentiation which takes on political and 
economic character; "the political factor must be 
autonomous and must become the primary nucleus around
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which new groupings crystallize."33 
A modern, capitalist class society with politically active 
and contending groups is the historical and social context 
for conservatism.
Elements of Method
Mannheim now begins a discussion of the method for 
studying conservative thought. Both the final form and the 
historical development of the thought-style should be 
described. To achieve this "morphology" of conservative 
thought one must identify the "inarticulate group 
experience" which provides the basic intention out of which 
the style of thought grows. One must also study 
"articulated theoretical statements" to work out what kev 
problem "gives this style of thought its theoretical unity, 
determines its growth, and makes its interpretation 
possible."34 The discussion of method is interwoven with 
examples from conservative thought. In abbreviated form, it 
is as follows.35
The Basic Intention: Look for "authentic manifestations" in 
order to "safeguard against arbitrary constructions." (This 
instruction raises problems of interpretation which have
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been discussed in Chapter Three.) Such manifestations or 
characteristics of the conservative way of life and thought 
are:
- It prefers the concrete. the immediate, the actual, 
details (by comparison, progressive thought prefers 
overall structure and consciousness of the possible).
- It is especially concrete in its concept of property: 
property is bound up with its owner in a non- 
transferable reciprocal relationship (e.g., rights
of original owner do not transfer to next owner).
- It has a qualitative idea of liberty, a feudal 
compared to an egalitarian one, in which liberty 
is a matter "concerned [with] the private and 
subjective side of life only, while all external 
social relations [are] subordinated to the 
principle of order and discipline."36
The basic intention behind all of this, that which these 
sequences of thought manifest, is "a harking back to an 
earlier way of life."37 It is related to traditionalism, 
but it is traditionalism become conscious.38 Mannheim 
stresses that the point is not to add up all these 
characteristics to equal 'conservatism', but to see the 
basic intention, follow its unfolding, and understand its 
function in the social process.
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"To see things authentically as a conservative, 
then, is to experience events in terms of an 
attitude derived from social circumstances and 
situations anchored in the past."39
The Kev Problem: for conservatism is opposition to the
natural-law mode of thought. This offers a "theoretical 
nucleus" around which a self-aware conservative mode of 
thought could develop out of an earlier "more or less latent 
impulse." But the opposing types of thought are not "cut- 
and-dried systems." "Conservatism did not merely want to 
think 'something different' from its liberal opponents; it 
wanted to think it differently.. .. "40
In relation to the Key Problem, Mannheim characterizes 








—  rationalism for problem 
solving
—  deduction from general 
principles
—  universal validity claimed 
for individuals
—  universal applicabilty of 
historical and social laws
—  atomism and mechanism





—  Reason replaced with History, 
Life, Nation; i.e., Being above 
Thinking
—  irrationality of reality 
counters deductive thought
—  individuality counters 
universal validity
—  organism counters universally 
applied laws
—  "We" counters "I"
—  dynamic reason counters 
static reason
These characteristics are not a checklist for conservative
writers, however. No one conservative thinker attacks all
of natural-law thought.
"Thus it is impossible to juxtapose two static, 
completely developed systems of thought. All that 
can be done is to demonstrate the two ways of 
thinking, the two ways of tackling problems."42
In "Conservative Thought" Mannheim demonstrates one of these
ways of thinking with an analysis of two major authors and
comments on several others. A third author is analyzed in
the German original, and there are indications that he
planned a more extensive study.43 His treatment of the








The first available version of Mannheim's study of 
conservatism, and the most accessible, is called 
"Conservative Thought." "Conservative Thought" is a 
translation of the journal article which Mannheim adapted 
from his Habilitationsschrift (the dissertation which 
qualifies one to become a university lecturer, but not yet a 
Doktor); Mannheim did the first draft of the translation 
himself, and the draft was later edited by Paul Kecskemeti, 
his son-in-law, also a sociologist. It was published in a 
collection of Mannheim's writings called Essavs on Sociology 
and Social Psychology (1953), and later in a collection 
titled From Karl Mannheim (1971).1
For many years only the journal article, in either 
English or German, was available; the original dissertation 
was lost. However, it was recovered, edited by David 
Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr, and published in 
German in 1984. It was published in English translation in 
1986 under the title Conservatism. Conservatism includes 
material that was not in the journal article, and in 
addition, it displays more of the philosophical and 
theoretical tenor of Mannheim's writing than the earlier 
version does. Many authors have observed that Mannheim, in 
adapting to his new English home, changed his scholarly 
approach from a highly theoretical European style to a less
philosophical one, oriented to the more concrete and 
psychological explanations favored by what he considered the 
Anglo-Saxon mind. Some of his abstract sociology is lost in 
this change, and his ironic turn of phrase disappears also.
Although the basic outline and argument of the book 
Conservatism is like that of the essay "Conservative 
Thought," reading it is like reading a different work. The
two are best discussed, I believe, on different terms; I may 
take this position because a comparison would be extremely 
difficult to maintain when applying the method of Mannheim's 
study to another case, as in this dissertation.
Most of this chapter is based on the earlier version 
because it is the one I first met with (in 1986). I 
continued to refer to "Conservative Thought," but was not 
aware until 1989 that I would use it as the basis of this 
dissertation, and thus I did not go beyond my initial 
unsuccessful attempts to obtain the more recent and expanded
Since From Karl Mannheim is the more readily 
available book, I have used it for page references. It 
reproduces the essay in exactly the same format as in 
Essavs...; deducting 58 pages from From Karl Mannheim 
will give the equivalent page numbers in Essays....
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version. Most of my notes are based on the earlier work.
The summary I give of Mannheim's method is not greatly 
affected by the difference between the two versions; some of 
the deeper questions concerning his analysis and its 
implications are affected, but they are not crucial to this 
chapter. The more recent version adds subtlety and depth to 
Mannheim's analysis; it deserves comment on its own account.
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HISTORICAL CONDITIONS OF CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT
The previous chapter introduced Mannheim's approach to the 
analysis of a particular type of thought in connection with 
social change. This chapter makes a detailed study of the 
historical conditions that Mannheim identifies as the 
impetus to conservative thought, and comments on his way of 
relating context to the content of a style of thought.
The Politically Effective Group
Having outlined the form of conservative thought,
Mannheim begins the task of investigating its historical
development, especially its social context.
"The aim of [the] analysis is to find out how 
[the]... trend of thought... reflects the 
sociological characteristics of the group or 
individuals who stand behind it and through whom 
it finds expression."1
Mannheim has selected Prussia as "the outstanding 
centre of conservative thought."2 In 19th-century Prussia, 
Mannheim observes, only the nobility and the bureaucracy had
the level of social organization to be politically effective 
in response to the French Revolution; the proletariat was 
guild groups rather than a class; the Mittelstand (middle 
class) was not politically a bourgeoisie in the French 
sense.3 A feudal society had not yet become a class 
society. Instead of the French conflict between king and 
people, there was a struggle between the nobility and the 
monarchy (represented in Prussia by the monarchical 
bureaucracy) —  the German version of the working out of the 
conflict over ruling the state from 'above' (the monarchy) 
or (as demanded by the French Revolution) from 'below'. 
Mannheim is arguing that because Germany lacked a common 
people able to act against the state, Germany in effect had 
to substitute part of its nobility in that function in an 
era of challenge to the state.4 The nobility, though 
'above' socially, functioned as a 'below' politically.
Yet since the nobility wanted to solidify their 
position at the top of the social order while acting to 
change the governmental order, Mannheim says that they had a 
conservative analogue of the French 'revolutionary impulse'. 
They wanted change toward "an 'organic' society"; "[the 
impulse was] a desire to revive the corporative structure of 
medieval society"5 which had given them position and power. 
The corporative society was the theoretical opposite of the 
absolutist state of the 18th and 19th centuries, in which
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there was (theoretically) a supreme sovereign with final 
authority, rather than a monarch who shared power with 
representative assemblies.
At the same time that there was a conservative move 
toward the past, there was also a liberal impulse in Prussia 
from those intellectuals who had welcomed Enlightenment 
thought. As Mannheim and others observed, in Prussia, 
unlike in France, centralizing and rationalist 
Enlightenment-like reforms came from 'above7, from the 
absolutist and bureaucratic state, partly against the 
interests of the nobility. (Although the reformers came 
from the nobility —  of necessity, since they held high 
bureaucratic positions which only nobles could hold —  they 
did not come from Prussia, but from other German states.
They represented an impulse toward a new German nationalism; 
Prussian nobles, in contrast, inclined toward conservatism 
and local rule.)6
The conservative Prussian nobility wanted to revive the 
corporatism of medieval society, which organized the clergy, 
nobility, and city magistrates into Stande or corporate 
political bodies (the Diet) which had an advisory function 
in the state. Many medieval institutions at all levels —  
monasteries, ecclesiastical and secular courts, the church, 
the kingdom, principal cities —  were each considered as a 
coporate body which could act for those it "represented” in
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matters of government. In Germany, in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, these corporate bodies participated in the 
Imperial Diet and in territorial diets, some of which even 
included the peasantry; there were also some city diets.7
Stande —  loosely, standings —  is also a more general 
term for recognized social orders (peasantry and townspeople 
as well as clergy and nobility), or the people who are part 
of them, and connotes fixed and hierarchical social 
structure with associated rights and obligations. The 
corporation was, as under modern law, able to act as one 
person and have the rights and responsibilities of an 
individual; conservatism's attachment to the corporate order 
included the sense that the rights, privileges and 
responsibilities of the community were more important than 
the rights of its individual constituent members, 
particularly as the theoretical basis of a state 
constitution. So the response to the power of a supreme 
sovereign took a different turn in Germany than it had in 
France;
"The situation [of resistance to the absolutist 
state in Germany] found its ideological expression 
in a feudalistic reaction... [A] movement.... with 
the most advanced ideological weapons... fought 
for aims which were determined by the social 
position of the nobility."8
Political and Social Structure of Prussia
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Mannheim could assume a familiarity with the late 
18th/early 19th-century period on the part of the German­
speaking reader of his original written work on 
conservatism, and perhaps for this reason he does not 
delineate it. Some background, however, is necessary for 
the American reader.9 After the French Revolution of 1789, 
as Mannheim indicates, all of Europe's ruling classes were 
sharply conscious of the political effects of Enlightenment 
thought. The countries of Europe (as we now know them) 
were, like pre-revolutionary France, mostly monarchies, with 
the exceptions of a few republics. What is referred to as 
the Germany of the time was larger than today's Germany and 
was fragmented into about 300 sovereign divisions or 
territorial states, ruled by princes or bishops. It was 
part of what was still called the Holy Roman Empire. The 
Empire, which included much of what would later be Germany, 
Poland, Austria, and Switzerland, was under the rulership 
(sometimes nominal, sometimes effective) of the Holy Roman 
Emperor, who had for centuries been elected almost entirely 
from the Hapsbutg (Austrian) dynasty by a handful of high 
nobles and archbishops (electors), including those in 
Germany. The nobility's status as electors provided a base 
for their power in competition with the monarchy. The Holy
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Roman Emperor ruled the Empire as a whole, but nobles ruled 
their own territory within that empire (and the Hapsburg 
emperors also had their own family territories).
In Germany, besides the 300 sovereign states, there 
were approximately 1500 manorial estates belonging to 
nobility who had no intermediate sovereigns between them and 
the Emperor, and some 50 free cities with the same 
unmediated relationship. Thus there were nearly 1,900 
rulers in Germany. Customs were local, and what was 'local' 
was circumscribed by a day's journey when journeys were made 
by foot or on horse. Kings, archbishops, counts, dukes, and 
margraves at the head of the states, and other nobles in 
their own small estates, in effect continued a feudalistic 
social system (though having dispensed with the personal 
ties of feudalism at the level of the territorial state).10 
A few states dominated in this 'Germany', either because of 
success in trade, or size, or, as with Prussia, both size 
and military power.
The rise of Prussia had begun in the 17th century, 
after the Thirty Years War had weakened the Hapsburg 
dynasty. Prussia began to grow around the core of the state 
of Brandenburg (whose court city was Berlin), as the 
Hohenzollerns began successfully to make alliances and 
military gains of territory under Frederick William the 
Great Elector. He and his successors encouraged immigrants
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to build up the undeveloped territory. The landed nobles of 
Prussia, colonizers of border lands which were added to the 
state, were militaristic and pragmatic, and their alliance 
with the Hohenzollerns solidified Prussian strength. For 
this alliance, the nobles (collectively called Junkers) were 
given absolute control over the peasants who worked their 
land.
Prussia became known for its military might. In the 
18th century, the Prussian army was a feudal-entrepreneurial 
system in which nobles, as salaried army officers of the 
Prussian state, ran military companies that owed occasional 
service to the Prussian ruler, but whose finances were 
otherwise under the company commander's control, with any 
profit he could make on maintenance of his soldiers his to 
keep. The rank and file soldiers were a combination of 
peasant draftees or recruits, and hired foreigners —  
mercenaries who could only be controlled by the most rigid 
military discipline. Prussia vied with the Austrian 
monarchy for control over Germany and other parts of the 
Empire. The central bureaucratic administration that was 
necessary to a military state continued after its high point 
under the "enlightened despot" Frederick the Great in the 
mid to late 18th century, but had limited control over the 
nobility's privileged rule of its own lands.
Prussia's nobility, which provided the state's high
141
bureaucrats (although not its reformist ones) as well as its 
military officers, were basically exempt from taxes, which 
were borne disproportionately by the thin middle class of 
tradesmen and artisans. Peasants were still serfs, tied to 
the land they were born on and owing so much labor to their 
lords that they had difficulty farming their own land.
While hereditary serfdom had disappeared in many German 
states during the 18th century, it remained in Prussia even 
into the early 19th. Until the emancipation of the serfs, 
the peasants on the nobles' estates had to have the lord's 
permission to marry, to move off the estate, to have their 
children learn a trade or go to school. Peasants owed 
varying amounts of unpaid labor to their lords, and their 
children had to perform domestic service for the lord.11 
Some of Prussia lay outside the boundaries of the Holy Roman 
Empire, remote from traveled areas. Prussian nobility, 
unlike their counterparts in western Germany, were not just 
landlords. They did not live in town or at court, but on 
their estates, managing them for agricultural production and 
exercising authority over their peasants. Nobles had laws 
and courts pertaining only to them, and they dispensed 
justice and their own law enforcement on their own lands.
From the mid to the late 18th century, Prussia had been 
ruled by Frederick the Great, an Enlightenment figure who 
was also a brilliant military general. He doubled the size
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of the army, and through years of war he almost doubled the 
territorial size of the state. He died shortly before the 
French Revolution and was succeeded by other Prussian kings 
who were pale leaders by comparison. Following the 
aftermath of the French Revolution, Napoleon began the 
military expansion of a new French Empire. He defeated 
Austria in war, refused to acknowledge the Holy Roman 
Emperor, and rearranged German states east of the Rhine.
With this change, the Holy Roman Emperor had to abdicate.
Prussia then declared war against Napoleon in 1806, in 
alliance with Russia and Saxony, and only a week later lost 
a decisive battle at Jena.12 Napoleon's victory there was 
so devastating that Prussian forces at some remaining 
fortresses surrendered without firing a shot. Napoleon 
entered Berlin, Prussia's capital city, took the horses-and- 
chariot victory monument from the top of the Brandenburg 
Gate, and carried it off to Paris.13 Prussia lost nearly 
half its territory, and owed a huge indemnity to France.
What had been the Holy Roman Empire was now divided into 
three parts: a reduced Prussia; Austria; and the 
Confederation of the Rhine. Germany's 300 states had been 
consolidated to about thirty. Prussia, whose militarism was 
its main claim to reputation, was humiliated. If the 




As Mannheim observes, the same set of historical 
conditions gave rise to both liberalism (progressivism) and 
conservatism. There had been many contradictions in 
Germany; it had been home both to a backward feudalism and 
to enthusiasm for the Enlightenment. Even in Prussia there 
were reforms, but they were reforms motivated from above, 
from a ruling (and mostly non-Prussian) noble class of 
government administrators who sometimes wished to strengthen 
not just Prussia, but a greater Germany. To achieve 
economic strength they planned to eliminate obstacles to 
capitalist development. Reform ministers in the 
administration of the Prussian state after Napoleon's 
victory abolished serfdom and guilds in the first decades of 
the 19th century. These reformers (Stein and Hardenberg) 
were not native Prussians. Army recruitment and discipline 
were also reformed under officials (Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau) who were not native Prussians.14 These reforms, 
if they were effective, would take from Prussian nobility 
their feudal privileges and their profit-making positions of 
military leadership.
The reforms and the increasing centralization of 
government administration, which, except for taxes, had 
previously been parceled out among the estates of the
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nobles, were opposed by the conservative nobility. Prussia 
was still mostly agricultural; until its boundaries were 
extended after the defeat of Napoleon, Berlin was its only 
city of any size (about 150,000 inhabitants in 1800, 20% of 
whom were soldiers or their dependents; London at the time 
had a population of 1.1 million, Paris about 600,000).15 
Though Prussian peasants had been emancipated from serfdom, 
it cost them much of their land, which they had to give as 
compensation to the nobility for loss of the peasants' 
services. Meinecke explains why this compensation came 
about:
"...it would never have been possible to impose 
reforms against the opposition of the landowners.
They still constituted the wealthiest and most 
powerful group in society, and Prussia lacked a 
socially and economically strong middle class that 
might have helped the state to defeat the nobles.
The true opponent of the nobility was the higher 
bureaucracy. .. . "16
Social positions (Stande. estates) had been basically 
hereditary until the 1800s; burghers could only rarely 
become nobles (by virtue of ennoblement by a ruler), nobles 
could not take up middle class occupations without losing 
their status and privileges; peasants could not become 
burghers. The reforms changed this, and "Estates turned 
into classes...."17 but while some burghers and well-off 
peasants were able to move upward (and buy estates of the 
nobles), the nobility did not take up another style of life. 
It "retained the character of an Estate,"18 attached to its
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old forms. Before the reforms, nobles could not incorporate 
peasant land into their estates; afterward the Junkers 
increased their holdings, by receipt of land as compensation 
and by purchase of other lands. With their now larger 
estates, and the need to re-establish productivity after the 
war, the Junkers more than ever needed agricultural labor to 
work the land, and managed to get exceptions to the freedom 
of landed peasants from obligatory services.
In practical terms, the abolition of serfdom was a 
temporary phenomenon in some areas. Alongside these still- 
serfs, a rural proletariat began to form as some peasants 
became landless because their remaining holdings were too 
small to be productive and had to be sold; these peasants 
worked as paid labor for the nobility. The reformer Stein 
in time "regarded the Prussian nobles as a burden on the 
nation: there were too many of them, most of them poor... 
undereducated and too demanding."19 Max Weber, a hundred 
years later, still regarded the Junkers as a recalcitrant 
class, and said that though they might have been landed 
nobles, they were never aristocrats.20
The nobility's authority over lands and people was 
imbued with the concept of Herrschaft. translated as 
dominion or rule, but literally lord-shaft (as in the shaft 
of a spear), and similar in sense to the English word 
"lordship". The exerciser of Herrschaft was der Herr, the
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lord and master. Sheehan comments:
"The nobility's claim to political power was 
rooted in their Herrschaft. a concept which... 
fused various forms of authority with the person 
of the individual...."21
Herrschaft had both legal and cultural meaning. It
established jurisdictional rights of rulers, though not
without room for contention between competing parties.22
In the 18th century, centralized government, with its
written rules and legal codes "replaced the complex of
customary law and tradition upon which the world of
Herrschaft had depended."23 Culturally, Herrschaft
supported a patriarchal system of both family and
government:
"As a Herr im Haus. the father's authority, his 
Herrschaft. was linked with a hierarchy of other 
authorities, ranging from the noble lord to the 
prince to the divine source of all legitimate 
rule."24
The emperor, princes, bishops, nobles, the guilds, were all
part of Herrschaft. With the changes at the end of the 18th
and beginning of the 19th century:
"In Prussia, as in other German states, the 
conflict between the reformers and their enemies 
continued a longstanding struggle between the 
advocates of state sovereignty and the defenders 
of Herrschaft... To its enemies, reform endangered 
religion, property, and authority."25
Why, under these circumstances, so favorable to
conservatism, were there any attempts at reform in Prussia
at all? For one thing, the cities had very different
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economic interests, and different social forms from the 
countryside and its nobility, and wanted reforms (though for 
the most part they did not get them). For another, Prussia 
was not just a rigidly bureaucratic and militaristic state; 
it had also experienced Enlightenment ideas and progressive 
administration under Frederick the Great. It also had 
different regions, not all of them Junker-ruled. With 
Napoleon threatening to rule all of Europe, there were hopes 
that Prussia, though temporarily defeated, would yet be the 
"protector of German freedom and culture.... Heroism, 
military glory, energy, enlightened Protestantism —  these 
were the forces that made Prussia appealing in 
Germany.. .. "26
Both the conservatives and the liberals hoped for a 
Prussia restored to its former strength, and an alliance 
with Russia against Napoleon from 1813 to 1815 made possible 
the "Wars of Liberation," followed by Napoleon's defeat at 
Waterloo. Prussia came out of the subsequent Congress of 
Vienna, as part of the new German Confederation, with 
boundaries that increased its share of western Germany. The 
Confederation included Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Prussia continued to struggle with Austria (where Metternich 
consolidated reactionary forces) for control of central 
Europe.
The early 19th century was a period of emerging
nationalism in Germany. In an attempt to build a nation 
state out of centuries of fragmented, personally- 
aggrandizing small rulerships, German thinkers drawing on 
idealism and Romanticism conceived of a national feeling 
residing in the people as a whole —  the Volkstum. This 
encompassing spirit was held to be an immanent quality of 
all the sharply divided German estates and classes —  the 
peasants, the Buraertum (bourgeoisie, townspeople, citizens 
rather than subjects, the middle class)27, the nobility, 
craftsmen, the proletariat. In the late 18th and early 19th 
century, romantically nationalistic works came from Novalis, 
Herder, Fichte, the Grimms, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and 
reached a high point in Hegel's philosophical marriage of 
spirit and the state. But the nobility still distrusted the 
bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie feared the proletariat and a 
rootless peasantry.
Conservatism and Intellectuals
Here we can pick up again on Mannheim's analysis. He 
has said that the reformist bureaucratic state is acting in 
part against the nobility. The conservative nobility are 
looking for a way to re-establish the world they knew only a 
generation before. An alliance, as Mannheim puts it, now
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forms between Romanticism and feudalistic conservatism. 
Romanticism, intellectually opposed to the Enlightenment, 
shares conservatism's social base: those outside of the 
current of modern capitalism and rationalization (previously 
mentioned by Mannheim in connection with "suppressed modes 
of thought"). Aside from the nobility, these are the petit 
bourgeoisie and (lacking institutionally-strong Catholicism 
in Prussia) Pietist Protestants. (Peasants, although also 
earlier identified as 'outside' by Mannheim, are not 
specified as part of Romanticism's social base.)
By the time Romanticism becomes a movement, however, 
its exponents are chiefly 'socially unattached 
intelligentsia'28 from the same stratum that provided 
proponents of the Enlightenment. But while Enlightenment 
writers had the ideological support of the bourgeoisie, 
"conversion to romanticism meant for the intelligentsia an 
increasing social and philosophical isolation."29 The 
German bourgeoisie was not politically conscious; newspapers 
were few and not independent of the ideology of the state; 
the profession of independent writer was a new and insecure 
one. Although there had been an upsurge in the publication 
of books and the founding of journals and newspapers in 
Germany at the end of the 18th century30, they promoted a 
literary culture rather than political commentary. This 
literary public was probably less than 5% of the total
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population.31 Early 19th-century Germany "lacked a
political or cultural center like London or Paris."32
Under Frederick the Great, poets and scholars wrote of the
spirit, not of the politics of the state, and nobles gave
them patronage without concerning themselves with what these
thinkers wrote. But as the 19th century begins, the
intellectuals "sell their pens";33 on the negative side,
Mannheim says, they become "mercenary pamphleteers"; on the
positive side they raise questions as they speculate on
history and philosophy. Their observations could be astute,
but lacking social roots,
"...they defended causes which had their social 
basis elsewhere —  in strata of greater social 
vitality. Their fate is typical of the fate of 
the intelligentsia in the modern world —  clearly 
traceable since the eighteenth century."3*
Now, in a Germany on the edge of the industrial
revolution,
"The fate of the world of thought is in the care 
of a socially unattached, or barely attached, 
stratum.... This fact is of the greatest 
importance for modern thought...."
because ultimate aims of ideological movements derive from
their social background. In the hands of intellectuals who
don't share this background, aims can be "frittered away."
But, on the other hand, without intellectuals to speculate
on philosophical questions and to perceive and discuss
qualitative differences,
"it might easily happen that all spiritual content
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would disappear from our increasingly capitalistic 
society and leave nothing but naked interests.
For it is the latter which are at the basis of 
ideas as well as ideologies."35
Mannheim examines the thought of some of these "socially
unattached" intellectuals. They are freischwebende —
"free-floating" (or free-soaring) —  because they are
neither of the class of their birth nor of the class of
their aspiration as they move across the social order in
their attempt to establish their living. They still,
however, have the personal history of their class origins to
influence their actions, as well as their ambitions. They
are not unrelated to the social order, but are in a position
of suspension (another meaning of Schwebe), of hovering.
Earlv Conservatism
As examples of precursors of such unattached 
intellectuals in early German conservatism, Mannheim 
discusses the writings of Adam Muller (1779-1829) and Justus 
Moser (1720-1794), and compares them to the English 
conservatism of Edmund Burke (1729-1797), whose attack on 
the French Revolution influenced Muller. In German social 
thought, Mannheim says, Muller stands at the "juncture" of 
intellectual Romanticism and feudal conservatism.36 Like 
Burke, Muller is the nobility's "middle-class" interpreter,
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whose distance from the nobility gives him perspective on 
their social conditions, while his interest in becoming one 
of them gives him solidarity with some of their views.37 
Muller, the son of a minor official, was a tutor to families 
of the nobility; he gained a noble title a few years before 
his death. Moser was another middle-class interpreter, the 
son of a lawyer who had risen to an important government 
position alongside aristocrats; the younger Moser's career 
followed a similar path.38 He is analyzed by Mannheim as 
an influence on Muller; he was himself a late 18th-century 
writer and government official, and a Westphalian, not a 
Prussian.
Like Burke, Muller emphasizes gradual historical 
development and continuity, and makes nobility the prime 
actor in history. Like Burke, he is romantic about Europe's 
past. Mannheim traces Muller's romanticism to the attitude 
of pantheism, another pre-rationalist remnant. Pantheism is 
so attuned to the rhythms and fluctuations of the world that 
it reaches the point where, in Mannheim's words, "thought 
must not portray the world; it must accompany its 
movements." This is an important development and "from this 
tendency," Mannheim says, "arises everything we call 
'dynamic thinking'."39 Muller's Elemente der Staatskunst 
(Elements of Statecraft), prepared as lectures for German 
nobility who were government officials, is "a plea for the
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nobility and the whole feudalistic attitude."40 It was a 
response to a pamphlet by a liberal writer and was 
"encouraged" by Friedrich von Gentz, Muller's friend and a 
writer and politician who spread Metternich's reactionary 
views.41 The influence of Burke, Mannheim says, can be 
verified by Muller's own references; there is also an 
influence from Moser, Mannheim claims, though he is not 
quoted by Muller.
Moser, Mannheim says, doesn't romanticize like Burke, 
he simply "lives in the remnants of the past which still 
exist in the present";42 the past is not yet an object of 
reflection. He wrote a history of his home district, 
Osnabrvick, and many newspaper essays. The history put forth 
the theory that traditions and custom contribute to the form 
of government. Even a sympathetic observer notes that 
Moser's theory is more consistent than his history;43 
Mannheim, in a footnote, calls the Osnabruckische Geschichte 
"largely a tissue of more or less gratuitous 
explanations. "44
Moser's writing, Mannheim says, praises 'practice' in 
contrast to 'theory', and favors 'qualitative' thinking 
against universals (an element of Romanticism, Mannheim 
points out, which was already in feudalism and its local 
differences of customs). Moser justifies serfdom, and 
opposes general laws. Moser's theme (what a critic would
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call the good old days of feudalism) is also in Muller, 
Mannheim finds, but more as a type of thought than as a 
direct influence from Moser. "Moser's... older feudalistic 
ideas... reappear on a romantic 'level' in Muller."45 In 
drawing on both feudalistic and romantic sources, Muller 
gave "internal consistency to the ideological struggle" of 
counter-revolutionary thought.46 The "alliance with 
romanticism" saved the old, feudalistic forms of thought and 
experience, "revived them, and eguipped them with a modern 
theoretical foundation."47
The Historical Determination of Thought
Mannheim analyzes how the writings of both these 
authors exemplify the characteristics of conservative 
thought listed earlier —  concreteness against abstraction; 
extreme individualization; qualitative thinking that is 
against generalization and uniformity (thus anti­
bureaucracy) . Conservative German thought, he says, started 
out in opposition to the Enlightenment tendency to 
bureaucratic centralization, then after allying with 
Romanticism, also opposed the natural law thought of the 
revolutionary bourgeoisie. It thus opposed two forms of 
rationalism: bureaucratic rationalism, which 'equalizes'
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territorial and social differences in a narrow sphere; and 
bourgeois rationalism, which "wants to rationalize the whole 
social order... in a systematic manner."48
France had had a ready-made counter-revolutionary 
metaphysics in Roman Catholicism; northern Germany, home to 
Protestantism, had to formulate its opposition and did so by 
attacking the logic and method of liberal thought. 
Enlightenment thought, Mannheim notes, is unilinear -- the 
unfolding of single principles is its 'progress', its 
'rights of man'. Muller opposed static (rational) thought 
with dynamic thinking, and the "historical school" opposed 
rationalism with irrationalism (the not always reasonable 
course of actual events). In Muller's Elemente der 
Staatskunst
"grows up that phenomenon which, under the name 
of 'philosophy of life' (Lebensohilosophie^, 
has ever since, and today with renewed vigour, 
assailed rationalism in all its diverse 
forms.1,49
All these different tendencies become unified in a single 
Weltanschauung.
The conservative opposition to rationalism is a 
historically determined one. A priori. Mannheim says, we 
would speculate that progressives would emphasize Life (and 
its accompanying activity, movement and change), and that 
conservatives would rely on norms and rigid, unchanging 
abstractions. But empirically, historically, it is the
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other way around, because the progressive thought of the
bourgeoisie arose in alliance with rationalism (and its
universal norms).50 Romantics and conservatives, needing a
key theoretical issue to challenge, made the natural-law,
rationalistic thinking of the Enlightenment that issue.
Responding to that core theoretical problem unified
conservative thought.
"In bourgeois natural-law thought the state is 
established by a settlement (contract) between 
the contracting parties recognized for all time 
as just. In feudalistic, romantic thought the 
state is an ever-fluctuating dynamic settlement 
between antagonistic groups. Something in that 
conception sounds familiar to us."51
The familiar emphasis on the dynamic, according to Mannheim,
has since been taken over by the Left.
Content and Context
In his essay on "Conservative Thought" Mannheim 
examines both the content of knowledge (including 
epistemological assumptions) and the social context of 
knowledge. His sociology of knowledge is not just about the 
social position of the knower, but is also about the ideas 
themselves, as in a history of ideas. The summary below 
breaks out what Mannheim says into these two areas; in
brackets [like this] is my way of phrasing when it is very 






arose in opposition to 
Aristotelian scholasticism 
and to Rennaissance 
philosophy of nature.
Rationalism assumes true 
knowledge is only that which 
can be shown to be 
universally valid.
Intellectually, Romanticism 
arose in opposition to the 
rationalism of the 
Enlightenment.
Traditionalism is a general 
psychological attitude, 
transhistorical.
Ways of thinking or acting 
can have their own history; 
they pre-exist the 
individual and are 
[relatively] objective 
mental structures.
Each style of thought works 
out a kev problem that: a) 
gives the thought its 
theoretical unity b) 
determines it growth c) 
makes its interpretation 
possible. (E.g. key problem 
for conservatives is to 
oppose natural-law mode of 
thought —  not just its
SOCIAL c o n t e x t
French Revolution polarized 
thought as well as action.
Politics became the center 
of crystallization for 
styles of thought in the 
first half of the 19th 
century.
Social groups outside of the 
bourgeois movement for 
rationalization and 
capitalism are groups which 
continued the thought that 
rationalism suppressed —  
Romanticism and feudal 
conservatism.
Conservatism is a specific 
product of class society. 
Traditionalism can become 
the historically-specifc 
conservatism given the 
necessary juncture of 
events, which includes the 
need to oppose another style 
of thought. This happens in 
a class society, a society 
in which change occurs by 
class conflict.
Objective mental structures 
are bound up with the fate 
of human groups.
Behind each style of thought 
is a basic intention out of 
which it grows, the 
"inarticulate group 
experience" [derived from 
social circumstances].
(E.g. basic intention of 
conservatives is to hold 
onto a traditional way of 
life [which they still to
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CONTENT/EPISTEMOLOGY
content but also its 
[epistemological 
assumptions]. They oppose 
Reason conceived of in 
static fashion.
Opposing styles of thought 
will have different 
intentions but may have the 
same impetus, and share 
characteristics. (E.g. 
"excessive subjectivism" 
of both romanticism and 
rationalism in the 
nineteenth century.)
Content or epistemology 
cannot be assigned to 
political positions a 
priori. (E.g, a priori,
Life would seem to go with 
progressive thought, and 
norms and rigid abstractions 
with conservative thought, 
but it is vice versa because 
revolutionary thought of the 
bourgeoisie arose in 
alliance with rationalism.)
SOCIAL CONTEXT
some extent practiced before 
conservative thought went 
forward in its 
development].)
Left and right political 
positions may derive from 
the same basic opposition to 
a preceding style of thought 
[depending on social and 
political circumstances and 
events]. (E.g. Marxist and
vitalist conceptions of 
dynamic reality develop from 
romantic opposition to 
bourgeois rationalism.)
Right wing opposition to 
capitalism initiated 
criticisms that were later 
taken over by the left. The 
structural difference 
remains, however, that left 
opposition (proletariat) 
grew out of capitalism, 
right did not.
A social group must have 
acquired a certain degree of 
organization to effectively 
respond to [pressure on 
their way of life], both in 
political action and in 
thought.
Exponents of a style of 
thought who are socially 
unattached intelligentsia 
will not have a cause of 
their own and thus will not 
understand [or theorize] 
ends; this typifies the 
intelligentsia today and is 
traceable to the 18th 
century.
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The content of a style of thought is a response to
social context; that context also includes already existing
styles of thought, which may either be opposed or adapted by
the developing style. It is the oppositional dynamic,
however —  two different arguments competing to define
meaning and social purpose —  that generates consciously
articulated styles of thought. A style of thought is not
inherently (by its content) suited to a left or right
political position. Historical circumstances determine the
political favor attached to ideas. The shaping of ideas by
interests (and of interests by ideas) is not a mechanical
process, but one which reaches deeply into lived experience,
traditions, and desires.
After a close analysis of the writings of Adam Muller
and Justus Moser, with asides on Burke, Ranke, Stahl,
Savigny, de Maistre, Hegel, and other, more minor, authors,
Mannheim concludes:
"It is not necessary to go into all the 
details....Our purpose was merely to show that not 
only the content of thought, but even the 
conceptions of reality of the twofold opposition 
against bourgeois rationalism were formed in 
direct reaction against it; that the product of 
the struggle was a concept of life which was 
characterized by movement, by dynamics; and that 
both the vitalist and Marxist conceptions of 
reality developed in clear continuity from this 
romantic opposition."52
For the most part, Mannheim's account of the 
development of the conservative style of thought is an 
account of contents. Context plays a background part in his
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description, though not in the theory which is meant to 
support his method. An overview of context (as given here) 
supports his argument that the social conditions, 
experience, and historical place of a particular social 
group provided the substance out of which conservative 
thought was built. But as Mannheim's critics complain, the 
mechanism of connection is not specified. However, Mannheim 
argues that the connection is not mechanical —  finding it 
is an interpretive process.
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CHAPTER SIX
FROM CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT
The previous chapters have discussed how knowledge functions 
in society, considered questions about what scientific 
knowledge contributes to worldview, and discussed how 
Mannheim investigated the influence of worldview by giving a 
developmental account of a "style of thought." This chapter 
turns to the comparison of different centers of contention 
for styles of thought —  namely, politics (as in Mannheim's 
example) and science (as I find central to arguments about 
the environment).
Together, Chapters 1-6 form Part I of this study. They 
introduce the concepts used for the analysis of 
environmental thought. Part II summarizes major 
environmental books of the 1960s and 70s, analyzing their 
concerns and underlying worldview. The last two chapters 
compare scientific and political frameworks for 
understanding social action, and evaluate the use I have 
made of Mannheim's method for analyzing the relation of 
worldview and argument, and the relation of social origins 
to the content of arguments.
Scientists as Environmental Voices
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After I first read Mannheim's "Conservative Thought" I 
thought it would be interesting to see how left and right, 
or conservative and liberal, are now positioned on 
legislative issues before the U.S. Congress, and whether 
those positions accorded with any of the 19th-century 
conservative and liberal goals. To narrow the inquiry, I 
turned to environmental issues, but soon found that a left 
and right characterization of stances was not easily made.
I wondered if this was because politics itself was not the 
center of contention where environment was concerned, but 
scientific data and opinion that was the focus of 
disagreement. I then began to think about science as an 
organizing center for an emerging style of thought, an 
"environmental" style of thought. My understanding of 
environmental issues had come out of a feeling for nature 
and an appreciation of its vitality, beauty and diversity. 
That nature tradition, I thought, might be like the 
persistence of feudal tradition among 19th-century 
conservatives —  a "suppressed mode of thought" that now, 
under new and threatening conditions, was finding its voice 
in a new way.
Thus I had two parallels to Mannheim's study of 
conservative thought: a concept-organizing center (science)
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for contended issues, and a group with a neglected worldview 
who felt both the obligation and the opportunity to speak. 
The nature lovers, I thought, would have appropriated 
scientifc arguments to make their case while developing a 
specific voice of their own, just as conservatives 
appropriated Romantic rhetoric —  a third parallel. In my 
memory of the 60s and 70s, when environmentalism sprang up, 
it was those who cared about nature who were carrying the 
flag and getting people to listen. Behind 
environmentalism's sudden appearance, I knew, was a long 
tradition of conservation. But when I tried to list the 
books that I remembered from that period, I could not 
remember books by nature writers. After some research, I 
found that the books that most captured the public 
attention, that were most widely sold (some in the millions 
of copies), were, for the most part, books by scientists. 
Scientists might seem to be likely authors where arguments 
have science at issue, but in fact, there are many 
constraints against scientists speaking out on public 
issues. The objectivity that science aims for is 
pragmatically coupled with neutrality, while environmental 
issues call for taking sides.
Perhaps, I thought, the two types of environmental 
voices —  scientific and nature-oriented —  combined in some 
way. I do think that this combination happens, but I did
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not find much of it in the leading books of the period. 
(Rachel Carson is an exception to this general rule; her 
feeling for nature illumines Silent Spring.1 of course, 
there are many avenues to public opinion, and books are only 
one. The nature-oriented organizations that had long been 
active in conservation were not silent during the 60s and 
70s. But the voice that captured attention was the voice of 
warning, and that warning was made most convincingly by 
people with scientific training.
So the works that are reviewed here are mostly books by 
scientists, although articles and books by non-scientists 
are also included. The works were chosen for the notice 
they achieved, evidenced either by sales figures or by 
frequent mention in other environmental literature.
Although only these works are mentioned, I read many 
others —  poetry, reflections, fiction, polemics, 
meditations on nature. To my regret, I could not bring them 
all into one study. With my source material at hand, I 
considered how to apply Mannheim's study of conservative 




Mannheim selects a particular example of conservative 
thought, what he calls "early or old conservatism" in 
Germany in the first half of the 19th century, because this 
is a particularly "paradigmatic" case for his analysis of 
style of thought. He notes that the theoretical divisions 
of conservative thought, and their corresponding social 
class divisions, are not so clearly marked in England, where 
in fact conservative thought of the political type began.
An essential part of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge 
is that a consciously-developed ideological argument must 
have a particular social location, some "bearing strata," at 
least in the initial stages. Thus he locates the early 
conservativism of Germany in the Prussian nobility, but 
notes that conservative thought assumes different forms 
depending on whether it is borne by aristocracy, small 
estates, bureaucracy, or monarchy.
The way in which Mannheim identifies the social 
location of an ideological position is not to go into detail 
about socioeconomic status (landholding, relative wealth, 
social status, occupation, hereditary privilege, etc.), but 
is instead to trace currents of thought along a line of 
development that follows historical events. He does a 
history of ideas in which the ideas are related to material
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developments. The principle of his sociology of knowledge 
as he applies it to conservative thought is that "thinking 
reflects existence."
In his analysis of conservatism, Mannheim identifies 
several key elements in the development of a style of 
thought. I have abstracted these key elements from what 
Mannheim says; he does not provide a summary of this method 
as I give it here. (Where I use his terminology it is in 
quotes.) Mannheim identifies a polarizing event (not his 
term) that gives impetus to the style of thought. (For 
conservativism, the polarizing event was the French 
Revolution.)
He locates the polarizing event within a sphere of 
social activity, and names that activity the point or agency 
of "crystallization" for styles of thought that develop 
oppositionally. This point is a center of contention around 
which groups develop their differences in the form of 
arguments meant to persuade.
He identifies an effective group, (my term) one with 
sufficient social organization to mount the response to the 
opposing style of thought. The actual authors of the 
response may speak for that group rather than being of it. 
(For 19th-century German conservatism the effective group 
was the Prussian nobility.
He identifies a "basic intention" that comes out of the
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group's social situation. The individual can match this 
intention to his/her own experience, which is unarticulated 
until the style of thought articulates it. (For 
conservatives, to hold on to a traditional way of life.)
There is a polarity (my term) by which opposing styles 
of thought can be characterized, and which stands for the 
fact that styles of thought develop oppositionally. 
(Conservative/liberal.)
There is a "kev problem" (epistemological issue) which 
is related to the group's intent, as Mannheim says, not only 
to think about different things, but to think about them 
differently. (For conservatives, to resist the abstract 
universals of Enlightenment thought.)
These elements must be situated within a context of 
"oriented change” —  extensive society-wide change which is 
the matrix within which polarization can take place. (In 
Mannheim's example, restructuring of the monarchical, 
European nation-state, the growth of capitalism, and class 
society.)
Following Mannheim
There are three major points to remember in analyzing a 
style of thought according to Mannheim's method: that the
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overall method is an analysis of meanings (not of veracity, 
validity, or accuracy); that arguments express and derive 
from a basic intention related to a desired world; that the 
arguments are structured around a kev problem that gives 
theoretical unity to the thought-style.
The basic intention is the intention of a group or 
class, not of any single thinker, and no single thinker will 
express all of it, but some "authentic manifestations" of 
this intention will be in any one individual author's work. 
"Authentic manifestations" are characteristics of the 
argument related to intention; they are authentic in that 
they come out of the experience of life shared by the group 
with the intention.
Similarly, there are characteristics of the argument 
related to the key (epistemological) problem, which come out 
of opposition to an already formulated argument for a 
desired world, one that the newly raised voices wish to keep 
from happening, or from developing further.
In conservative thought, for example, characteristics 
of the argument which are related to the intention to 
maintain or return to a traditional form of living are its 
emphasis on details rather than on overall structure, on a 
concrete notion of property rather than an abstract one, and 
on a qualitative idea of liberty rather than a 
universalistic one —  all related to an older feudalistic
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structure of property ownership, rights, and obligations, 
with its local peculiarities and personal relationships.
Epistemological characteristics, formulated in 
opposition to revolutionary Enlightenment thought, are that 
History replaces Reason as a legitimating explanation —  it 
is the supposed principal mover of human events; the 
irrationality of reality is emphasized, rather than its 
adherence to universal laws; universalistic statements are 
countered by descriptions of individual cases; and finally, 
dynamic reason replaces static reason. (This dynamic 
reason, or dialectic, counters the static character of 
Aristotelian or formal logic, which relies on fixed 
identities for the progression of its reasoning. Fixed 
identities allow for the timelessness of universal laws, and 
for natural law as found in Enlightenment thought.)
Analyzing Individual Authors
All of these characteristics are Mannheim's summation 
of a body of conservative thought. He uses individual 
arguments to illustrate these characteristics, but he does 
not say how he went about evaluating each separate argument 
itself. Instead, he talks about how he treated the body of 
work as a whole. For my investigation, I have found it
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necessary to ask the question, How may an individual 
author's work be investigated for its possible participation 
in a thought style? The overall process of investigation is 
hermeneutic: individual arguments with a similar theme point 
to a thought style; an apparent thought style gives meaning 
to the utterances of individual arguments. In order to 
piece together the whole thought style out of its individual 
elements, one needs an overview from reading many arguments, 
and a methodical way of approaching the individual works.
For the works considered in this study, I had an overview as 
a result of having read many of the environmental works of 
the 60s, and some of the 70s, as they appeared. Of each 
individual work, after reading or re-reading it, I asked:
- What does the author praise? Criticize? Emphasize?
Justify?
- What is the author's main argument?
- What other types of argument does the author ally with or 
adopt?
- How does the author define differently something that has 
already been given a definition by an existing and opposing 
thought-style?
From my overview of the works I listed provisional 
characteristics related to intention in environmental
thought as it comes from scientists:
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- Emphasis on system complexity and interrelatedness.
- The frequent citing of facts and the use throughout of 
quantification.
- The use of prediction as warning or an emphasis on 
prediction as a requirement of responsible action.
- Speaking out in the context of moral responsibility.
The citing of facts and the use of prediction 
conceivably come out of the professional, occupational 
experience of all scientists, out of empirical 
investigation, out of the requirement that science be 
predictive to prove itself. Interrelatedness is not 
emphasized by all scientists. In the life sciences —  whose 
subject matter has a direct connection to environmental 
issues —  an emphasis on system complexity is particular to 
ecologically-oriented scientists, and it is counter to the 
reductionist discipline of molecular biology. Speaking out 
is another characteristic not common among scientists, who 
have been traditionally expected to stand apart from 
politics. Yet there has been, since the development of the 
atomic bomb, an ethic of speaking out as a moral 
responsibility under grave circumstances; it is the gravity 
of the situation that makes the scientist speak out —  a
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case of no longer being able to keep quiet.
The key epistemological problem for scientist 
environmental writers in this period appeared to be holism 
vs reductionism. Some characteristics of the related 
arguments are:
- Wholes replace parts as elements of analysis.
- Interrelatedness counters isolated elements.
- Multiple causes, or cyclical causes, replace single or 
linear causes.
- Time-awareness replaces atemporality; the present is not a 
timelessly representative moment of universal laws, but is 
projected into a future which will change it.
- Behavior constitutes structure (as in ecology), rather 
than structure determining behavior (as in molecular 
biology); this is a choice of perspective, not a final 
either-or statement.
These "authentic manifestations" and epistemological 
characteristics of the environmental style of thought are to 
be found in the totality of the arguments made in the major 
environmental books of the 60s and 70s. As Mannheim 
observed, no one argument will include all elements.
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Politics and Science as Centers of Contention for Thought
Mannheim's reading of European history is that politics 
became the center of crystallization for styles of Western 
thought in the first half of the 19th century, when the 
growth of the modern state made all social struggles 
political (i.e., gave them political relevance in the 
apportionment of power between and among government and 
governed.) Today, we could say that state intervention 
plays the part of state growth; all struggles are 
politically relevant because of the pervasiveness of the 
state.
In addition, today the growth of science (also a site 
of state intervention) provides a new center for styles of 
thought because it makes for new struggles: over the use of 
nuclear power; over the control of the processes and 
ownership of one's own body (and because of psychoactive 
drugs, thus over one's mind); over the environment, which 
transcends political boundaries; over the collection, use, 
distribution and control of information; over the meaning of 
ethical values themselves, not just over any particular 
values.
With science as the center of contention for styles of 
thought (arguments intended to persuade and legitimate), the 
fulfillment of Mannheim's categories can be hypothesized as
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follows for the 1960s and 70s in the United States, the 
developmental period for a new environmental style of 
thought.
Polarizing event
Atomic bomb. This began the re-evaluation of science.
Center of contention 
Science
Effective group
Critical responses to science are located in varying groups. 
For environment as the issue which elicits or provides the 
opportunity for this critique, and for critique which 
appears as coherent theoretical or persuasive argument in 
written form, one group is notable: relatively independent 
life scientists. Nature-oriented writers also present an 
environmental argument, but not as theoretically or 
pragmatically attuned to science.
Basic intention





To resist reductionism with holism. Scientific rationalism 
and technological growth suppress holism until the holistic 
view becomes relevant to the misuses of science/technology, 
whereupon it takes the form of "environmentalism."
Oriented change (issues in the United States, 1960s-70s) 
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons 
population explosion 
pollution
"Silent Spring" and subsequent environmental warnings 
oil spills




The environmental works of the 1960s and 70s that have 
been chosen are reviewed in chronological order, to give a 
sense of the development of the environmental argument. I 
give a much more detailed account of content than Mannheim 
does with the works he considers. Mannheim presented the 
results of his analysis, not the process of it. The form of 
"Conservative Thought" is critique as much as analysis. 
Mannheim "unmasks" conservative thought, but does not do it 
oppositionally. In fact, some have argued that Mannheim 
intentionally reproduced the conservative approach in his 
insistence on the importance of concrete circumstances, 
local conditions, and dynamic change.1 Yet since Mannheim 
points out that this emphasis was later taken over by 
Marxist thinkers, this characteristic of his work cannot 
definitely be used to position him politically. As Mannheim 
himself says, content cannot be assigned a political label 
a priori; historical circumstances will determine whether a 
given content will have a left or right meaning.
Since all analysis must be made from some position, and 
since Mannheim himself is subject to the same analysis that 
he applies, it is reasonable to ask where he stood, what his 
background was, and whether he could achieve some stance of 
neutrality in his work. That question requires much more
investigation than this study can provide. However, the 
same question can be asked also of me, and can be at least 
partially answered. In the environmental debate, I am on 
the side of those who are convinced that not enough is being 
done to make the changes that are necessary to preserve the 
environment and assure the future security of our own lives 
on the planet. In my own terms, I am a science-skeptic, one 
who does not trust that science and technology will be used 
for ecological balance, while at the same time depending on 
science to provide the information that warns of danger and 
makes environmentally positive action possible. In this 
study I am reviewing the works of people who mostly share 
that view. This study is not an account of both sides of 
the argument, but of one side —  although that one side has 
its own diversity. By being detailed about content, I 
attempt to give a balanced account of the development of 
that argument, as I believe Mannheim attempted to do in the 
case of conservative thought.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
1. See the Introduction by David Kettler, Volker Meja and 
Nico Stehr, editors of Conservatism, by Karl Mannheim 




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCIENCE - SILENT SPRING
Part I introduced knowledge in society and the question of 
how science, as a particular form of knowledge, is to 'be' 
in society. The environmental debate has been identified as 
a place where this question is prominent. That debate was 
used as a case in point for a "conceptual shift" toward the 
use of a scientific framework for legitimating social 
action. Mannheim's study of conservative thought was 
reviewed and taken as a model to follow for the study of 
environmental thought. Part II analyzes environmental 
arguments. This chapter reviews the book that set off the 
environmental debate in the United States, Silent Spring, 
and the questions it raises about the uses of science.
Developing a Stance
We can see the concern about science in the 
environmental arguments that began developing in the United 
States in the 1960s. As environmental concerns were voiced,
a stance began to develop toward science in society that 
would engage not just occasional critics, but a large 
public. There was a century-old tradition of nature 
appreciation and conservationist ethic in American society, 
but this tradition did not contain positions on the 
activities of science. For that was needed a new type of 
argument —  itself scientific —  that would act as a banner 
for environmentally concerned people to hold up and rally 
around. That banner argument appeared with the publication 
of the book Silent Spring.1
The Banner Argument
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, published in 1962, was 
the first "environmental" book to capture public opinion. 
Her graphic account of the environmental damage done by the 
indiscriminate use of the newly synthesized pesticides, 
especially insecticides, was not only a best seller in the 
United States but was widely read elsewhere, being 
translated into twelve languages within a year of first 
publication.2 Before the changes brought about by World 
War II, books about what we would now consider the 
environment were "Nature" books —  books about a natural 
world that was not a problem to be solved as "the
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environment" is.
There were many postwar changes in the United States: 
an expanding economy, a baby boom, the growth of suburbs, 
the spread of technology, the increasing importance of 
science across many domains of activity —  military, 
medical, agricultural, industrial. There were increasing 
encroachments on nature as a result of population pressures 
and new methods of farming and forestry. In this era of 
progress, voices critical of "gains" produced by science and 
technology had small audiences. Carson was an exception. 
Trained in science, she wrote a book that warned of the 
heedless use of scientific invention and, at the same time, 
of the urgent need for scientific study of the effects of 
new methods of controlling insect and plant life.
Silent Spring is both a moral tale and a scientific 
commentary.3 Carson wrote an impassioned book, yet one 
committed to science and scientific evidence. Her 
description of the natural world shows a love of its beauty 
and its achievements; she combines this with a harsh account 
of the destruction of both life and balance that has 
resulted from an attitude of conquest toward nature. It is 
this interplay of lyrical and cold prose that gives the book 
much of its power. Silent Spring is an attention-holding 
tale of death and destruction at the hands of unthinking and 
unheeding conquerors; it is also a documented record of
environmental damage. At the end of the book, a chapter- 
length series of notes on the author's sources (for almost 
every page of the book) shows the thoroughness with which 
she has gathered her evidence, the spirit of science which 
underlies her effort.
The book begins with a vision of an Eden past —  of an 
imaginary town set among farms somewhere in America, in 
harmony with its natural surroundings. Here people notice 
and enjoy the beauty and variety of the life that surrounds 
them —  plants, animals, birds, fish. But a change takes 
place. Some "evil spell" settles on the community; people 
become ill, wildlife sickens, plants wither. No newly born 
life survives among domestic or wild animals, no plants bear 
fruit, no birds sing. Barely noticed, a white granular 
powder still lies in places where it had fallen on the town 
"like snow." Though the change seems incomprehensible, 
Carson explains that "No witchcraft, no enemy action had 
silenced new life... The people had done it themselves."4 
This "Fable for Tomorrow," as Carson calls it, is based on a 
present in which pesticides are spreading death beyond their 
intended targets. It is a warning to us, a portent of a 
future in which the voices of spring are no longer to be 
heard. Though the town is imaginary, the past in which 
spring brought beauty and rebirth to towns across America is 
not. It is the desolation of the future which is fabled,
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not the Eden of the past. And yet, though the future is an 
imagined one, it is imagined on the basis of scientific 
evidence.
In Carson's story of the imaginary town, the plants and 
animals are named or identified by familiar terms; they are 
specific lives to her. Not just trees, but "oak and maple 
and birch set up a blaze of color in autumn across a 
backdrop of pines." Not just roadside plants, but "laurel, 
viburnum, alder, great ferns and wildflowers delight... the 
traveler's eye through much of the year." This feeling for 
nature is the blood that courses through the body of 
Carson's argument.
The Scientific Report
Setting prophecy aside for reporting, Carson goes on to 
explain that while no one real town in the United States has 
suffered all the disasters of the fable, the disasters are 
real and have all occurred somewhere, with many towns 
suffering a substantial number of them. The "imagined 
tragedy may easily become a stark reality we shall all 
know," Carson warns, and her book, she says, will attempt to 
explain how the silencing so far has come about.5 It does 
that and more. It indicts the practices and attitudes that
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have caused such damage, and urges other actions more 
cognizant and more appreciative of how nature works.
The chapter that follows the fable starts immediately 
with a direct attack on the way chemicals have been used to 
alter nature. In the long history of living things, change 
has occurred slowly as species were molded, in interaction, 
by their environment. No one species —  until now —  has 
alone had the power to change the networks and cycles of 
nature's interactions as man does with his interventions.
This power to change nature has already become what 
Carson calls an assault on nature. A "chain of evil and 
death" has been initiated with new, synthetic chemicals.
The new postwar insecticides are made by rearranging 
molecules into new structures.6 The result is new 
substances, not known in nature. Most pre-war insecticides 
were inorganic, but the postwar synthetic insecticides are 
organic, or carbon-compound chemicals. Carbon has a high 
ability to link with other elements. This means that many 
new arrangements can be produced in the laboratory. While 
nature uses millenia of time to achieve balance, Carson 
observes, man is hasty and heedless in his introduction of 
new substances into the environment, and the quantity and 
variety of chemicals to which life must now adjust is 
staggering. Most of these synthetics not only act as direct 
poisons, but also alter the biological processes of
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oxidation and enzyme production on which normal functioning 
of body organs depends.
The new synthetics fall into two main groups: 
chlorinated hydrocarbons (now sometimes also called 
organochlorines) and organophosphates. The residues from 
the spraying or dusting of hydrocarbons are long-lasting in 
their toxicity. Probably most well known among the 
hydrocarbons is DDT —  now banned in this country as a 
result of the outcry following Silent Spring but still 
manufactured here and exported to the third world; dieldrin 
and aldrin, more toxic, remain in use. Organophosphate 
residues decompose more quickly than those of hydrocarbons, 
but are poisonous in miniscule amounts. The organophosphate 
malathion was still being spread from the skies in
California up until 1990, and is currently applied by
spraying on the ground.7
Carson's writing gives a striking picture of 
insecticides in the hands of the "control men" as an active
force in nature and in human life.8 Comparing the 
unrecognized threat of insecticides to the recognized danger 
of radiation, she warns that "Chemicals are the sinister 
and little-recognized partners of radiation in changing the 
very nature of the world."9 Throughout the book she uses 
phrases that repeat the theme of hovering danger unheeded: 
"chain of poisoning and death"; "impetuous and heedless pace
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of man"; "a mesmerized state"; "tranquilizing pills of half 
truth"; "elixirs of death"; "ingenious manipulations"; "a 
menacing shadow"; "the enchanted forest of the fairy tales 
has become the poisonous forest"; "pollution is unseen and 
invisible"; "the shadow of sterility"; "habit of killing"; 
"mission of death"; "sinister touch of the poison"; "Their 
presence casts a shadow that is no less ominous because it 
is formless and obscure."10 "Poison," in this account of 
Carson's, becomes an actor in the drama of a threatened 
environment.
Carson warns that "insecticides" are in fact biocides, 
potential killers of any life, not just insect life. There 
is only a fraction of time in which to adapt not only to a 
great number of chemical poisons, but to an array never 
before experienced biologically. We are at great risk: Our 
health is threatened, and the natural world on which we 
depend is endangered. And yet our goals are unexamined, and 
even our immediate reasons for the use of these chemicals 
collapse upon examination, when we see that engineering our 
environment with pesticides has allowed the most troublesome 
insects to establish themselves in areas chemically stripped 
of their natural enemies. In Carson's judgment it is not 
that there is no insect problem, no need of control, or that 
pesticides are never justified, but that the destruction is 
out of hand.11 We have much of the necessary ecological
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knowledge for achieving balance, Carson asserts, but do not 
use it. We accept inferior solutions as though we were 
"mesmerized," and settle for a changed and unsatisfactory 
natural world. Control agencies and specialists show 
"fanatic zeal" and exercise "ruthless power" in pursuit of 
an insect-free world.12 "This is an era of specialists... 
intolerant of the larger frame...." The use of chemicals 
has been indiscriminate and without advance investigation of 
their ecological effects —  an outcome of reliance on these 
specialists dominated by profit-driven industry. Yet it is 
the public that takes the risk of this use, and the public, 
Carson says, that should decide whether to continue in the 
same direction.13
Environment and Science
This basic argument of Carson's —  that the 
indiscriminate use of pesticides that we practice is 
ecologically unsound and a danger to human health —  is 
buttressed by chapters in her book which provide case 
studies of the postwar approach to nature, and which 
criticize that approach. The record of damage accumulates 
in one area of the environment after another: rivers and 
groundwater polluted by seepage and runoff of pesticides;
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contaminated soil that kills plant-assisting organisms as 
well as passing on poisons to crops; fatal damage to trees 
and beneficial plants as well as, or even instead of, to 
weeds; kill-off of birds, fish, livestock, wildlife and pets 
along with insect pests; among humans, permanent damage to 
the nervous system and vital organs, sometimes resulting in 
death; alteration of life at the cellular level that 
threatens both human and non-human genetic heritages; 
changes in the environment as a result of chemical attacks 
on it that increase the populations of pests; the rapid 
evolution of insecticide-resistant insects that threaten 
food crops and human health as much as or more than ever 
before. Dangerous chemicals are everywhere, and no human 
beings can avoid contact with them. They are in the soil 
and water, in fish, insects, and animals; they are in our 
food; they are stored in most human bodies.
Throughout all of this, science has a dual role. It is 
both "good science" and "bad science," although Carson does 
not use these terms or outline an argument about science 
separate from her account of the misuse of its inventions, 
which follows the misdirection of the attitude of conquest 
toward nature. Science as good science does detailed 
ecological studies, and makes use of the environment itself 
and natural biological controls to manage pests. In 
exploring life in cells and at the molecular level, good
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science is an effort of patience and ingenuity and an 
achievement of wonder. It is humble before nature and its 
awesomeness, and is itself awe-inspiring in its reach into 
nature's mysteries. It offers us the knowledge that we must 
have so that we may meet our "obligation to endure."14
As bad science, in a history that is not one to be 
proud of, it develops pesticides out of the death- and 
destruction-purposed chemical warfare research of World War 
II. (Insects were used to test the efficacy of the weapons, 
and the commercial development of insecticides followed 
after the war.) Bad science is more ingenious in devising 
poisons than in studying their effects. When research into 
effects is done, it is post mortem rather than 
precautionary. This inadequate science specifically 
neglects the ecology of the soil; in its narrow 
specialization of applications it ignores ecological 
principles in general. It is complicit in the profit-driven 
motives of the chemical industry. It announces "safe" 
levels of toxins as if they could be compartmentalized, and 
leaves "little understood" their "interactions, 
transformations, and summations of effect."15 This 
science acts as if it had no knowledge of its own theories 
of evolutionary change and adaptation and is taken by 
surprise by new generations of insects that no longer 
succumb to the killing chemicals science has synthesized.
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It remains intractably in the "Stone Age" of scientific 
concepts when it arrogantly asserts that we can control 
nature.16
Responses to Silent Soring
The publication of Silent Spring set off a public 
debate on environment and health that engaged industry, 
government, nature lovers, and citizens worried about their 
safety. Silent Soring was not just a book; it was a public 
event. The first response to Silent Soring came from the 
chemical industry, before publication of the book in 
September, 1962, but after condensed excerpts had appeared 
in The New Yorker. A manufacturer of insecticides tried to 
discourage publication by telling the publisher that 
Carson's statements about chlordane and heptachlor were 
inaccurate and disparaging, and (matching the cold-war, 
anti-Communist temper of the times) added that the chemical 
industry was under attack from groups who wished to decrease 
the food supply in the United States to the same levels as 
in Iron Curtain countries.17
Silent Spring was widely sold, highly criticized, and 
highly praised. After its publication, there were many 
disparaging reviews from industry sources, and many positive
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reviews in major newspapers. The book had a large advance 
sale and was a Book of the Month Club selection. It became 
a number one best seller, and since its first publication 
has been through several printings with the original 
publisher, been translated into at least a dozen languages, 
won at least eight awards, and has sold approximately two 
million copies.18 When Silent Spring first appeared, the 
chemical industry mounted a public relations campaign 
against it, sending out fact kits, press releases, and book 
reviews.19 In a rush to get its point of view known by the 
time of the book's publication, Monsanto had a parody 
written of Carson's "A Fable for Tomorrow," called "The 
Desolate Year," about destruction visited on the land by 
insects and plant diseases unchecked by pesticide 
controls.20 It was, as feminist scientist Patricia Hynes 
later characterized it, "a hostile parody... written in a 
style which mimics and banalizes Carson's writing."21 In 
imitation of Carson's naming of the now silent voices that 
had once brought pleasure, it names the swarming, unopposed 
insects that deform and kill plant life. Carson writes, "On 
the mornings that had once throbbed with the dawn chorus of 
robins, catbirds, doves, jays, wrens and scores of other 
bird voices there was now no sound; only silence lay over 
the fields and woods and marsh."22 The Monsanto article 
reads, "[Insects] came creeping and flying and crawling into
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the open.... They were chewers, and pierce-suckers, 
spongers, siphoners and chew-lappers, and all their vast 
progeny were chewers —  rasping, sawing, biting maggots and 
worms and caterpillars. Some could sting, some could 
poison, many could kill." As Hynes comments, this criticism 
of Carson exemplifies the view that "Women write life's 
poetry while men handle its hard prose."23
The debate over Silent Spring was news. The 
documentary series "CBS Reports" planned a program on it for 
April, 1963. Before the program was aired, a thousand 
letters —  what executive producer Fred Friendly called an 
"unprecedented volume" of advance mail —  came in to the 
network protesting the forthcoming broadcast. Five of the 
program sponsors withdrew —  among them producers of food 
products, animal feed, and household disinfectants (all of 
which depend on the use of the types of chemicals Carson 
discusses). The program aired; Eric Sevareid summarized the 
book and interviewed Carson, as well as government 
officials, and a spokesman for the large chemical 
corporation, American Cyanamid.24 Countering official and 
industry claims that the book overstated the problems,
Carson asserted that the public had heard very little about 
the hazards and failures of pesticide use, and that her 
information would make it possible for them to see the whole 
picture.25
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Silent Spring was the catalyst for Congressional
reviews of federal programs related to pesticide use. The
executive branch, under President Kennedy, had its own
review, beginning in the fall of 1962. Carson testified to
this committee as well as in the Senate. The President's
Science Advisory Committee issued a report, The Use of
Pesticides, in the spring of 1963, that recommended staged
reduction of the use of persistent pesticides until their
use was eliminated.26 The report, coining after an initial
period of strong attack on Silent Spring, was widely seen as
vindicating Carson.27
The debate that centers on Carson, let alone on
pesticides, is not yet dead. A symposium on Silent Spring
was sponsored by the American Chemical Society some twenty
years after the book's publication, in 1984.28 A
participant, C. F. Wilkinson, a specialist in public health
and toxicology, commented:
"In Silent Spring. Carson used pesticides 
symbolically to illustrate her view of the dire 
consequences of our continued efforts to master 
nature through technology. Despite numerous 
scientific inaccuracies and broad unsubstantiated 
conclusions, Silent Spring had an enormous impact 
on the way pesticides were viewed. For the first 
time, people were made aware of the hidden costs 
of pesticides and their potential for causing 
adverse effects on human health and the 
environment. The public felt betrayed, and 
science and technology, previously considered 
valuable allies, were seen as nature's 
enemies. ',29
At the same symposium, Shirley Briggs, a longtime
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colleague and friend of Carson's, now head of the Rachel
Carson Council, recalled that
"Many reviews [of Silent Spring! included pat 
phrases, such as, 'Of course she exaggerated and 
made, mistakes, but in general she was on the right 
track'. These face-saving phrases have taken on a 
kind of immortality; they turn up again and again 
from people who admit, when guestioned, that they 
do not know of any inaccuracies or mistakes, but 
'so many people said there were some'. We at 
Rachel Carson Council have yet to be shown a valid 
example, despite the sketchy state of much of the 
information available to her at that time. This 
accuracy shows the value of her very conservative 
approach.... "30
Changes Since Silent Spring
What changes have there been in pesticide use since 
Carson wrote her book? The use of DDT in the US was banned 
in 1972 (with exceptions)31, after years of litigation by 
the Environmental Defense Fund.32 Five basic chemical 
ingredients of pesticides have been banned for all use, and 
26 have been restricted.33 The testing of toxicity has 
increased in quantity of studies and precision of 
techniques.34 But these gains are overshadowed by other 
developments. Fifteen years after Silent Spring (by 1977), 
pesticide use by American farmers and gardeners had 
increased two and half times.35 David Pimental, an 
entomologist at Cornell University, notes that "on average,
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crop losses due to Insects have Increased nearly twofold 
from the 1940s [to the late 70s] in spite of a 10-fold 
increase in insecticide use." Among the causes is a change 
in farming to monocultures and no-till methods that both 
require higher pesticide use and make crops more vulnerable 
to pests. Pimental's judgment is that "Progress has been 
made on pesticide problems, but Silent Spring is not 
entirely behind us."36
The Environmental Protection Agency estimated in 1984 
that approximately 600 basic pesticide chemicals have 45,000 
to 50,000 formulations for market use.37 As of 1986, eight 
years after the EPA review of the 600 chemicals was begun, 
preliminary assessments had been completed on just 124 of 
them; no final assessments had been completed.3*
Though chemicals may stay in use while under review, 
researchers with the EPA state that "the vast majority of 
pesticides produced and used for agriculture when Silent 
Spring was published have either been discontinued because 
of efficacy problems or environmental concerns or restricted 
to specific nonagricultural uses."39 What is meant by this 
is that the DDT-type of insecticides (hydrocarbons or 
organochlorines), sometimes called the "old pesticides," are 
declining in use. But because they are persistent in the 
environment and in body tissues, they are not gone. And 
organophosphates, also dating from the 60s, are still in use
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(e.g., malathion). The new pesticides (especially the 
carbamates introduced around 1970, similar in action to 
organophosphates), though less persistent than the old, have 
an increased potential of leaching into the groundwater 
through the soil.40 There is a further possible effect on 
groundwater from the increasing practice of adding 
pesticides to irrigation water; effects have not been 
studied.41 Also, the organophosphates and the newer 
carbamates are more highly toxic in direct effect on humans 
and animals and more dangerous to users applying them.42 
"When agriculture and public health services switched from 
the organochlorine to the organophosphate and carbamate 
insecticides, human and animal pesticide poisoning increased 
worldwide," concludes one of the scientists participating in 
the American Chemical Society symposium.43
The agricultural chemist who notes this change also 
gives this summary: "Despite the continuing and spreading 
controversy over the use of pesticides, the use of such 
chemicals has increased since the publication of Silent 
Spring. The average annual increase in pesticide use [as of 
the mid-80s] has been about 4 to 5% on a global basis." The 
developed nations use more than half; exact amounts used in 
developing countries are difficult to determine.44 But 
pesticides are relied upon in the third world for both the 
heavily agricultural economies, and for control of pests
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even in urban areas because of their year-round presence in 
tropical climates, and pesticide use is increasing.
Although direct effects of pesticides on wildlife have 
been much studied since the 60s, less attention has been 
paid to effects on human health,45 and according to Russell 
Hall, a researcher with the US Fish and Wildlife Service, 
"effects of pesticide use on ecosystems have scarcely been 
investigated."46 Research that has been done concerning 
human health shows that, since Silent Spring, "the list of 
pesticides that have been recognized as a part of the human 
body burden has grown... All forms of life have been shown 
to contain trace amounts of DDT."47
The Success of Arguments
Much of what Carson argued against —  the heedless use 
of pesticides, the lack of scientific studies of effects, 
the turning of a blind eye to ecological complexity, the 
overweighted influence of the chemical industry, 
bureaucratic self-promotion —  continues as before, and is 
quantitatively intensified.
Four major problems of pesticide use are sometimes 
identified: poisoning of humans and animals; persistence in 
the environment and as residues on food; resistance
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developing among target species; disposal of wastes and 
containers.4® Scientific knowledge of poisoning is limited 
mostly to direct effects, and much remains unknown about the 
"secondary" or indirect effects of interactions of different 
chemicals on organ function and neurophysiology. In 
addition, human health did not initially receive as much 
attention as wildlife poisoning, and there is an information 
lag in this area, particularly with regard to carcinogens, 
for which symptoms take years to develop and human testing 
is not ethically acceptable.49 Information on persistence 
of pesticides in the environment is still coming in for the 
"old" pesticides; new pesticides can be used while their 
toxicity is still under review, and the contentious problem 
of what tolerances are safe in both direct application of 
pesticides and in residues on foods is at present an 
unresolved tangle of fact and assumption. Insect and plant 
species continue to develop resistance to insecticides and 
herbicides, and new and untested formulations are thus 
developed and introduced into the environment.50 Disposal, 
and "Superfund" cleanup, has not progressed beyond the 
concept of "safe management" of hazardous waste to the 
intent to reduce, detoxify and destroy it.51
At best, the record is mixed; at worst it is alarming. 
But the tenacity of an argument, and the impact of it on the 
public consciousness, is not simply a matter of the success
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achieved in reaching the intended goal. The technical 
nature of Carson's argument gave a new legitimacy to 
"speaking for Nature,"52 and its impassioned commitment set
a high standard of moral purpose that attracted supporters 
of conscience, and those who believe that science has a 
moral responsibility to society.
Carson's main argument is that the unthinking use of 
new technologies derived from scientific knowledge endangers 
the balance of nature and the future of human health. What
has been praised as a great advance in agricultural 
productivity she criticizes as a threat to life. She 
redefines the wonders of science as figures that cast 
shadows in which another, and frightening, effect of their 
efficacy emerges. She is technical in presenting her 
evidence, poetic in her description of the world that can be 
lost.
Two years after Silent Spring, a technical and 
thoroughly researched book by Robert L. Rudd, Pesticides and 
the Living Landscape.53 also made a strong case that 
pesticides threaten all life, not just harmful insects. 
Rudd's book, written and completed at about the same time as 
Carson's, was delayed in publication as first a trade 
publisher and then an academic one wrangled over its 
controversial conclusions.54 It is a much less passionate 
book than Silent Spring, drier and more conventionally
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scientific. It contains information that Silent Spring does 
not, but was eclipsed by Carson's book, though it received 
many reviews and was published in four countries. Rudd was 
a wildlife biologist, a Professor of Zoology at the 
University of California, and did work on vertebrate pest 
control. His book cost him a position at the state 
agricultural experiment station.55
What Rudd did not do that Carson did was redefine the 
meaning of science and its advances in the life of the 
ordinary citizen. Carson did this by touching the ordinary 
person's appreciation of nature. She allied her argument 
both with the scientific tradition and with a nature 
tradition; she is, like Muller in Mannheim's example of 
conservative thought, at a "juncture" of two ways of 
thinking.
Political and Scientific Frameworks
In Silent Spring. Carson emphasizes that it is the 
public that takes the risk of the indiscriminate use of 
chemicals, and the public that should decide whether to 
continue in the same direction. She insists that not all 
experts are "qualified witnesses," because some have 
specialties too narrow to enable them to assess damage to
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wildlife, while others have specific interests in 
maintaining the very use of chemicals that needs alternative 
evaluation.
Carson's stand on public choice in this specific case 
lends support to the more general proposition (not stated by 
her) that in matters of science, the citizen may judge, if 
the citizen is given enough information. In fact she also 
suggests that the citizen must judge when it is the 
citizen's interests (and life) that are at stake. When 
experts disagree, who should we believe? Or as Carson puts 
it, "Which view are we to accept?" Her guiding principle is 
that "the credibility of the witness is of first 
importance." Entomologists specialize in insects, not in 
wildlife as a whole, and they are not "disposed to look for 
undesirable side effects" of their control programs.
Wildlife biologists, however, do have the necessary broad 
view.56 Many issues concerning choice are untouched here, 
but basically, citizens are to make rational decisions based 
on valid testimony. Since Carson wrote her book the 
environmental argument has expanded, and the question of 
what scientists to believe, what action to take, and who 
should decide on action has appeared across a great variety 
of situations.
The relationships between science, environment, and 
politics keep growing in complexity. For both scientists
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and environmentalists, taking sides, being politically 
implicated or politically active, and trying to keep facts 
separate from values are issues for which the guidelines are 
unresolved.
Two frameworks of understanding contend when we try to 
resolve these issues as citizens, scientists, or 
environmentalists. We use one framework for our 
understanding of politics in a democratic society, another 
framework for our understanding of science as part of our 
modern, technologized world. The political framework has 
been in use for some two centuries, and has ancient roots in 
Greek thought and the Roman emphasis on law. The scientific 
framework is more recent, less well-formed, and though it 
occurs more and more frequently in our public discourse, its 
use is not as readily recognized. It is like a relatively 
new person who is efficiently active among an established 
group of people working together, but who has not yet 
established an identity with them —  it is not yet greeted 
as a known quantity or acknowledged as a given type.
Both the political and the scientific frameworks are 
conceptual frameworks —  one for thinking about politics and 
society, the other for thinking about science and its uses; 
both for handling information and making sense of events. 
Each framework can also be used (as here) more formally than 
in everyday life, as an analytical device to see change that
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is occuring in society.
Because the frameworks are popular —  that is, used by 
people in general —  they have an element of consensus that 
means they are presentations of the way things are 
conventionally said to be, not necessarily the way they 
actually are. In order to hold a place in common 
understanding, each framework is a simplified model of 
things. Many elements of actual relationships are left out. 
For this very reason, a close look at the frameworks reveals 
the conflicts that we experience as a society when complex 
changes meet simplified expectations.
Take, for example, the issue in Silent Spring of 
whether goals shall be specialist-determined or citizen- 
determined. The idea of citizen participation fits in the 
political framework of understanding, in which the state and 
its citizens are linked by rights and obligations. In both 
the liberal (Enlightenment) and conservative views that have 
influenced American government, human nature itself 
determines the nature of this relationship. Depending on 
the conception of human nature, government is 
correspondingly either optimistic about or dubious of human 
goodness —  emphasizing, in today's terms, either social 
welfare or law and order. In this framework of 
understanding, material sustenance is provided through the 
economy, which supports the state, and which is in turn at
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least partially safeguarded by the state. Each of us is a 
citizen in respect to the state, but an individual on his or
her own in respect to the economy. Science per se is not in
the framework; the framework pre-dates the central role of
science. What the rights and obligations are between
citizen and science are therefore not clear. Should science 
have a role like that of the state, in which it attends to 
the voice of citizens? Should it be a "representative 
government" wherein the public decides? Or are citizens not 
competent to judge scientific matters?
When the emphasis shifts to science itself in the 
question of how we shall use science, we are shifting to the 
science framework for understanding, in which the major 
relationship is between science and its users or recipients 
rather than between the citizen and the state. Human nature 
is sidelined, and the natural world replaces it as a 
determining force, but the natural world does not determine 
the relationship between science and its users or recipients 
as human nature determines the relationship between citizen 
and state. Instead, it determines only what science should 
be. Science must answer to the natural world (its truth 
must match that world), but it is not clear whether or not 
science must answer to those who receive its effects. The 
rights and obligations between science and its users and 
recipients are not clear. The economy remains as a flanking
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force, with science providing technology to support it. The 
science framework does not include the state or government 
or their corollary, the citizen. The individual, as user or 
recipient, is entirely on his or her own with science as 
well as with the economy. Without the presence of the 
state, no institution is charged with safeguarding the 
citizen.
Of course, in real life, science and the state cohabit, 
and there are many restrictions, permissions, and 
assistances which connect them and redound on citizens and 
users. But no convenient conceptual framework ties together 
these arrangements for science matters, which have arisen 
pragmatically, and not also as a result of theory, as 
occurred in the political sphere. Thus there are heated 
arguments over what scientists do or do not owe to citizens 
who do not like what they do; confusion over whether 
scientists should give political opinions; debate over how 
government influences scientific endeavor and how it makes 
use of its fruits. The ground on which decisions about 
these issues should be made is not clear, and we switch 
between the political model and the scientific one, when 
neither one is adequate. We are in the midst of a 
conceptual shift, trying to find our way to a new framework 
of understanding in which science dominates as surely as the 
state, but in a different way. The intellectual awkwardness
of this situation is a sign that we are rearranging the 
concepts that guide our actions, under pressure from another 
guiding influence on those actions, events themselves.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND POLITICS
The previous chapter reviewed Silent Spring, the book that 
made environmental damage a public issue. This chapter 
continues consideration of the questions Carson raised about 
the uses of science in the context of today's environmental 
debate.
Scientists and Environmentalists
If (as suggested in the Introduction) environmentalism 
expresses the view that science should often be viewed with 
skepticism, and institutionalized science expresses the view 
that science should be trusted, are scientists and 
environmentalists opposed actors in our society?
Science and environmentalism can be distinguished along 
many lines —  institutional, political, ideological —  but 
scientists and environmentalists are not so easy to 
separate. An environmentalist is someone who has already 
taken sides in the debate over the seriousness of
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environmental problems. The label 'scientist', by 
comparison, does not tell us where its owner stands on this 
debate or whether he or she has taken any position at all.
There are scientists whose work analyzes or even 
improves the environment, but who are not active 
environmentalists; scientists doing this kind of work who 
are active environmentalists; scientists who have been 
trained in a non-environmental area but who are active in 
arguing environmental causes; scientists who serve in 
environmental agencies of government; scientists who work 
for environmental organizations. Only some of these 
scientists go over a line that separates scientist from 
environmentalist. In the ethos of science, because 
objectivity resembles neutrality, non-neutrality casts doubt 
on objectivity. Understandably, scientists are not 
occupationally disposed to activism or outspoken stances.
Sometimes scientists and environmentalists stand apart 
on issues, sometimes together. Environmentalists rely on 
scientific data to give warning about the state of the 
environment. Conflicting interpretations can be found among 
scientists about the meaning of data, so that some 
scientists will be aligned with environmentalists on the 
direction in which the facts are said to be leading, and 
some will not. Scientific disagreement over the state of 
the environment, and what, if anything, to do about it, is a
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constant in the environmental debate. But it is the 
exception rather than the rule for scientists to take 
activist stands.
Taking Sides
In a forum on man and nature sponsored by Harper's
magazine, April, 1990, participants were given a
hypothetical situation: an elderly resident has willed
several hundred acres of farmland and woodland to a
community with 15% unemployment, where there is pressure for
land development. Most of the participants have tried to
come up with ways to conserve much or all of the land as is.
The discussion continues:
Michael Pollan [Executive Editor of Harper'si:
"Well, I have decided that you guys have your 
heads in the clouds. I am going to develop the 
entire square mile by selling five-acre plots.
You've tried to stop me but everything —  
petitions, lawsuits, protests —  has failed. The 
political process is over. It's America. It's 
democracy. Do you go home now?"
Dava Foreman [Founder of Earth First!, known for 
espousing "monkey wrenching," or sabotaging of 
construction or resource-use projects that are 
opposed by environmental groups]: "I never go
home."
Pollan: "What do you do?"
Foreman: "Conservationists have a fully equipped 
toolshed and use the proper tool for the proper 
job at the proper time."
Robert D. Yaro [Senior Vice President of the New 
York City area's Regional Plan Association]: "Are 
hatchets in your toolshed?"
Foreman: "Lots of things are in there!"
Pollan: "And after politics are exhausted?"
Foreman: "Oh, you might start by pulling up survey 
stakes. And you might want to engage in some 
paper monkey-wrenching, to slow things down.""
Yaro: "Paper can be one of the most effective 
tools. You know, this society can't do things 
very quickly, but it is brilliant at slowing 
things down."
Pollan: "Suppose Dave called you the night before 
the bulldozers showed up. He's planning to pour 
something in the gas tanks. Will you help him?"
Frederick Turner [Founders Professor of Arts and 
Humanities at the University of Texas, Dallas]: 
"People do what they are best equipped to do. I'm 
not a politician. My inclination would be to use 
art, theater, poetry, and song. The power of a 
good song, like the coal miners' strike songs, is 
terrific."
Daniel B. Botkin [Professor of Biology and 
Environmental Studies at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara]: "I agree with Fred.
What I bring to the environmental area is my 
reputation as an objective scientist who can 
evaluate the land. To pour something in a gas 
tank — "
Foreman: "—  grinding compound — "
Botkin: "—  would destroy my credibility. We all 
must play different roles."
James Lovelock [Biologist who developed the Gaia 
theory that the earth as a whole fine-tunes the 
balance of minerals, plants, animal life, and 
atmospheric chemicals in the manner of a self­
regulating system]: "Dave, it just so happens
that my main line of work is as an inventor. I 




Lovelock: "See, if I really felt strongly about 
this issue, I would be obliged to act, even at the 
risk of losing credibility."1
In this discussion, one scientist says radical action would
compromise his objectivity; another says he might take that
risk for issues he feels strongly about. One is willing to
mix science and social values under certain conditions;
another is not. According to the conventional view, science
must be free from supporting this value or that one in order
to maintain its objectivity; by extension, so must
individual scientists. Scientists, as this brief example
indicates, are not of one mind about what appropriate
scientific behavior is under all circumstances.
And on environmental issues themselves, scientists also
take different positions. For example, a scientific
conference gives an alert on environmental peril:
"At a forum on 'Global Change and Our Common 
Future' organized by the National Academy of 
Sciences and the Smithsonian Institution, speakers 
repeatedly urged that major economic, scientific 
and political resources be immediately committed 
to solving problems like global warming and the 
depletion of the earth's protective ozone layer...
[Also mentioned were] prospective food 
shortages, possible on a catastrophic scale...
A main message of the forum, said Martin 
Holdgate, director of the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature and former chief 
science advisor to the British Government, was 
that 'we would be incredibly stupid not to take 
these dangers as real.'"2
But Dixy Lee Ray, former head of the Atomic Energy
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Commission, former Governor of Washington, and a marine
biologist by training, takes another stance as a strong
proponent of technological development. In an article
entitled "Who Speaks For Science?" she gives her views on
environmental threats:
"Repeatedly... the American public has been 
subjected to a litany of catastrophe —  to 
predictions of impending disaster...: The oceans 
are dying, the atmosphere is poisoned, the Earth 
itself is losing its capacity to support life...
It's all pretty heady stuff, but is it true?.. 
False, exaggerated, or misleading information 
persists... [through] dissemination of... 
factoids. Examples... are: PCB's cause cancer; 
any level of radiation is harmful; acid rain is 
caused by sulfur dioxide from burning coal...
It is up to good scientists to weed...
[scientific] phonies out, but we don't do it.
Rather, we allow, by our silence, such renegade 
organizations as the Union of Concerned Scientists 
to present itself as the 'voice of the scientific 
community'. They back up the Helen Caldicotts,
Barry Commoners, Paul Ehrlichs, Amory Lovinses, 
and other pretenders."3
The named "pretenders" have warned, respectively, of the
health hazards of nuclear radiation, of technology-driven
poisoning of the environment, of overpopulation leading to
famine and possibly war, and of the misguidedness of "hard"
fossil-fuel and nuclear energy production compared to "soft
energy" alternatives.
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The Voice of Science
Are these contrasting scientific opinions 'science' 
speaking? If there is a voice of science, is it scientific 
organizations, scientific conferences, government agencies? 
Or is it individual scientists? Is the voice of science in 
pronouncements on issues, or is it in the day-to-day work 
and the highly specific and technical reports that never 
reach a general, layperson public? Is science a 
collectivity that is more than the sum of its parts, or is 
it a collection of disparate pieces that just happen to go 
by the same name?
Science obviously does not have one voice, because it 
does not have just one character. Science is an ideal in 
the sphere of knowledge as well as an economic undertaking. 
It has locations in the worlds of business, government, and 
academia. It is present in our technology and (accurately or 
not) in our science fiction. The voice of science that 
reaches the general public comes through many channels: 
newspapers and news magazines; news, science, medical, and 
nature programs on TV; popular science and environmental 
magazines; newsletters; books; events such as Earth Day and 
entertainment benefits with environmentally-committed movie 
stars and musicians; and person to person through medical 
practitioners. This voice of science is not primarily the
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voice of scientists, yet scientists themselves are the 
original source of this mediated information. It's 
therefore important to find out what happens to the voice of 
the scientist.
Scientists
What is a scientist? Miriam Rothschild is a self-
taught naturalist known for her research on fleas. She
writes: "Looking back on my childhood, I am convinced that
naturalists are born and not made. My father was a keen
naturalist, but although we all shared the same upbringing
[in her early childhood, in pre-World War I Hungary], my
siblings were not hooked on plants and insects in the way I
was." Her father died when she was young, and Rothschild
was educated at home by a governess "with absolutely no
knowledge of the natural world. At the age of 17, I
insisted on attending evening classes at the Chelsea
Polytechnic, but up to then I was entirely self-taught."
After "75 years as a passionate naturalist," she concludes:
"I am a naturalist, not a scientist. I have a 
vivid emotional love of the natural world from 
rain clouds to tapeworms, and my enthusiasm has 
lured me into varied investigations. Furthermore,
I love discussing my favorite topics, be they 
birds or flowers, trees or fleas, and burning the 
midnight oil, enthralled, while reading about 
other people's observations and discoveries. This
has resulted in my publishing 300 papers and 
books, which some might glorify with the title of 
scientific research.
But have no illusions —  curiosity, a keen eye, 
a good memory and boundless delight and enjoyment 
of the animal and plant world, with perhaps a 
little intuition thrown in, do not make a 
scientist; one of the outstanding and essential 
qualities required is self-discipline, a quality I 
lack. A scientist requires not only self- 
discipline but hard training, perseverance, 
energy, determination, judgment and a goal. If 
you can combine the two, you get the best of both 
worlds.1,4
Another view on what a scientist is comes from the
joint writings of Richard Levins, a population biologist,
and Richard Lewontin, a zoologist, both at Harvard
University. "Modern science," they state, "is a product
capitalism" and its needs to expand and to transform
production. And
"scientists have become 'scientific manpower'...
The creative parts of scientific work are more and 
more restricted to a small fraction of the working 
scientists, the rest are increasingly 
proletarianized."
"The class divisions that plague our society as 
a whole also cut across the ranks of science... In 
between [class] extremes [of proletariat and 
bourgeois investors] is the group of petty 
bourgeois professionals working alone or in small 
groups in universities and research institutes. 
Although they may be motivated by a great 
diversity of concerns, their activity depends 
increasingly on obtaining funding from government 
agencies, private foundations, or corporations."5
Despite the diversity of concerns and beliefs among
scientists, Levins and Lewontin say, there is an implicit
ideology that all scientists receive. Among its
characteristics is the separation of thought from feeling
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Their comments on this separation throw additional light on
Rothschild's self-description:
"The supposed superiority of thinking over feeling 
implies that those who withhold feelings are 
superior to those who express them. One result is 
that women, socialized in our society as the 
custodians of feeling, must either suppress 
themselves in order to do science or must be 
systematically underestimated, as if 'more 
emotional' meant less rational."6
The non-scientific-ness of emotion is a repeated theme
of the criticism Rachel Carson received for her book, Silent
Spring. and it reoccurs in a comment made by the editors of
Silent Spring Revisited, a volume based on a symposium
sponsored by the American Chemical Society.7
"In one respect at least, our book is likely to 
fail: we cannot match Rachel Carson's language and 
imagery. These chapters were written by 
practicing scientists, schooled in the need to be 
conservative in their interpretation of data, to 
write directly, and to avoid emotionalism."8
By this the authors imply that Carson, who was trained as a
marine biologist, was, because of her passionate commitment
to a cause, not a scientist, or not scientific.9 It may be
that Miriam Rothschild is right, and that naturalists are
born, and scientists are made, but scientists are made not
just by characteristics of their personality (such as the
self-discipline Rothschild cites), but by a social process.
This process includes educational opportunities and a
division of labor in which class, race and gender are
implicated.10 The state of the economy and the politics of
funding for scientific research are equally part of the 
process. Science is not just scientists carrying out their 
research.
Science and Politics
The possibilities of social action on environmental
problems necessarily involve all parties in politics, but in
a politics that is being redefined by science. To see what
science is doing to politics (and politics to science), we
can first take some vignettes from events on the
environmental front from the past few years.
Joshua Lederberg is a Nobel laureate in biology and
past president of Rockefeller University. In a newspaper-
sponsored roundtable discussion in 1983, he talked about
science and politics:
"Q: To what extent do you think that science today 
has been politicized? There was, for example, the 
trial in Salt Lake City where scientists disputed 
whether radioactivity from atomic tests in the 
1950s caused subsequent disease among Utah 
citizens. It seems that science asks people to 
believe in the reliability of results. Yet here 
was conflict.
Dr. Lederberg: Why do you call that 
politicization?
Q: Radioactivity is a politically charged issue.
Dr. Lederberg: In Utah, at least, a large part of 
the controversy concerns the amount of
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radioactivity released and the extent of human 
exposure to it. The answers have a lot to do with 
the records that were kept and the credibility of 
the institutions involved. Of course, people's 
institutional affiliations will have a lot to do 
with what they say about the authenticity and 
veracity of records of past events.
Q: Isn't that politics?
Dr. Lederberg: Yes, but it may not be politicizing 
science.
Q: There is an interesting conflict here, since 
policymakers must pass legislation... and they 
turn to scientists for a basis for rulemaking..
But scientists don't always have the experimental 
data to provide such a basis. How should they 
deal with the legislators' demands?
Dr. Lederberg: The scientists' job is to tell them 
the health risks; value judgments belong to a 
larger sphere. That's a naive theory of 
separation, but it's something we ought to aspire 
to."11
Whatever the merits of Lederberg's aspiration to the 
separation of fact and value, scientific findings and 
political policy do interact. The debate over global 
warming provides an example of a political attempt to change 
the meaning of findings presented by a scientific 
researcher. James Hansen is an atmospheric physicist who is 
the director of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's Goddard Institute for Space Studies.
Rolling Stone put him in their Earth Day Hall of Fame 
because he "first called America's attention to the 
greenhouse effect with his dramatic testimony before 
Congress during the torrid summer of 1988."12 That
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testimony included the statement that he was "99%" sure that 
the warming trend he found in the 80s was not a chance 
event, and that it was time to stop "waffling" about the 
contribution of greenhouse gases, mostly the product of 
human activity, to global warming. His certainty became a 
media event.13
The year after his Congressional testimony on global 
warming, in 1989, Hansen charged the Office of Management 
and Budget (part of the executive branch of the U.S. 
government) with changing his written testimony before it 
was delivered to Congress. The change was made "over his 
protests, making his conclusions about the effects of global 
warming seem less serious and certain than he intended.”14 
Hansen's computer models of the global environment sparked 
disagreement within the scientific community as well as 
within the Administration.
Stephen H. Schneider is a climatologist and head of 
Interdisciplinary Climate Systems at the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research, which is sponsored by the National 
Science Foundation. He is a publicly active scientist who 
has testified before many government committees, and written 
books on global warming for the layperson. Commenting on 
Hansen's assertions about global warming, he says that 
Hansen's statistical methods don't warrant a "99%" certain 
conclusion. "Despite these qualifications," he says, "I
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fully agree with Jim that it is much more likely than not
that the greenhouse gas buildups in this century have
contributed to the observed global warming. It is simply
impossible to assign formal probabilities without making
intuitive assumptions."15
Schneider draws this distinction for scientists who
advise the government: it was not acceptable for the Office
of Management and Budget to alter Hansen's scientific
conclusions, but it would have been acceptable if they had
altered his policy opinions.16 Also, Schneider observes,
scientific conclusions require full disclosure about
uncertainties and what is not known; policy conclusions
often require simple and dramatic statements in order to
capture media and thus public attention.17 Simplification
leaves plenty of room for misunderstanding, and "Scientists
who go public with their work, particularly if it could
potentially affect policy, often meet with a mixed reception
from their own colleagues."18
Hansen himself has had this to say:
"I am not an environmentalist... I think an 
environmentalist knows what his objectives are and 
tends to cite evidence that supports his 
conclusions. Environmentalists are not interested 
in evidence that minimizes these conclusions. A 
scientist has to report his results whether they 
support his conclusions or not. A scientist has 
to give the full relevant caveat. I am and want 
to be a scientist who looks at problems without a 
prior inclination. But on the other hand, I also 




Because we have two separate frameworks for thinking 
about scientific matters and political matters, while in 
actuality science and politics combine, we have difficulty 
establishing how it is that science should 'be' in our 
society. This difficulty is equally caused by conflicting 
events. Both intellectually and materially, science and 
politics are in a contradictory relationship as well as an 
interconnected one.
The ambiguous role of science in the public arena (Is 
it separate from politics or not?), and the conflicts this 
ambiguity engenders are not a major theme of the first best­
seller environmental warning, Silent Spring. It appears 
that for Carson good science is half the solution to the 
problem: science that is comprehensive and thorough, science 
that is not held hostage to bureaucratic promotion of 
government programs and economic self-interest. Yet Carson 
knows (and comments) that science is not independent from 
government funding and government manipulation of scientific 
intentions in specific programs, so citizens must take up 
the other half of the solution. The framework for thinking 
about science is as much a part of her analysis as the 
political framework is: Citizens have been made passive 
recipients of scientific ingenuity, and there's no mechanism
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in place for making either scientists or the government take 
responsibility for the effects of scientific invention. But 
if citizens speak and government acts, things can be 
righted; the political framework is still a major point of 
reference. Yet this political framework alone is not 
enough; the word of science must be added to it. Such an 
addition raises difficulties, however.
Citizens must hold the state to its promise (or its 
contract) to behave according to certain values given to 
human life, liberty, and well being. In the framework for 
politics, values reside with the state as well as with the 
citizen, and both are expected to carry out appropriate 
actions. In the science framework, however, values do not 
reside in science, although it occupies a position like that 
of the state (central to collective action). Science fends 
off the explicit attachment of values to its purpose and 
activities; it separates itself from value-motivated action. 
There is supposed to be a separation between fact and value, 
between science and public policy. Values are located only 
in the public policy sphere, not in the domain of science.
So Stephen Schneider could say it would be alright to change 
James Hansen's public policy recommendations, but not his 
scientific conclusions, and Joshua Lederberg can aspire to 
separate fact from value in the matter of assessing the 
risks of radiation. But in actuality, science supports
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prevailing bureaucratically-established values by not 
examining them when it gives its findings and accompanying 
recommendations to government panels. In this respect it 
loses its voice.20 As guides to understanding and 
explanation, the political and scientific frameworks remain 
separate, and scientists cannot speak across the gap.
The Direction of Scientific Activity
Because of the political and economic supports of and 
restrictions on science, even though many leading voices of 
environmental concern are those of scientists, the direction 
and outcome of scientific activity in modern society does 
not work toward ecological balance in the natural world. 
Rather, scientific activity is channeled toward 
environmentally destructive technologies and policies, 
toward an environment that is considered to be external to 
the science and productive activities that are, in fact, 
within the environment and part of its ecology. Scientific- 
technological activity is still directed more toward 
manipulating and dominating the natural world than toward 
the responsiveness to it that is necessary to prevent 
environmental destruction. Manipulation of the natural 
world has been the source of much human power and progress,
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but this manipulation is now up against natural limits. Our
power to change nature now includes the power to destroy the
web of life that supports our own life, totally.
This recognition of possible impending death for
humankind is a scientific recognition, but whether we are
close or far from such a fate is much argued in the world of
science, and out of it. Not everyone shares a sense of
alarm, but some individual scientists would like to see the
current direction of scientific activity changed. Some
twenty years ago, on the occasion of the first Earth Day
(1970), Rene Dubos, a microbiologist and author of many
popular books with scientific themes, indicated the need for
a means by which individual concern could act. In a
handbook prepared for an environmental teach-in on Earth
Day, Dubos wrote:
"I do hope that [the teach-in] will help alert 
public opinion to the immediacy of the ecologic 
crisis... I know that many scientists and 
technologists would welcome a form of public 
pressure that would provide them with the 
opportunity to work on problems of social 
importance.
The colossal inertia and rigidity —  if not 
indifference —  of social and academic 
institutions makes it unlikely that they will 
develop effective programs of action or research 
focused on environmental problems. Two kinds of 
events, however, may catalyze and accelerate the 
process. One is some ecological catastrophe that 
will alarm the public.... Another... is the 
emergence of a grassroots movement, powered by 
romantic emotion as much as by factual knowledge, 
that will give form and strength to the latent 
public concern with environmental quality..."21
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Science and Social Goals
An argument for the environment is not simply either 
scientific or 'environmental'; it is likely to be both. The 
differences come over how science is to be used or to be 
done. Few scientists would disagree that science should be 
used to the benefit of society, but when it comes to 
directing scientific activities to specific social goals, 
scientific caution intervenes. While it is a social goal to 
find a "cure" for cancer, this social goal can be worked 
toward through specific scientific activities —  for 
instance, research into the structure and behavior of cells. 
"Society" will then put the findings to use, reducing the 
incidence of cancer and stopping or slowing the course of 
the disease once it occurs in the individual's body. It 
will do this through care given by private physicians, 
through public health clinics, through education of the 
public, use of medicinal drugs, and possibly, lifestyle 
changes.
The scientist provides the information; society goes 
into action. This is the model which accompanies the 
objective or ideal of separating fact from value. Of 
course, society must make the research possible through 
private and government funding, and provide the institutions 
of education and communication that support scientific work.
234
But the scientist, in this model, does not do the follow- 
through, and does not even push hard for the follow-through 
to happen, although she or he may make recommendations to 
government panels and private-sector nonprofit 
organizations. The scientist continues to do still more 
scientific research, while other specialists —  politicians, 
lobbyists, administrators, social workers, outreach people - 
- provide funding to disseminate recommendations, put health 
programs into place, and make the new therapies available. 
This separation enables the scientist to maintain the stance 
of objectivity through silence. But sometimes scientists do 
speak out. Why?
Voices are raised to be heard where issues are 
contested; American society is already committed to fighting 
cancer (although researchers in the field probably feel it 
is not committed enough). It is not committed to 
environmental action (although it has become politically 
popular to act as though it were), and is inactive on the 
environment at a time when inaction itself is seen as a 
threat. The danger of inaction provides scientists with the 
condition for speaking out.
The question of how science should 'be' in society —  
connected to our values or totally separate from them —  is 
also a question of how scientists should act in society and, 
conversely, a question of what society should demand of its
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scientists or allow them to do. We come here to the problem 
mentioned in Chapter One, that of speaking of society as 
though it were a unitary actor, and of scientists as if they 
also amounted to a unitary actor. To phrase the situation 
as if it were this way is only to use a shorthand. The 
polarity of science-skeptic and science-truster which is 
found in contemporary American society cannot be understood 
simply as antagonistic actors located in specific 
occupational and social positions. Theoretical 
abstractions, centered on concepts which guide thought and 
influence action, are necessary to identify the polarity, 
both in thought and in society.
The question of whether science should (or can) remain 
separate from social values is sometimes expressed as the 
question of scientific autonomy: Is science to remain 
autonomous, free from the political sphere of social values, 
or must it, in the face of the environmental threat to our 
survival, adopt specific social goals (for example, 
population control) as also priority scientific goals?
Is science to be autonomous science or servant science? 
At the National Academy of Sciences conference on Global 
Change and Our Common Future, mentioned above, speakers said 
that the economy, science, and politics must all be 
committed to solving environmental problems. This is 
science serving society, but it is not science in service to
society. It is science bestowing the gift of knowledge, not 
science forced to adopt a political ideology. Science in 
this role is not a servant; it is master in its role of 
solving the problems of material life. In a very broad 
sense, science that serves society by bestowing knowledge is 
some form of servant science, but there is an ideological 
debate about autonomous science/servant science in which the 
issue is not this type of service.22 The debate is about 
ideal types, about a particular kind of autonomy and a 
particular kind of servant role. The argument for autonomy 
ignores the dialectical complexities implied in the 
autonomous/servant dichotomy, and assumes that science can 
stand solely on one side of the relationship, having only 
the characteristics of that side. The argument that denies 
either the possibility or the desirability of autonomy 
claims that science is dependent on the society from whose 
values it wishes to stand aloof, even while it is dominant 
in that society epistemologically and insitutionally. 
"Science," as objectivity, is itself a value in society, and 
science wants to be valued by society in this way. By this 
argument there is no complete autonomy from social values 
for science, only a particular kind of autonomy, autonomy in 
respect to certain requirements and not others.
Tacit Trust in Science
Environmental issues are conventionally debated on the 
level of specific problems and remedies, and not on the 
level of underlying issues. Some of the topics from a 
collection of "opposing viewpoints" on the environmental 
crisis exemplify this positivist approach of only dealing 
with the facts in front of us: "Environmental Pollution 
Causes Cancer"/"Environmental Pollution Does Not Cause 
Cancer"; "Rigorous Testing Protects Consumers From 
Pesticides"/"Rigorous Testing Does Not Protect Consumers 
From Pesticides.1,23 There are many arguments of this type 
being constantly offered in reports, books, news, and 
conferences. There are other arguments made about the roles 
of industry and government, about population growth, and 
sometimes about the global interconnections of economy and 
environment. There are very few arguments directly about 
science, however. Such arguments still circulate mostly in 
the academic world; some reach a wider, nonfiction-reading 
audience.24
These arguments are, for the most part, critique and 
response to critique. There are few scientists outside of 
the academic debate who feel it necessary to speak in 
support of science. There is no need; science already has 
legitimating power. It is particularly difficult to find
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scientists urging trust in science in the environmental 
debate. In the terms that I have used, there are few 
prominent science-truster voices. One could take this to 
mean that there are few scientists who have that argument to 
make, but the seemingly inexorable movement of science along 
the path that science skeptics warn against suggests that 
that is not the case. Instead, these voices are few to be 
found because of the characteristics of science in society, 
and because of the fact-centered level of the debate.
The relevant characteristics of science in society are 
that, first, since science bestows legitimacy on action, the 
stance of trust in science is implicit, rather than 
articulated. Second, as already noted, scientists are 
occupationally disposed to silence (in public) in the 
interests of neutrality. Third, they are themselves well 
aware of the complexities and imperfections of science as 
practice and as institutional pursuit, and unless thrust 
into a polarizing situation, have little reason to mount an 
argument for the public which glosses over those 
complexities. And finally, when scientists do speak, they 
confine themselves to the specifics of their specialty, 
again being professionally inclined to restrict their 
speech. Only as the public's challenges to the uses and 
direction of science become more insistent will voices that 
urge trust be as prominent as the ones that now warn against
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the course our science and technology are now taking. That 
this challenge will increase, and that the debate will 
sharpen, is indicated, I believe, by the growing centrality 
of science to our collective and personal concerns.
Skepticism of Science
A fully-developed argument about the directions, uses 
and epistemological suppositions of science, and their 
intersection with politics, is not yet evident in public 
debate. There is no argument centered on science which is 
yet comparable to the conservative style of thought as 
retrospectively analyzed by Mannheim —  an argument 
developed over time with many individual contributors, which 
coalesced within a group with a particular social location. 
That argument about science is still developing; it is most 
noticeable in its public form, I maintain, in environmental 
arguments that I call (following Mannheim) an environmental 
style of thought. Murray Bookchin and Barry Commoner, to be 
discussed in later chapters, have both contributed to 
building an argument which penetrates through surface issues 
to the underlying dynamics of environmental crisis.
Bookchin finds the root of our problems in hierarchical 
society: where man dominates man (and particularly,
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dominates woman), man will dominate nature. Commoner argues 
that the reductionist direction of today's life sciences 
atomizes our knowledge of the environment and our action 
toward it, in contradiction with the holistic reguireraents 
of ecological balance. The developing field of 
environmental ethics will also contribute to a science- 
centered argument, as will debates over medical technologies 
and genetic engineering.
The first crack in the picture of a perfect science 
perfect in neutrality and beneficial effect —  came with the 
atomic bomb. The next came with the environmental crisis. 
The perfect picture, of course, was never held by those who 
were knowledgable, but it was held by the public, and it was 
environmental warnings that reached the public which began 
to build, directly and indirectly, a case for skepticism 
about science in society.
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The previous chapter discussed the voices of science and the 
question of how science should 'be' in society. This 
chapter reviews a book that followed a few years after 
Silent Spring, which warned of scientific ingenuity 
misapplied to the environment. This later book questioned 
science itself, and claimed that environmental problems were 
in part the outcome of a theoretical bias in the biological 
sciences and of trends in scientific practice which 
threatened scientific integrity.
Science Out of Hand
Barry Commoner's Science and Survival, published in 
1966 but including writings going back to 1963, begins: "The 
age of innocent faith in science and technology may be 
over."1 Throughout the book Commoner develops the argument 
that science, though it has brought us many benefits in 
medical knowledge, new products, and innovative methods of
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production, is getting out of control. Commoner wants to 
make science more responsible; in particular he wants 
scientists to take the responsibility to provide information 
to the public about new scientific knowledge.
One of the reasons for having doubts about science and 
technology is that our ability to build sophisticated 
automatic systems has outstripped our ability to control 
them. As example, Commoner recalls the electric power 
blackout of November 1965 in the northeastern United States 
and Canada. A complex network linking power facilities over 
an 80,000 square-mile area enabled one facility to take over 
when another failed. But when the failure of a relay switch 
at one station sent power surging to another, safety 
switches there shut it down? in a chain reaction, safety 
switches shut down one plant after another as power surged 
through the system. As each part of the system shut down, 
another part of the northeast was abruptly covered in 
darkness.
Commoner does not bother to paint the picture that many 
of his readers would remember: Traffic lights stopped 
functioning, street lights went out; elevators halted in 
their shafts and passengers remained immured in the dark for 
hours; lights went out and refrigerators went off in homes 
and businesses; emergency generators switched on in 
hospitals, and staff nervously wondered if the emergency
245
electrical supply would be adequate. TV was gone; you got 
your news from a "portable" radio or from people who had 
heard the news on the car radio as they drove home from work 
in a darkened world. The constant activity of modern life 
was brought to a dead stop in some places; it went crawling 
on in others. Most people had no idea that such a total 
blackout could happen; power failures were usually local, 
the result of damage from storms. Clearly, the designers of 
the power network had not foreseen the possibility that the 
system that was designed to prevent just such an occurence 
had instead speeded its happening.
But Norbert Wiener, the cybernetician who had died just 
the year before, would not have been surprised, Commoner 
says. In 1960, Wiener stated that machines could be built 
which "'escape from the complete effective control'" of 
their makers.2 The power failure was a "blunder," as 
Commoner puts it, and he goes on to tell of another of equal 
magnitude, although its chain reaction took place over years 
rather than minutes. Radioactive fallout from nuclear tests 
in the atmosphere in the western states in the 1950s, in 
which the Atomic Energy Commission saw no hazard, by the 
late 1960s appeared to be the cause of thyroid problems in 
the region's children. The AEC had overlooked the 
possibility that radioactive iodine, though only lightly 
deposited on the ground, would be concentrated in the milk
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of the dairy cows that grazed the area, and further
concentrated in the developing glands of young children who
drank the milk. "In both cases," Commoner observes, "the
process was over and the damage done before we understood
what had happened."3 Both cases
"have cast a shadow —  small, but deeply troubling 
—  over the brilliance of... scientific successes.
Is it possible we do not know the full 
consequences of the new power grids and the new 
bombs? Are we really in control of the vast new 
powers that science has given us, or is there a 
danger that science is getting out of hand?"4
Twenty-five years later we are well aware that we did not
know the full consequences of many of our new, postwar
technologies, but in the early 1960s this awareness was not
widespread.
Commoner titles his second chapter "The Sorcerer's 
Apprentice." He is not alone among scientists in referring 
to the story in which new found expertise practiced without 
wisdom and foresight brings serious trouble. As he sees the 
post-war world, advances in scientific knowledge have been 
great, but simple necessities of life are becoming 
problematic. The environment is polluted. The burning of 
fuels is producing a greenhouse effect in the atmosphere; 
automobile exhausts are creating smog. Leaded-gasoline auto 
exhaust also contaminates water and crops. Despite the 
nuclear test ban treaty of 1963, as Commoner writes this 
book nuclear explosions are still occurring in the
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atmosphere and spreading radiation across thousands of 
miles; people are found to have radioactive strontium-90 in 
their bones and teeth. Groundwaters in the United States 
are polluted by industrial wastes, sewage, and fertilizer 
runoff; detergents choke streams and foam out of water taps 
until a ban on their non-biodegradable, synthesized 
hydrocarbon ingredient in 1965. Insecticides such as DDT 
kill more life than they are intended to, again in chain 
reactions. Commoner cites the case of a Bolivian town where 
DDT killed most of the domestic cats as well as the malarial 
mosquitoes; with the cats gone the town was invaded by a 
rodent that carried black typhus, which killed several 
hundred villagers before cats were once again brought in.
Again and again, Commoner cites examples of ecological 
complexity and interrelationships where harmful consequences 
of chain reactions are not foreseen. Some, such as the 
indiscriminate killing by DDT, are foreseeable; some, like 
the effects of radiation could, for lack of knowledge or its 
dissemination, not be foreseen. Detergents were another 
"massive intervention into nature" which were a 
technological mistake.5
The problems engendered by detergents, nuclear tests, 
automobile exhausts, pesticides and fertilizers "have a 
common scientific background. Each of them springs from a 
useful technological innovation."6 Should we then pull
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back from this type of scientific development? The
scientific revolution at the turn of the century, coming
from the discovery of the physics of the atom, brought
"the great flowering of modern science —  
including the new energy sources and synthetic 
substances which have covered the earth with 
pollution. We are today witnessing the inevitable 
impact of the tidal wave created by a scientific 
revolution more than half a century old. It is 
simply too late to declare a moratorium on the 
progress of science. The real question is not 
whether we should use our new knowledge, but how 
to use it."7
Further,
"Since the scientific revolution which generated 
modern technology took place in physics, it is 
natural that modern science should provide better 
technological control over inanimate matter than 
over living things. This disparity is evident in 
our environmental problems."8
There have always been risks in the advance of science,
Commoner allows, but with the increase of the power of
science there is also an increase in risk, from local and
brief events —  such as exploding steam boilers —  to global
and persistent problems —  such as fallout. The "margin for
error has become very much reduced."9 In all the examples
Commoner cites, he points out, risk was taken before it was
fully understood what the risk was. We are in danger, he
says, not just from the hazards we risk, but from "an
incipient abdication of one of the major duties of science -
- prediction and control of human interventions into
nature."10 Both scientist and citizen should be concerned
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about this duty, and we must understand how it is that this 
near-abdication has occurred.
Commoner is already, in the first pages of his brief 
book, discussing science itself, and its role in society, 
much more than was done in Carson's book —  though she also 
stresses the lack of prediction and foresight.
The Direction of Science
"Many of our recent technological mistakes crop up as 
an unexpected biological aftermath of a new advance in 
physics or chemistry," observes Commoner. Yet at the same 
time there are claims of "sweeping advances in our basic 
understanding of life."11 This paradox is the outcome of 
the practice of two kinds of biology: classical —  the study 
of the cell as the basic unit of life; and molecular —  
which "assumes that the separate, chemical constituents of 
the cell.... account for life."12 Commoner notes that 
molecular biology is considered new, and cell biology old, 
with the implication that the old must give way to the new 
as science advances. But both types of biology, he says, 
have nearly 200-year old histories.
Classical biology began with description and 
classification; this classificatory achievement still
250
stands. With the development of the microscope, the cell
was found to be the "universal unit" of living things.
"Separated from the organism the cell still 
retains the features of vitality: metabolic 
transformations of food substances, responsiveness 
to environment, energetic activity, reproduction, 
and inheritance. But when the cell is 
dismembered, these capabilities are lost, even 
though certain isolated parts, such as enzymes, 
are able for a time to carry out one or another 
chemical reaction."13
While classical, or cell, biology studies the structure of
the cell, another approach, in which most constituents must
be removed from the cell for analysis, studies its
chemistry. The biochemistry of the cell, which has branched
off in one direction into molecular biology, has gone from
the discovery of hemoglobin (a protein which enables blood
to carry oxygen throughout the body) to the discovery of DNA
(nucleic acids whose molecular structure encodes
'instructions for life'). Molecular biology has achieved
great discoveries, but in its necessary procedure which
kills the cell, Commoner says, a subtle property is lost.
Commoner is not making a claim for vitalism —  the idea of a
life force added to "otherwise lifeless substance"; he is
presenting a systems-view of emergent properties of the
whole not discernible in isolated parts.
In the argument between molecular and cell biology,
cell biology considers itself holistic, and molecular
biology atomistic. Molecular biology considers cell biology
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dated; the cutting edge and the funding money is in 
molecular biology. In 1966, when Commoner's book was 
published, the discovery of DNA was thirteen years old, and 
the field that was built on it was still new. Commoner 
argued that the results of experiments with DNA and RNA had 
been too greatly generalized, to come to mean that DNA bv 
itself controls heredity. Commoner claimed that the whole 
cell does this, in complex interactions of its constituents.
The debate still continues, but at a muted level, with 
molecular biology the current winner. The "central dogma" 
(the scientists' own term)u of molecular biology is that 
DNA determines the structure (order of amino acids) of 
proteins, but not the other way around —  proteins can't 
affect the structure (order of nucleotides) of DNA.
Commoner says that "experimental observations deny... this 
assumption."15 But the hierarchical image of the master 
DNA molecule is mirrored in the theoretical dominance 
claimed by molecular biology; DNA is what counts, the cell 
is only an accessory. DNA alone determines heredity, and 
heredity is a defining element of life, the subject of 
biology. Molecular biology, then, owns the essential 
knowledge of the discipline. "There is, I believe," says 
Commoner
"a crisis in biology today. The root of the 
crisis is the conflict between the approaches to 
the theory of life."16
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One of the outcomes of the conflict is that
"The dominance of the molecular approach in 
biological research fosters increasing inattention 
to the natural complexity of biological 
systems. "17
This is especially true, Commoner feels, of "the living
environment into which all animals, plants, and man must fit
or perish."18 Since the "free inguiry into nature that we
call basic science" is the source of the knowledge which
gives us technological innovation, Commoner observes, a
basic theoretical crisis in biology "may help to explain why
new technological innovations are so frequently troubled by
biological failures."19 Commoner goes behind the problem
to find causes at a theoretical level.
In an interview given a few years after the publication
of Science and Survival. Commoner refers to himself as a
"biologist, a biochemist, and a biophysicist" whose research
"has been to do with the way chemical processes take place
in living cells."20 As he became concerned about
environmental problems, he proposed the Center for the
Biology of Natural Systems at Washington University in St.
Louis. He recalls:
"The university administration thought I was off 
my rocker. At that time everyone was saying, the 
wave of the future is molecular biology, we don't 
have to worry about organisms in their natural 
state any more because it's all going to be done 
with test tubes. Now, I am a molecular biologist;
I organized the first training programme in the 
United States in molecular biology.... But while 
all that was going on, I realized that was not
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really where its at. We're learning more and more 
about smaller and smaller parts of the cell, while 
terribly important theings were happening out 
there in nature about which we were totally 
ignorant. "21
Commoner is also critical of ecologists at this time, for 
not speaking out about environmental problems, and he points 
to himself and Ren£ Dubos as non-ecologists who did.22
Commoner goes on to speak of holding a philosophical 
conviction in holism which conflicted with the mechanistic 
approach of molecular biology. It was around 1960, he says, 
when
"although I had been doing essentially molecular 
biological work, I realized that it was going the 
wrong way so I began marching the other way. But 
I did not give up or reject my molecular work. I 
tried to find ways of relating data about the part 
to the properties of the whole."23
Scientific Integrity
There are other difficulties in basic science now, 
Commoner states in his book; the problem of diverging 
biologies is only one. While scientific research is growing 
to be a very large endeavor, important traditional 
scientific practices are on the decline. The free 
dissemination of knowledge is being blocked by military and 
profit incentives; competition for national prestige is 
overcoming the principle of being blind to national
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boundaries; the scientist's freedom to choose his own 
problem is being limited by patterns of research support. 
These are "serious disparities between the traditional 
principles of science and modern realities."24
Commoner sees an erosion of scientific integrity. That 
this erosion was taking place was also the conclusion of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science in a 
report by the Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human 
Welfare, in 1965. The integrity of science, by their 
definition, is the totality of its processes of discovery 
and discussion, and the organization which makes it possible 
for these processes to take place. The "pressure of 
insistent social demands" has eroded the process, the report 
stated.
"'Under these conditions, the laboratory of basic 
science inevitably loses much of its isolation 
from cultural effects, and becomes subject to 
strong social demands for particular results.
Despite reducing the time, between discovery and 
application.... this, has resulted in 
technological application before the related basic 
scientific knowledge was sufficiently developed to 
provide an adequate understanding of the effects 
of the new technology on nature ,,t25
As Commoner reminds us, examples of this premature
application occurred in nuclear explosions in the atmosphere
and in the intensive marketing and use of detergents and
pesticides.
The Nuclear Question
In a chapter entitled "The Ultimate Blunder," Commoner 
discusses the possibility of nuclear war —  an issue that 
was intensely debated during the cold war era in which the 
book appeared. The question he puts is whether having 
nuclear weapons is a real defense of a nation's security. A
full-scale nuclear attack on this nation, he states, would 
destroy a large proportion of its people, animals, 
vegetation, and what is now called infrastructure. The 
economy would be largely destroyed, survivors would be ill 
and doctors and hospitals few. At the same time, water 
would be contaminated, sanitation facilities destroyed. 
Rebuilding under such conditions would be extremely 
difficult. Effects on fertility would bring birth rates 
down while cancer rates would go up. Soil would be 
contaminated, and the kill off of birds would mean an
increase of the insect population (which dies only at higher
doses of radiation than birds); agriculture could not 
achieve the levels of production that existed before the 
attack.
The intricate system of the biosphere would be 
disrupted. Pine trees, being especially vulnerable to 
radiation, would die, and the soil protected by their 
watersheds would erode —  causing loss of retained water,
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floods, and finally, the lack of enough soil for new trees
to grow in. Even if people can be protected, "agriculture,
the biological balance of the land, and the climate"
cannot.26 Thus, like the New England power grid, a war
machine with its automatic targeting and release of
missiles, and the subsequent retaliation, could have
unexpected reactions and effects once it is set into motion.
Such arguments about advanced weaponry, familiar now,
were hotly contested in the 1960s, and a source of great
tension in American society. Much information about nuclear
weapons and the effects of nuclear fallout had been kept
military secrets, and only piece by piece did the complete
picture of a possible nuclear holocaust become public.
Commoner deplores this secrecy:
"Had the nature of nuclear warfare been fully 
described in the scientific literature, biologists 
could have explained to the generals —  long 
before 1961 —  that they could not guarantee that 
the delicate balance of life-relationships on the 
earth's surface would survive a major nuclear 
war."27
Scientist. Citizen and Government
The dissemination of information, Commoner stresses, is 
especially important. With Commoner, as with many other 
scientists, recognition of the immense power of the atomic
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bomb and becoming alert to the horrors that would follow in 
the train of a nuclear war was a decisive experience.28 
There will always be risk in the application of scientific 
knowledge; what we need to do, Commoner argues, is to 
balance risk and benefit in a way acceptable to the public. 
Scientist and citizen should communicate with each other. 
Commoner believes that questions of risk and benefit are all 
"subject to objective scientific and technological 
analysis"; it is the balance between them that science can't 
decide.29
"Scientific method cannot determine whether the 
proponents of urban superhighways or those who 
complain about the resultant smog are in the 
right, or whether the benefits of nuclear tests to 
the national interest outweigh the hazards of 
fallout. No scientific principle can tell us how 
to make the choice, which may be forced upon us by 
the insecticide problem, between the shade of the 
elm tree and the song of the robin."30
Science can't make the balance, because that is a "value
judgment" —  not based on science. Pollutant levels, for
instance, are social problems (Commoner's emphasis) which
"must be resolved by social processes." Scientists must be
involved in these judgments, but they must also "reflect the
demands, opinions, and ethics of citizens generally."31
This brings in the government as mediator, in a triad
of scientist, citizen, and government (or, as Commoner calls
it, administration). The relationship between government
and citizen doesn't come in for any special discussion in
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Commoner's work, but the role of scientist in relation to
government does. The scientific community, Commoner says,
is divided about what this role is. Some scientists
"try to keep their political views separate from 
their scientific duties. To other scientists such 
rigorous objectivity seems to imply a disregard 
for the nation's defense, or for the numerous ways 
in which science can serve human welfare. They 
seek to play a part in directing the power that
they help to create.
The second of these positions is relatively 
new and originates in scientists' intense concern 
with such dangerous issues as nuclear war."32
Scientific issues, Commoner observes, now "appear with a
strong admixture of political views."33 Is there harm in
"exploiting political interests to further a scientific
goal?" he asks.34 His judgment is that there is, that the
pressure of political goals damages the ability of science
to understand nature in the ways he has already discussed.
Thee is already a problem of knowing which scientist to
believe. This is the most troubling question for the
citizen, in Commoner's experience. "The citizen has begun
to doubt what he used to take for granted —  that science is
closely connected to the truth."35 Commoner connects this
problem with the position, taken by some, that scientists
have a special competence for judging social issues —
because they are in possession of the facts and are trained
in analysis and rationalilty. Commoner rejects this
position. He does not favor
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"a statement in which a number of distinguished 
scientists argued for a particular space 
experiment partly by supporting its scientific 
value, and partly by describing its special 
usefulness as a vehicle of international 
propaganda for the United States."36
"When scientists voice their social judgments with 
the same authority that attaches to their 
professional prounouncements, the citizen is bound 
to confuse the inevitable and insolvable 
disagreements with scientific disputes. If 
scientists attach to their scientific conclusions 
those political views or social judgments which 
happen to provide support for these conclusions, 
scientific objectivity inevitably comes under a 
cloud. "37
Commoner believes strongly in an informed citizenry. The 
scientist, he affirms, has a "profound duty to impart as 
much knowledge as he can to his fellow citizens."38
Science and Social Action
What is at issue for us now, Commoner warns, is
survival. About all the related problems, he says, he can
speak only for himself. As a scientist, he arrives at his
own judgments about scientific and technological issues. As
a citizen he decides what course he wants his government to
pursue, and acts to get that course taken. As a human being
he thus expresses his moral convictions.
"As a biologist, I have reached this conclusion: 
we have come to a turning point in the human 
habitation of the earth. The environment is a 
complex, subtly balanced system, and it is this
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integrated whole which receives the impact of all 
the separate insults inflicted by pollutants.
Never before in the history of this planet has its 
thin life-supporting surface been subjected to 
such diverse, novel, and potent agents... I 
believe that continued pollution of the earth, if 
unchecked, will eventually destroy the fitness of 
the planet as a place for human life."39
Most urgently, there is a need for the scientific community
to establish a way to report on hazards in advance
(Commoner's emphasis).
"The costs of correcting past mistakes and 
preventing the threatened ones are already 
staggering, for the technologies which have 
produced them are now deeply embedded in our
economic, social, and political structure."40
The problems of pollution can be technologically corrected,
but the effects of nuclear war cannot —  the biosphere could
not be protected from catastrophic effect that would be
unrepairable# Nuclear war "would be a blunder from which
there would be no return"; prevention by disarmament offers
the only solution to its problems.41
We must find a way to use science intelligently. Our
ignorance of the effects to come from our innovations is a
fault which
"signifies that the capability of science to guide 
us in our interventions into nature has been 
seriously eroded —  that science has, indeed, got 
out of hand."42
To restore the integrity of science, "scientists need to
find new ways to protect science itself from the
encroachment of political pressures."43
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"If science is to perform its duty to society, 
which is to guide, by objective knowledge, human 
interventions with the rest of nature, its 
integrity must be defended."4*
Scientists have a responsibility for the technological use
of scientific developments that they carry out when they
inform the public. This is an "involuntary obligation"; to
ignore it is to withhold information from fellow citizens.
Because much of the substance of science is not understood
by most citizens, "the technical content of the issues of
the modern world shields them from moral judgment."45
Commoner concludes with a strong statement:
"The political crisis generated by scientific and 
technological, knowledge is upon us.
Science can reveal the depth of this crisis,
but only social action can resolve it. Science 
can now serve society by exposing the crisis of 
modern technology to the judgment of all mankind.
Only this judgment can determine whether the 
knowledge that science has given us shall destroy 
humanity or advance the welfare of man."46
* * *
Commoner takes on science directly in this book, and 
connects a practice and a worldview to environmental 
consequences. The main argument of Science and Survival 
is that postwar technology is destroying the environment, 
and that the science associated with that technology is on 
the way to being out of control. Commoner defines postwar
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technology differently from the conventional wisdom of the 
time, as a threat rather than as unalloyed benefit and 
progress. Change in the scale and power of science make it 
mandatory for us to take control of its direction.
Otherwise, the continued intervention into nature through 
technological innovation without awareness of future effects 
will damage the environment to the point where it is no 
longer fit for human survival. This analysis rests on an 
understanding of complex systems, both human and man-made, 
and the chain-reaction effect of small changes in them. 
Events in the natural and social worlds are explained as 
expressions of cycles, not as outcomes of linear 
developments. This systems view, in turn, is a part of 
Commoner's commitment to and experience with studying whole 
organisms, and organisms in the context of their 
environment, rather than analyzing solely their molecular 
structure as discovered through methods that must destroy 
the functioning of the whole.
Scientific knowledge, in Commoner's appraisal, is 
powerful and is risky (meaning that it can lead to both 
benefit and harm). Science is under political pressure and 
must maintain its objectivity and integrity by resisting 
this pressure, by maintaining its apartness. Yet scientists 
are not separate from their society, and have a 
responsibility to fulfill both the demands of science and of
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citizenship by disseminating information and by making that 
information understandable and accessible to the public.
When science does not resist political pressure, and when 
scientists do not communicate with the public, the integrity
of science is diminished, the connection between science and
truth is doubted, and science, unrestrained by the cross­
checking processes among scientists themselves, gets out of 
control —  generates technological interventions and 
proceeds with atomistic assumptions that damage the
livability of our world. The need is to control what is
happening in science; the issue is survival.
Because science guides our interventions into nature, a 
divided science —  physics and chemistry unattentive of 
biology, biology itself theoretically split —  results in 
the disregard of needed information and counterbalancing 
views to the detriment of the environment and our health.
In this book Commoner thus traces the problems of the 
environment not simply to the demands of the profit-driven 
economy —  although he emphasizes the reliance of the 
economy on environmentally-destructive technologies —  but 
to a theoretical division in scientific knowledge. He does 
not develop this argument at length, but in a 150-page book 
that mostly describes environmental problems in detail, he 
gives it a significant place. Commoner criticizes the lack 
of foresight on the part of both scientists and government
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administrators, and relates that lack of foresight to a 
split in the life sciences which encourages a reductionist 
and narrow focus which gives little attention to far- 
reaching effects of current technological developments. He 
speaks out against the loss of scientific integrity which 
results from the mixing of science and politics.
Commoner repeatedly states that social problems require 
social solutions —  not technological, and not biological 
ones. In this he is referring to what he conceives of as a 
necessary separation between scientific knowledge and social 
values, in the interests of objectivity. Scientific 
conclusions should not be socially colored; science itself 
does not have the answer to questions of social values.
This is the conventional view, which Commoner takes despite 
his criticism of the course of science. His solution to the 
inevitable intersections of science and social issues is the 
cooperative involvement of scientist and citizen on issues 
of public concern.
In Commoner's examples, citizens, afraid for their 
lives, demand better information of government and 
scientists, and then decide what they want. He hasn't an 
answer for what happens when they don't get it —  that is, 
hasn't an analysis of their limited power of intervention —  
nor does he speculate on citizens stopping scientific 
development, as in the case of the movement to close nuclear
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power plants. What he's doing is suggesting a grass-roots 
start to change.
Science here is the traditional science —  a body of 
objective knowledge —  distorted by growth and by outside 
pressures but not fundamentally unrepairable. Its 
epistemological possibility of objectivity is not in 
question, and its institutional capacity for it, though 
damaged, is recoverable. The sorcerer's apprentice, after 
all, is in trouble because his knowledge is truly effective? 
his problem is that it is partial. The wise sorcerer —  
good science —  will restore the balance. Though Commoner 
acknowledges the doubt the public has formed about the 
wisdom or accuracy of science, he does not go so far as to 
suppose that the public may suspect that all the sorcerers 
are apprentices.
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THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS —  POPULATION
The previous chapter reviewed a book that critiqued science 
and warned of the environmental danger of scientific 
knowledge applied without caution. This chapter reviews a 
book that warns of the environmental danger of government 
inaction in the face of a global population explosion.
Population Growth
Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb was published in 
19681; a paperback edition made it widely available, and it 
sold nearly a million copies in its first two years in 
print2, three million by 1990.3 Ehrlich, a biologist known 
for his field research in ecology, was then (and is still) a 
professor at Stanford University, specializing in population 
biology. He had previously written books on his ecological 
research. The Population Bomb is written in a direct, 
punchy style, with chapters broken up into short sections. 
The organization of the book is simple: "The Problem" —
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overpopulation, in Ehrlich's view; "The Ends of the Road" —
possible (and horrible) outcomes if population growth goes
unchecked; "What Is Being Done" about it; "What Needs to Be
Done"; "What Can You Do?"; "What If I'm Wrong?". Like
Carson, Ehrlich opens his book with the vision of a
frightening future, and like Carson he works from what is
happening now. Unlike Carson, however, he does not have to
imagine one place that will experience overwhelming problems
in the future. He finds it now, in India, on a "stinking
hot night in Delhi" in a crowded slum.
"The temperature was well over 100, and the air 
was a haze of dust and smoke. The streets seemed 
alive with people. People eating, people washing, 
people sleeping. People visiting, arguing, and 
screaming. People thrusting their hands through 
the taxi window, begging. People defecating and 
urinating. People clinging to buses. People 
herding animals. People, people, people, 
people."4
"Old India hands will laugh" at his shocked reaction,
Ehrlich acknowledges, but all the same, he says, "since that 
night I've known the feel of overpopulation."5
In underdeveloped countries, Ehrlich states (in the 
late 60s), food production falls behind population growth a 
little more each year. The "logical conclusion: mass 
starvation." The rich will get richer, the poor poorer. 
Three and a half million poor will die of starvation in the 
year that The Population Bomb is published; most of them 
will be children. In a decade or so, this number will look
like a "mere handful."6 The basic fact of population 
growth is that the more people there are, the more rapidly 
population doubles, other things being egual. Doubling time 
varies with the economic status of the population: poor 
agricultural populations add to their numbers more quickly 
than industrialized urban ones, but overall the world's 
population in the late 1960s doubles about every 37 years 
(approximately 35 years in poor countries, 50-100+ years in 
rich ones). At that rate, after 900 years, Ehrlich 
observes, there would be sixty million billion people on 
Earth. He dismisses the possibility, discussed in the 
popular press, that large populations could be moved to 
other planets. Even if all planets were habitable (and 
logistical problems overcome), as population continued to 
grow, it would take only about 250 years to fill up the 
solar system. Also, since it would take generations to 
reach the outer planets, passengers would have to practice 
strict birth control. "Thus we would have to export our 
responsible people, leaving the irresponsible at home on 
Earth to breed."7 The irresponsibility of overbreeding 
(more than two children per couple) is a continuing motif of 
Ehrlich's book.
Even in developed countries, population growth causes 
problems, and Ehrlich attributes to it the "headaches" of 
"garbage in our environment... overcrowded highways,
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burgeoning slums, deteriorating school systems, rising crime 
rates, riots, and other related problems."8 On population 
growth, he repeatedly emphasizes that it is the relationship 
between the birth rate and the death rate that is the most 
important, since if births exceed deaths then population 
will grow.9 With about 40% of the population of the 
underdeveloped countries being under the age of 15 in the 
late 1960s, the likelihood of the "greatest baby boom of all 
time" is an "ominous" fact.10
We got to this brink of a population explosion, Ehrlich 
says, because the urge to reproduce has been fixed in us by 
billions of years of the evolution of all life in the 
direction of reproductive success, and because human culture 
has developed around human biological needs. "Our urge to 
reproduce is hopelessly entwined with most of our other 
urges."11 For most of human life on earth, the prevalence 
of death from disease, starvation and accident kept total 
numbers low. Ehrlich dates the first population increase to 
a time when agriculture replaced hunting-gathering. Changes 
that came with industrialization, along with later medical 
advances (particularly "victory over malaria, yellow fever, 
smallpox, cholera and other infectious diseases"12 in the 
underdeveloped countries) greatly decreased the death rate 
and contributed to population growth. "Death control" of 
population has decreased, but birth control has not
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increased correspondingly. Biologically and socially,
Ehrlich says, "death control goes with the grain, birth
control against it."
"In summary, the world's population will continue 
to grow as long as the birth rate exceeds the 
death rate; it's as simple as that... Basically, 
then, there are only two kinds of solutions to the 
population problem. One is a 'birth rate 
solution', in which we find ways to lower the 
birth rate. The other is a 'death rate solution', 
in which ways to raise the death rate —  war, 
famine, pestilence —  find us.1,13
At the time of writing, Ehrlich felt that the next nine 
years would tell the extent of the population crisis, 
primarily because of the likelihood of famine in 
underdevloped countries. World wide, food production kept 
pace with population increase until about 1958 when (as 
others estimating the approach of famine put it), "the stork 
passed the plow." In 1965-66, because of agricultural 
disasters, there was no increase in worldwide food 
production at all, although world population kept 
growing.14 Ehrlich and others saw escalating food problems 
in India and Latin America. Ehrlich finds India too reliant 
on American food aid, Latin America too much in the grip of 
Roman Catholic doctrine that the rhythm method is the only 
acceptable method of birth control. He refers to a report 
on Colombia, where population doubling time is 22 years, 
which (although he does not draw attention to it) 
counteracts his references to irresponsible overbreeders:
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"The average mother goes through a progression of 
attempts to limit the size of her family. She 
starts with ineffective native forms of 
contraception and moves on to quack abortion, 
infanticide, frigidity, and all too often to 
suicide. That's the kind of misery that's 
concealed behind the dry statistic of a population 
doubling every 22 years."15
Before World War II, such a woman "could expect two or three
children to survive to reproductive age if she went through
ten pregnancies." Now seven or eight will live, and 80% of
the family's income will be spent on food.16 There is not
enough food today, Ehrlich states, and there will be even
less tomorrow.
The Environment
Food production that doesn't keep up with population is 
a massive problem in itself, "but in the long view the 
progressive deterioration of our environment may cause more 
death and misery than any conceivable food-population 
gap."17 Population growth places a great pressure on the 
environment: erosion as the result of poor farming 
practices, destruction from strip mining, salinization from 
overirrigation, decreased productivity of soils where huge 
dams stop silt-rich annual floods (as with the Aswan on the 
Nile), pesticide use which changes the ecological balance 
and persists throughout the food chain.
By such intervention in the environment we change 
complex ecosystems to simple ones, and "one of the basic 
facts of population biology," Ehrlich tells us, "...is that 
the simpler an ecosystem is, the more unstable it is."18 
Complexity in an ecosystem allows one element to take over 
the function of another when change occurs. If most of the 
foxes who hunt a forest die of disease, their role can be 
taken over by weasels or owls. But when we use pesticides, 
we destroy complexity. Pest insects, which have large 
populations, are statistically likely to contain pesticide 
resistant strains, but animals higher up the food chain, 
with smaller populations, can be significantly killed off by 
pesticides. Fewer of them will be available to eat the 
insects, and again more pesticide will be used, killing 
other life along with the non-resistant insects. Pesticides 
also reduce diversity of life in the soil. The simplified 
ecosystem becomes less stable —  that is, less able to deal 
with change. Some simple ecosystems are directly created —  
fields of single crops, for instance, like wheat or corn. 
These are highly vulnerable to insect attack, not only 
because they present a large, attractive target to feed 
rapidly reproducing insects, but because their natural 
insecticides have been bred out to improve their taste.
"One could go on with pesticide horror stories galore," 
Ehrlich states. "The scientific literature is replete with
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them... It is a record of ecological stupidity without 
parallel.1,19
As a result of our productive activities even the 
vastness of the ocean is being poisoned, and the air is 
becoming depleted of oxygen. Air pollutants kill vulnerable 
plant life, and can disrupt climate by affecting the amount 
of heat from the sun that both comes to the earth and is 
radiated back from it. Rivers and lakes are deteriorating 
rapidly. Ehrlich tells of reminiscing with a friend about 
field research they had been doing together ten years 
earlier: a study of natural selection in water snakes living 
at the western end of Lake Erie. Still fascinated by the 
guestion, they would like to continue the research, but 
cannot, because most of the snakes are gone, as are the fish 
on which they fed. "The once beautiful lake is now a septic 
tank," Ehrlich states bluntly, and while a few years prior 
to their research, 75 million pounds of fish were taken from 
the lake, "no one in his right mind would eat a Lake Erie 
fish today."20 This loss of edible fish, a familiar story 
now, could still raise incredulous responses in the 60s. A 
deteriorating environment threatens us physically and 
perhaps mentally as well, and may have something to do, 
Ehrlich suggests, with "rising crime rates, disaffection of 
youth, and increased drug usage."
Ehrlich points out to his readers that he's taking a
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limited piece of the environmental problem to talk about:
"You will note that my discussion of man's 
environment has not dwelt on the themes that 
characterize the pleas of conservationists. I 
haven't discussed [redwoods]... I've shed no tears 
here for the passenger pigeons, now extinct, or 
the California condors, soon to join them. No 
tears for them, or for the great auk, or the 
mammoths, or the great herds of bison, or the 
California grizzly bears, or the Carolina 
parakeet. I haven't written about them, or of the 
pleasantness, beauty, indeed glory of many natural 
areas. Instead I have concentrated on things that 
seem to bear most directly on man."21
The conservation battle, says Ehrlich, is being lost, first
because nothing can remain undeveloped under the pressure of
population growth, and second because "most Americans
clearly don't give a damn." Ehrlich's evaluation of most
Americans may or may not have been accurate in 1968; twenty-
five years later most Americans say they are worried about
the environment. Ehrlich concludes his review of
environmental problems with this analysis of their cause:
"Too many cars, too many factories, too much 
detergent, too much pesticide, multiple contrails, 
inadequate sewage treatment plants, too little 
water, too much carbon dioxide —  all can be 
traced easily to too many people.1,22
Disaster Scenarios
Too many people brings us to the "verge of the 'death 
rate solution'," and Ehrlich outlines both general
possibilities and more specific scenarios for how that 
solution might work. Generally, disease could increase as 
population density does, especially malaria, yellow fever, 
and typhus. Or, viruses (still not fully understood, he 
says) may become more potent with large populations to 
circulate in. In 1918-1920, a flu virus killed 25 million 
people in a global epidemic. A more lethal flu would do 
still worse; the virus could occur naturally or escape from 
biological warfare research strains. Death and incapacity 
from illness would disrupt all areas of society, including 
food production and transportation. As many as one out of 
every seven people might die (which Ehrlich compares to one 
out of 200 people dying in battle in World War II) .23 Any 
crisis would exacerbate differences between rich and poor 
nations, especially the balance of food.
Specifically, Ehrlich offers Scenario I, in which China 
has catastrophic floods and famine in the early 1970s, and 
is shaken by food riots. The United States, at war in 
Thailand, is blamed for Canada's refusal to sell wheat to 
China, and Chinese troops move into Thailand as anti-Americn 
feeling increases. Escalating war leads to rationing of 
food and water at home for the United States; pressure to 
end the war quickly leads the U.S. to use tactical nuclear 
weapons. China strikes back from nuclear submarines along 
the U.S. west coast, and more than 100 million Americans die
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from fallout.
Scenario II has all of Latin America under the grip of
communism at the end of the 70s, a decade in which it has
suffered repeated famine, as have Asia and Africa. "Food 
riots have often become anti-American riots, as our enemies 
claimed we were withholding food from the starving."24
Continuing war in Southeast Asia has brought massive
casualties and economic crisis. Americans and Soviets would 
be at war in the Mediterranean if it were not for "a 
particularly virulent strain of bubonic plague killing 65% 
of the starving Egyptian population...." India has fallen 
apart into "starving, warring minor states."25 Food and 
water rationing are standard throughout the U.S., and riots 
are common in the cities. Ninety-thousand people have died 
in Los Angeles as the result of two years of killer smog.
The decline in Atlantic and Pacific Ocean fishing due to 
pollution is found to be irreversible. Government advisors 
recommend compulsory restriction of births to one per couple 
to prevent famine in the United States by the year 2000. As 
1980 begins, the Chinese and Russians establish missile 
bases in Latin America. America makes a pre-emptive nuclear 
strike; there is nuclear war. Monster fires, high radiation 
levels and climatic change follow. Sterilized soil and 
erosion make the northern two-thirds of the Earth 
uninhabitable. Squeezed into the Southern hemisphere,
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posioned by radiation, human beings die off as crops fail, 
livestock perish and plagues spread. Only the cockroach 
survives.
The third and more "cheerful" scenario still has 
shortages, rationing, and population control. In the mid- 
1970s the United States withdraws from war and also from 
sending food aid abroad. It decides its food production 
will be increased only so much as can happen without "damage 
to the environment of the North American continent."26 The 
Pope gives his blessing to birth control and abortion; 
cheap, long-term contraceptive drugs become widely 
available. But famine and food riots are sweeping Asia, the 
Arab world, Africa and Latin America. Governments fall in 
China and India, local warfare breaks out in other famished 
countries. The United States, Canada, the Common Market, 
Russia, Japan and Australia formulate "area rehabilitation" 
plans to be carried out, beginning in 1985, in "selected 
sections of Asia, Africa, and South America... The plan 
will eventually cover the entire world"; its goals include 
reduction of world population to 1.5 billion by 2100.27 In 
this scenario, as many as half a billion people —  one-fifth 
of the world's population —  die from starvation. Ehrlich 




In Ehrlich's evaluation, next to nothing is being done 
to control population growth. The United States budgets 
very little money for population control at home or abroad: 
"The population budget of all the agencies would not buy 
more than a dozen sophisticated military jets. It is 
roughly the same amount as the government appropriation for 
rat control."28 Meanwhile, biomedical research on cancer, 
circulatory diseases, and organ transplants amounts, in 
Ehrlich's words, to "preoccupation with death control."29 
"The establishment in American biology consists primarily of 
death-controllers..."30 Successful death control without 
successful birth control, he repeats, must lead to disaster. 
The underdeveloped countries are ahead of the developed ones 
in recognizing the problem, but "In summary, the world 
population control situation is dismal."31
Can improvements in agricultural production help fend 
off the problems of growing population? Ehrlich doesn't 
hold out much hope. Most arable land is already under 
cultivation; irrigation of dry lands to the extent necessary 
is economically impossible. Desalinization of ocean water, 
'farming the sea' for food, and food from petroleum, popular 
futuristic remedies, are disposed of by Ehrlich with 
technical and economic arguments. More promising is the
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development of grains with favorable amino acid balances, 
and the manufacture of high protein food and beverage mixes. 
Getting people to alter their eating habits, however, is as 
difficult as getting them to change their views on family 
planning.
Most hopeful is the development of high yield crops 
which give more food per acre on land already being farmed. 
However, many of these require more irrigation and 
fertilizer than existing grains, so only a limited number of 
farmers in underdeveloped countries will be able to adopt 
their cultivation. In addition, they present ecological 
problems: new and simplified varieties of plants can be very 
susceptible to disease and insects; the increased use of 
pesticides and fertilizers degrades the environment. They 
are a risk we need to take, and we can only hope for 
positive results in the long run. But "we already know that 
it is impossible to increase food production enough to cope 
with continued population growth." Even positive results 
"can do no more than delay the day of reckoning unless 
population control is successful."32
A Sick Environment
Ehrlich makes a strong, in fact an exaggerated,
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evaluation of the state of the environment. His
exaggeration is in keeping with the colloquial style that
marks many pages of the book. "It is pretty hard," he says,
"to ignore the stench that exudes from most of our 
open bodies of water, or the tears streaming down 
our cheeks as we inhale the mixture of poisonous 
gases and solid particles that passes for air in 
many of our cities."33
He quotes newspaper headlines and journal titles on the
environment? they sound like those of today: "'Clean Air,
Water Possible at a Price'; 'Pollution Called Multiple
Peril'; 'Toxic Substances and Ecological Cycles'."34 He
reviews the problems of smog and the automobile, of
pesticides, of tolerance levels for toxic substances and of
synergistic combinations of effects. We need to weigh risks
and benefits, he says, and the risks must be made clear.
But the government agencies that are responsible for
protecting us are at best inadequate, at worst on the wrong
side. In particular, "the Department of Agriculture (USDA)
has had a long history of pushing pesticides, displaying a
high level of ecological incomptence in the process."35
The Department of the Interior, under Stewart Udall in the
Johnson administration attempts to clean up lakes and
rivers, but laws are inadequate.
Ehrlich recalls the Mississippi fish kill of the early
60s (another subject treated by Carson). The unexpected
killing of an estimated 10 to 15 million fishes between 1960
and 1963, after a highly toxic insecticide was used on the 
cotton and cane fields along the river, put Mississippi 
fisheries out of business. Like the Mississippi, the 
Missouri suffers from pollution, but from slaughterhouse 
wastes rather than from pesticides. New Jersey's Raritan 
River is polluted by sewage, and the clamming industry in 
Raritan Bay is shut down. Lake Michigan, New York's Hudson 
River, and Pennsylvania streams are similarly afflicted. 
Ehrlich says of our "sick environment": "The patient 
continues to get weaker."36
The Cure
What needs to be done? "A general answer... is simple. 
We must rapidly bring the world population under control, 
reducing the growth rate to zero or making it go 
negative."37 Ehrlich envisions an international program 
"to set optimum population-environment goals for the world 
and to devise methods for reaching these goals."38 The 
United States, as the most influential superpower and the 
richest nation in the world, must take the lead. It "cannot 
remain affluent and isolated." It is part of a global 
economy, and has an "inflated position," using over half of 
the world's raw materials every year, although it has less
284
than l/15th of the world's population. Its proportion of 
world population will go down as population grows, but its 
share of raw materials is likely to increase. "Will other 
countries," Ehrlich asks, "many of them in the grip of 
starvation and anarchy, still happily supply these materials 
to a nation that cannot give them food?"39
As well as being part of a global economy, we are part 
of a global ecology. Every attempt to increase food 
production, as population grows, will have an attendant 
environmental cost, and/or an economic one. And there could 
be other costs that we should think about. We have to see 
the reality of the threat, Ehrlich insists, and he provides 
a homely example: "Will we be willing to slaughter our dogs 
and cats in order to divert pet food protein to the starving 
masses in Asia?" To avoid coming to such choices,
"Obviously our first step must be to immediately establish 
and advertise drastic policies designed to bring our own 
population size under control."40 This will provide us 
with the kind of future we want, and set an example for 
others.
What kind of measures would reduce population? Ehrlich 
offers some suggestions. Reverse tax policy, and tax 
children rather than granting exemptions for them. 
"Parents... who had ten children would pay for their 
reproductive irresponsibility ...." Impose luxury taxes on
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cribs, diapers, and expensive toys, "always with the proviso 
that the esentials be available without penalty to the poor 
(just as free food now is)."41 Give "Responsibility 
prizes" to couples for each five years of childless 
marriage, or to each man who accepts irreversible 
sterilization after fathering no more than two children.
Have lotteries which only the childless can win. Subsidize 
adoption and make it simple.
Once on the right track at home, the United States must 
take international action. Ehrlich recommends the 'triage' 
system of classifying other nations.42 Some nations will 
make the transition to self-sufficiency without drastic aid 
from us (e.g., Libya); others may become self-sufficient 
with our help (Pakistan); finally, the "tragic category —  
those countries that are so far behind in the population- 
food game that there is no hope that our food aid will see 
them through to self-sufficiency" (probably India),43 
Using such a system of classification, the United States can 
proceed to lead the way in the "area rehabilitation" Ehrlich 
mentioned earlier: "simultaneous population control, 
agricultural development, and where resources warrant it, 
industrialization of selected countries...."44 "Needless 
to say," Ehrlich acknowledges, "the sociopolitical problems 
of initiating such a program would be colossal."45 There 
are no sugarcoated solutions, he says; "the time for them is
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long gone. A cancer is an uncontrolled multiplication of 
cells; the population explosion is an uncontrolled 
multiplication of people."46 Surgery is necessary.
What optimum population is, is yet to be decided, but 
it should allow, Ehrlich feels, both the choice to be 
crowded and the choice to be alone, and be within the limits 
set by nature. Natural limits are not known, any more than 
social ones are, but Ehrlich estimates that a population of 
one to two billion people could be "sustained in reasonable 
comfort for perhaps 1,000 years."47 (This number is, of 
course, less than the approximately 3.5 population existing 
at the time that Ehrlich wrote his book.) If we stabilize 
at four or five billion, we still have a chance, but our 
lives will be less pleasant.
* * *
Ehrlich's main argument is that population growth 
threatens human survival. He presents the logic of numbers 
as inescapable. He traces social and environmental 
problems, not to social causes, but to a biological one —  
the urge to reproduce. His argument is monocausal rather 
than multicausal. The types of social policies he favors 
are top-down government regulation, extending to an
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international scale, but he does also recommend that 
everyone lobby both friends and officials for control of 
population, beginning at home. His recommendations favor 
industrialized nations with a large middle class that can 
carry out and benefit from birth control; the triage 
approach to aid eliminates the world's poorest people from 
even being considered to receive help.
Ehrlich criticizes existing government policies, keep- 
quiet scientists, voluble politicians, 'family planning', 
Catholic dogma, "reproductive irresponsibility", attitudes 
of the developed world toward the need for population 
control and toward use of resources. He emphasizes sheer 
numbers, likely disasters, current dismal situations, 
deteriorated environment, and the social problems of 
crowding. He favors hard-line government population 
policies, birth control, availability of abortion, sex 
education, worldwide effort on population control, support 
for population control from biologists, and the 
environmental evaluation of economic actions. He predicts 
famines, riots, wars, disease. He recommends as necessary a 
neoimperialism under the name of "area rehabilitation." 
Ehrlich's desired world is one in which situations are 
evaluated realistically rather than ideologically. It is a 
world in which individuals may choose their living space, 
and can, when they want, get away from it all to a world of
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nature which is still intact.
Science Trust and Science Skepticism
Ehrlich and Commoner had an ongoing and sometimes 
acerbic debate during the 60s and part of the 70s, 
particularly after Commoner formulated his argument in The 
Closing Circle that it is not population pressure but our 
choice of productive technologies that is the source of our 
environmental problems. They differ also on the politics of 
solutions. Ehrlich supposes solutions through top-down 
regulation by government agencies; Commoner supposes 
solutions through citizen-scientist cooperation. Ehrlich 
takes his regulatory view even though he finds existing 
government action entirely inadequate because it is 
uninformed and misdirected. Like Commoner, though, he 
believes that scientists should speak out. Unlike Commoner, 
he seems to think that scientific expertise is necessary for 
solving social problems. Ehrlich is critical of scientists 
for their aloof stance, and does not (unlike Commoner) 
hesitate to mix his scientific opinions with his social 
policy ones.
Ehrlich's analysis of how science is directed in 
society cannot bear much weight; he simply does not theorize
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much in The Population Bomb about science. Ehrlich offers 
no critique of the scientific enterprise as a whole, nor 
does he suggest that it needs to be defended. He does not 
analyze why we have a technology that gives us environmental 
problems, though he does cite Lynn White, who traced an 
attitude of subduing Nature to doctrines of the Christian 
church. His argument needs no such explanation, because the 
root of our environmental problems, in his analysis, is too 
many people. In my terms, Ehrlich is a science truster, not 
a science skeptic; Commoner is a science skeptic.
Ehrlich's is a warning voice. He startled the public, 
and made the previously dry topic of population growth a 
topic of immediate interest and everyday conversation. The 
condition of society and the condition of nature are 
inseparably linked through the pressure of human numbers.
Ehrlich is not a theorist in this book;48 he is, or 
presents himself as, a pragmatist, as a man of action much 
more than as a scientist. Bomb is a polemic. Its overall 
theme is the inevitability of disaster if the current course 
is followed. Ehrlich, as an ecologist, knows that "human 
beings are embedded in and supported by natural ecosystems," 
and he knows that human beings can destroy these systems and 
thus themselves.49 Out of concern, he speaks out. As a 
population biologist, he uses his specialty to make a very 
focused argument, meant to have political impact.50
Ehrlich gives his readers dramatized doom. His 
scenarios for the future seem in retrospect to be extremist 
fantasies, but they were matched by other cold-war scenarios 
at the time.51 And he made the public aware that the 
balance of food and population could easily be upset by 
natural disaster or social disturbance. He uses simple 
statistics to show the inexorable logic of numbers 
(recalling Malthus), and buttresses his argument with 
scientific legitimation: it is evolution that has fixed in 
us the urge to breed. His argument is reductionist —  
overpopulation is the root of all the most pressing social 
and environmental problems, and there are only two 
solutions: birth control or death control. Ehrlich 
recognizes and describes complex interactions in the natural 
world, but not in the social world. He often uses a 
colloquial style to get his point across quickly and 
directly. Like Carson, he is dramatic in his presentation 
of material.
Science and Survival and The Population Bomb share some 
characteristics that could be called (using Mannheim's term) 
"authentic manifestations" of the environmental style of 
thought: a reliance on quantification and facts, speaking 
out as a moral response, giving warning (predicting). These 
derive from the occupational experience of science and from 
its ethos. Both Commoner and Ehrlich express the
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ecologist's feel for system complexity and 
interrelationships in the natural world, but Ehrlich does 
not extend this understanding to the social world.
Epistemologically, in relation to the key problem of 
holism vs reductionism, Commoner exemplifies an anti­
reductionist stance: wholes replace parts as elements of 
analysis, and causes are cyclical and multiple rather than 
single and linear. Ehrlich is holistic about ecosystems but 
reductionist in his perception of and solutions to social 
problems.
The Ability to Speak
Commoner and Ehrlich, as university-situated 
scientists, in what is not yet in the 1960s and 70s a 'big 
ticket' scientific discipline (biology) heavily subsidized 
by federal funding, are relatively independent scientists 
who can speak out. Carson, as a trained but non-practicing 
scientist, was in a similar position. A comment on this 
type of position was made by Alice Stewart, a British 
epidemiologist who found statistical evidence (in the 1970s) 
that radiation was killing workers at the Hanford nuclear 
plant in Washington state. As reported on years later
[Dr. Stewart's published finding] drew immediate
and vitriolic criticism from other scientists,
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many of them under contract to the weapons 
industry... Even before the Hanford finding was 
published, the Government cut off funds for the 
study, prompting a Congressional committee to 
investigate allegations of a scientific cover- 
up. . .
At hearings in 1988 and 1989, [Dr. Stewart] 
told Senate and House committees that the Energy 
Department's program for assessing radiation 
hazards at nuclear weapons plants was badly 
flawed, hindering the free exchange of scientific 
ideas...
'If I was a coward and afraid of my job,' [she 
said], 'I wouldn't say a thing. But I am retired.
I have no department that anybody's dependent on 
for work. I speak out because I think there are 
not a lot of people in such a good position. I 
have nothing to lose. A lot of people do. This 
area of research can be shut down. I've watched 
it happen.'"52
The most widely read environmental books of the 60s and 70s 
were science-based, and the authors were scientists who by 
virtue of structural position or reputation were able to 
speak out. In this freedom, they are something like 
Mannheim's free-floating intellectuals, but unlike them, 
they do have their own goals, their own desired world.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TEN
1. Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1968).
(All page references that follow are to this 
book, except as noted.)
2. Tony Kaye, "The Birth Dearth," The New Republic. January 
19, 1987, p.20.
3. John Tierney, "Betting on the Planet," The New York 





8. pp.24-25. Other causes of these problems —  government 
policy, market activity —  are not mentioned. Most of the 
"headaches" of the 1960s are still with us in the 1990s, but 
riots were a phenomenon of the 60s that has not carried 
over, although the Los Angeles riot over the Rodney King 
verdict in 1992 indicates that they could happen again. The 
60s riots occurred in the context of activism on civil 
rights and on the Vietnam war; attributing them to 
population growth relies on assumptions that Ehrlich does 
not spell out. Ehrlich's explanation of population growth 
is simple and clear, while his sociological analysis is 
simplistic.
9. But Ehrlich does not go into the circumstances that 
affect human birth and death rates, other than 'breeding' 
activity and war, famine and disease; he doesn't really 
explain human population dynamics, which are affected by 














22 . p. 67 .
23. If he had
20 million to the 15 million battle deaths, then one in 100 
of the world's people (then 3.5 billion) died as a result of 
World War II —  1%, compared to the approximately 14% he 















37. The movement for Zero Population Growth, in which 
Ehrlich was actively involved, followed on his book.
38. p.131. This unconscious imperialism of America's 
heyday has been brought to an end by the Rio Conference (The 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
1992) , at which third world counntries have strongly 
resisted the American stance, which world opinion generally 
judges to be environmentally backward. Population, however, 
was not a major official topic at the conference; it was to 
be discussed separately later. The political problems of 
population control in an international context were too 
great to be negotiated into the conference.
39. p.133.
40. p.134.
41. p.137. Again, Ehrlich's population computations are 
better than his grasp of social policy.
42. Suggested, Ehrlich says, by William and Paul Paddock in 






48. Mannheim, in analyzing conservative thought, dealt with 
theorists, even if polemical ones. Analyzing work that 
eschews theory, like Ehrlich's popular book, extends 
Mannheim's method to where it is in some ways ill-suited to 
go. More is said about this in chapter sixteen.
49. Paul Ehrlich, The Machinery of Nature (Simon &
Schuster, 1986), p.5.
50. In a New York Times Sunday magazine article, John 
Tierney says he rushed to finish the book in time for the 
1968 presidential election (John Tierney, "Betting on the 
Planet," The New York Times. 12/2/90, p.76). In the book, 
Ehrlich recommends a Department of Population and
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Environment, which would establish policies for reducing 
population growth at home and abroad. Among other things, 
he recommends sex-determination enabling first-born children 
to be male, the right of physician-approved abortion, a 
challenge to Catholic doctrine on birth control and 
abortion, sex education, the taxing of children, and awards 
to the childless.
51. By comparison, Carson's fears for the future have found 
confirmation in the effect of pesticides on subtle and long 
term aspects of human health.
52. Keith Schneider, "Scientist Who Managed to 'Shock the 
World' on Atomic Workers' Health," The New York Times. 
5/3/90, p.A20.
More information is coming out about Hanford (1990), an 
early atomic weapons plant from which material came for the 
Nagasaki bomb. An article by historian Michele Stenehjem 
("Indecent Exposure," Natural History. September, 1990, 
pp.6-22) summarizes how the combined industry (General 
Electric) and government management of the Hanford plant 
withheld important scientific data on radioactive wastes 
from public view. The article lead reads: "For forty years 
scientists knew that radionuclides from reactors along the 
Columbia River accumulated in body tissue. They decided to 
keep it to themselves." (p.6) Other, airborne, wastes were 
taken in by plants, ingested by cows, concentrated in their 
milk, and passed on to children in the farming area around 
the plant, who thus became a high-exposure group.
Science magazine reports that the U.S. "Department of 
Energy confessed that leaks from its plant in Hanford, 
Washington, may have seriously affected U.S. citizens." 
Sources were airborne leaks from fuel tanks in the 1940s, 
and radionuclides in the river, contained in drinking water 
from the river and concentrated in its fish. The 
"reconstructed estimates" of radiation doses haven't been 
correlated with sickness rates, but Centers for Disease 
Control and DOE studies will be made. (August, 1990, p.474).
A preliminary study of Hanford radiation, released in 
1992, affirms that in the 1950s and 60s, the plant dumped 
radioactive water, used to cool the reactors, into the 
Columbia River. "The radiation reached the Pacific Ocean 
200 miles away, contaminating fish and drinking water along 
the river and exposing as many as 2,000 people to 
potentially dangerous doses." ("Radiation Flowed 200 Miles 




HOBBESIAN, ANARCHIST, AND HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS
Of the many books and articles written on environmental 
problems in the 60s and 70s, three works which were not 
best-selling books, but which were influential in the 
environmental debate, stand out. They are discussed in 
this chapter.
The Tragedy of the Commons
Originally published in Science magazine in December, 
1968, Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" has been 
much cited and reprinted since.1 Hardin, a biologist, 
takes population to be the key factor in a finite world, and 
provides a rational-choice type of analysis of the 
interaction of people and resources.
The article opens with the question of whether there is 
a class of problems with no technical solutions, affirms 
that there is, and puts the population problem in this 
class. Technological solutions to overpopulation, like
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farming the seas, developing new strains of wheat, or 
escaping into space, will not really solve the problem, 
Hardin asserts. In 1968, it is still necessary for Hardin 
to ask if ours is a finite world; this is not yet a given in 
the discussion of global problems. It is finite, Hardin 
says, and "A finite world can support only a finite 
population; therefore population growth must eventually 
equal zero."2 But even then, our difficulties do not end, 
and the 'greatest good for the greatest number' still cannot 
be realized.
Hardin cites von Neumann and Morgenstern's game theory
to explain that the first reason we can't have the greatest
good for the greatest number is that it is mathematically
impossible to maximize for two or more variables at the same
time. Then,
"The second reason springs directly from 
biological facts. To live, any organism must have 
a source of energy (for example, food). This 
energy is utilized for two purposes: mere 
maintenance and work... Work calories are used not 
only for what we call work in common speech; they 
are also used required for all forms of enjoyment, 
from swimming and automobile racing to playing 
music and writing poetry. If our goal is to 
maximize population it is obvious what we must do:
We must make the work calories approach as close 
to zero as possible. No gourmet meals, no 
vacations, no sports, no music, no literature, no 
art. "3
Avoiding such sacrifices means that the optimum population 
is less than the maximum population. If the maximum good 
per person is wanted for an optimum population, there must
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be a way to weigh the value of goods, despite different
values —  for example, some want land to be used for
factories, some want land to be kept as wilderness.
Differences in values, however, according to Hardin, are
only a theoretical problem; "in real life incommensurables
are commensurable," as when in Nature, natural selection
makes survival the criterion for having one thing rather
than another.4 "Man must imitate this process,"5 and to do
so, we must stop believing in Adam Smith's idea of an
invisible hand that leads individuals pursuing their own
interest to contribute to the common good.
Following this introduction, Hardin goes on to the
"Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons."
"Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be 
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons."
At first this presents no problem, for
"tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the 
numbers of both man and beast well below the 
carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, 
comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when 
the long-desired goal of social stability becomes 
a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of 
the commons remorselessly generates tragedy."6
Each herdsman still, "as a rational being... seeks to
maximize his gain." Hardin calculates two results, or
utilities, of adding one more animal to the land. One is
the proceeds of the sale of the additional animal, almost
all of which goes to the herdsman, so the positive utility
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for him is almost +1. The other is the overgrazing created
by one more animal; however, the effects of this are spread
among all herdsmen, so the negative utility for the example
herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
"Adding together the component partial utilities, 
the rational herdsman concludes that the only 
sensible course for him to pursue is to add 
another animal to his herd. And another; and 
another... But this is the conclusion reached by 
each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase 
his herd without limit —  in a world that is 
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all."7
Hardin says that although we learned this thousands of 
years ago, "natural selection favors the forces of 
psychological denial," which benefits the individual even 
though the society of which he is a part suffers. National 
parks provide another example of the tragedy of the commons, 
Hardin observes, being (at that time) open to all without 
limit. As a result, "the values that visitors seek in the 
park are steadily eroded." (National parks are still open 
to all to visit on a day basis, but campsites and trailer 
sites for overnight and longer stays are limited, and quotas 
are imposed on trips into wilderness areas of the larger 
parks.)8 Pollution is another example, but rather than 
something being taken out of the commons, something noxious 
is added in. "The pollution problem is a consequence of
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population,” Hardin states, for in earlier times "how a 
lonely American frontiersman disposed of his waste” did not 
matter.9
This leads Hardin on to a section titled "Freedom to 
Breed is Intolerable." "If each human family were dependent 
only on its own resources," Hardin speculates, then 
overbreeders would leave fewer descendants, not more, 
because some of the children would starve. But because we 
are committed to the welfare state, we face another tragedy 
of the commons. "To couple the concept of the freedom to 
breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right 
to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of 
action."10 Appeals to conscience won't work to control 
population growth, because "Those who have more children 
will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than 
those with more susceptible consciences. The difference 
will be accentuated, generation by generation." This 
assumes hereditary transmittal of conscience, Hardin allows, 
but "only in the most general formal sense," not necessarily 
through germ cells —  it could happen "exosomatically," he 
says, borrowing a term from A.J. Lotka, a mathematical 
biologist. Conscience is thus "self-eliminating." Hardin 
speculates a little on the "pathogenic effects of 
conscience," brought on, he believes, by a double bind of 
being damned if one does the wrong thing, but also damned as
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a simpleton who can be exploited if one doesn't.11 So 
conscience is really of no use. Definite social 
arrangements are more useful.
Thus we must mutually agree to coercion, that is, to 
laws against certain actions and penalties for 
transgressions of the law. "An alternative to the commons 
need not be perfectly just to be preferable," Hardin states. 
For example, we have such an alternative in private 
property, which "as a genetically trained biologist," Hardin 
says,
"I deny [is just]. It seems to me that, if there 
are to be differences in individual inheritance, 
legal possession should be perfectly correlated 
with biological inheritance —  that those who are 
biologically more fit to be the custodians of 
property and power should legally inherit more...
We must admit that our legal system of private 
property plus legal inheritance is unjust —  but 
we put up with it because we are not convinced, at 
the moment, that anyone has invented a better 
system. The alternative of the commons is too 
horrifying to contemplate."12
"The commons," Hardin says, "if it is justifiable at all, is
justifiable only under conditions of low-population
density." He gives a brief historical sketch of how the
commons has had to be abandoned as population has grown:
first we enclosed land for farming, pastures and hunting,
and 'enclosed' the sea for fishing —  abandoning the commons
in food gathering. We have begun to abandon the commons as
a place for waste disposal. "In a still more embryonic
state is our recognition of the evils of the common in
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matters of pleasure" —  e.g., blaring radios and mindless
piped music in public areas, billboards, commercials, the
planned supersonic transport.13 Enclosing the commons
infringes on personal liberties,
"But what does freedom mean? When men mutually 
agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind 
became more free, not less so. Individuals locked 
into the logic of the commons are free only to 
bring on universal ruin; once they see the 
necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to 
pursue other goals."14
Freedom is the recognition of necessity, and what is
necessary now is to abandon the commons in breeding, for
"Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all."15
The Theme of Rational Calculation
Hardin, in this essay, is the technician whose 
technical analysis shows him there is no technical solution? 
technique is up against the limits of a finite world. In 
the environmental problem as he presents it, population is 
the key to the solution, but because population is an 
outcome of human behavior, it cannot be managed by 
technology in the way that the environment (in Hardin's 
view) can be. The population/environment problem is a 
quantity/quality problem —  the quantity of people vs the 
quality of life.
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On the issue of individual choice vs common survival, 
morality, Hardin believes, is "system-sensitive"; ethics are 
situational. (At this point, the text of Hardin's argument 
has gone from seemingly objective analysis of mathematical 
certainties to criticism of morality; the population issue 
has moved to the background.) As an alternative, he proposes 
biological fitness as a basis for the ethics of ownership.
Hardin's argument relies on the application of a 
scientific outlook to guestions about population growth, to 
which he takes a mathematical (and Malthusian) approach, but 
which he does not explicitly characterize as either 
biological or social. The issue is taken to be one solely 
of numbers, of the distribution of goods across numbers of 
people, with an assumption that any kind of good can be 
quantified. The essay has the tone of inescapable facts and 
unarguable mathematical calculations. The difficult issue 
of competing human values is dealt with by making a direct 
analogy to the operation of a single criterion —  survival - 
- as the determining force in natural selection. A 
scientific theory —  evolution —  is thus applied to the 
social world as if the social world were not different in 
any relevant respect from the natural world. A rational 
analysis that calculates costs and benefits —  a scientific 
weighing of alternatives —  is the way to determine the 
solution to our environmental and social problems; science
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shows the way to society.
Hardin's central image, that of the commons, is 
constructed more for the purposes of his argument than in 
the light of history. His commons is an unenclosed space to 
which individuals apparently have unlimited access, from 
which they can derive benefit without paying out 
obligations. Overuse of the space grants short-term benefit 
to the first overusers; late comers get no benefit at all, 
because the commons has been depleted. Overuse is bound to 
happen, because it has positive utility for the rational 
calculator (so called). This dynamic, Hardin claims, has 
caused us to progressively abandon the commons throughout 
history, to fence in land, make rules about the sea, 
legislate protection of the environment.
Another View of the Commons
Hardin's understanding of the commons, I think, is 
backwards. His misappropriation of this term, and 
misrepresentation of the concept behind it, disregards a 
tradition of intelligent land use. The commons, 
historically, is not governed by rational choice —  
individual calculators do not hold sway. The commons was 
never a free-for-all space like the mythical American
frontier, and its use was regulated precisely because its 
limits were understood. It was not
unowned land, nor land owned jointly by its users, but was 
land with one owner, a person or a corporation —  an English 
landlord or an American town. There were a variety of legal 
and customary rights giving access to the commons. The 
commons are used in common, within commonly understood 
limits; they are not an anarchic space. In medieval 
Britain, the peasants who had tenancy rights administered 
the commons through a council. The number of animals that 
could graze was jointly decided upon.16 Where open land 
(not necessarily a commons) has been subjected to the type 
of overuse that Hardin describes, it is not because common 
people have been rational calculators bent on ever- 
increasing gains, but because the unequal distribution of 
wealth has made no other resource available to them. For 
them, it has been use or starve, not use and gain. In more 
modern examples —  strip mining, deforestation, 
overfishing —  it is not common use, but individual use by 
the modern individual, the corporation, that has caused 
depletion. The mismanagement of resources is not a tragedy 
of the commons, it is a policy of individualistic profit- 
seeking.
Hardin is closer to the mark on the overuse of parks, 
the particularly American version of the commons, yet here
again it is not rational calculation for profit that is at 
work for the individual user, for the users have no direct 
control of use the way herdsmen have control of —  or rights 
and obligations regarding —  commons use. The inexorability 
of every person's calculated use of common space for gain, a 
central idea of Hardin's, does not evenly apply to public 
open spaces historically or contemporaneously, and lacks any 
reference to economic structure. But the idea that the 
environment as a whole is a commons —  the air, the water, 
the soil, and their interactions —  is a powerful one, for 
in fact we are all affected by the uses made of the 
environment by others. The problem, though, is not that we 
must abandon the environment as a commons; instead, we must 
in fact treat it like one. Subjecting the use of space to 
regulation is not the abandonment of the commons —  it is 
the making of the commons.17
Hardin's use of the terms "positive utility" and 
"negative utility" scientizes the discussion, as does his 
appeal to the word "exosomatic" for his claim that 
conscience can be, in the most general way, hereditary. His 
eguation of the commons with the welfare state politicizes 
it; in Hardin's world, social interdependency did not appear 
until the welfare state did. He then scientizes his 
politics; The current system of property ownership is 
unjust, not on a social or economic basis, but on a
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biological one —  those biologically "more fit" to own 
property do not inherit more than those less fit. Yet 
private property ownership is preferable to the alternative 
of the commons (read socialism), which is too horrifying to 
contemplate. Freedom is the rule of law, and law, in 
another of Hardin's historically inaccurate constructions, 
is "mutual coercion." Hardin's argument is Hobbes with 
genetics —  not only are his hypothetical social actors 
driven only by self interest, they are biologically 
unworthy.
Post-Scarcitv Anarchism
Around the same time that Commoner was writing Science 
and Survival, and Ehrlich was writing The Population Bomb. 
Murray Bookchin was writing Post-Scarcitv Anarchism, a group 
of essays dating from 1965 to 1968.18 An earlier book, Our 
Synthetic Environment, appeared in 1963.19 Bookchin's work 
is deeply searching; it takes on theoretical questions that 
are absent in Commoner and Ehrlich. Bookchin's left 
analysis has kept him from being a widely published author, 
and he has never achieved the popular fame of Ehrlich in the 
late 60s or the widespread recognition of Commoner since the 
70s. Additionally, he is not a scientist, so his work is
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not in the category which is being most closely analyzed 
here. However, because Bookchin addresses central issues in 
the environmental debate (and has often been the first to do 
so), and because he has responded to arguments made by other 
environmental thinkers, it is valuable to take a brief look 
at his work.
The starting point for Post-Scarcity Anarchism is that 
the world is changing profoundly; instead of developing 
around scarcity, society is on the threshold of post­
scarcity —  a condition that offers not just material 
abundance but social and cultural abundance. Bookchin 
observes an increasing tension "between actuality and poten­
tiality," evidenced by black, women's, youth, children's, 
and gay liberation movements. Liberals, he notes, call this 
tension "rising expectations." Bookchin connects this 
social agitation with ecology: "The tension between 
actuality and potentiality, between present and future, 
acquires apocalyptic proportions in the ecological crisis of 
our time." He argues that the environmental crisis can't be 
saved "within the bourgeois framework"; "Capitalism is 
inherently anti-ecological"20 because it is production for 
the sake of production.
We are schizoid about technology, Bookchin says, 
because it could liberate us in a society organized around 
the satisfaction of human needs, but destroy us in a society
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organized around production for the sake of production.
It's not technology itself that has this dualistic
character, but hierarchical society, with its negative and
positive features. Marx may have been right that
hierarchical society was historically necessary to dominate
nature, Bookchin allows, but "we should never forget that
the concept of 'dominating' nature emerged from the
domination of man by man. Both men and nature have always
been the common victims of hierarchical society."21 This
is a key idea of Bookchin's —  that human beings dominate
Nature because they already dominate each other; it is not
that they must come to dominate each other in order to
dominate nature as argued by Marx and Engels.
"The notion that man must dominate nature emerges 
directly from the domination of man by man." ...
"The patriarchal family planted the seed of 
domination in the nuclear relations of humanity 
.... "22
We are at the end of hierarchical society's 
development, Bookchin says, and its positive and negative 
aspects can no longer be reconciled. Its historically 
necessary functions are over —  property, classes, monogamy, 
patriarchy, hierarchy and authority, bureaucracy and the 
state.23 Its domination of man by man has brought us 
competitive capitalism's ineguality of wealth and the 
domination of nature. The time has come for us to build a 
communitarian and ecologically balanced society.
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Environmental problems are not new, but "the very nature of
the issues has changed... [for] the decay of the environment
is directly tied to the decay of the existing social
structure"; the ecological crisis is a social crisis —  thus
the need for revolutionary change.24
The environmental problem is rooted neither in
technology nor in population growth.25 Technology can
improve or degrade human life —  the attitudes associated
with it are what's important. On population control,
"It is supremely ironic that coercion, so clearly 
implicit in the neo-Malthusian outlook, has 
acguired a respected place in the public debate on 
ecology —  for the roots of the ecological crisis 
lie precisely in the coercive basis of modern 
society. "26
social Ecology
The coming revolution and its utopia "can leave no area 
of life untouched that has been contaminated by domination." 
This utopia can be described as "anarchism" or "anarcho- 
communism" —  a "stateless, classless, decentralized society 
in which the splits created by propertied society are 
transcended by new, unalienated human relationships.1,27 In 
anarchist praxis (compared to socialist) "all action... is 
based on voluntarism and self-discipline, not on coercion 
and command."28 And it emphasizes spontaneity —  praxis as
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inner process, not external manipulation. "Every 
development must be free to find its own equilibrium." With 
spontaneity comes "authentic order and stability." Then 
"spontaneity in social life converges with spontaneity in 
nature to provide the basis for an ecological society." 
"Natural ecology [which shaped organic societies] becomes 
social ecology [which shapes utopia]."29 "Social ecology" 
is the concept for which Bookchin has become best known, the 
idea that attracts his young followers among the Greens.
Bookchin further argues: "The very development of the 
material preconditions for freedom makes the achievement of 
freedom a social necessity."30 When we reach the point 
where scarcity can be eliminated, we find that a post­
scarcity society is necessary for our survival.
In a chapter on "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought," 
Bookchin asserts that "Ecology is intrinsically a critical 
science."31 Air pollution, heat pollution (now called 
global warming), pollution of the earth's waterways and 
groundwaters, are now on a different scale from historical 
examples, which were local in extent. Modern society has 
logistical problems of urbanized and centralized form, but 
these problems go even deeper than problems of the physical 
structure of mass society. Their roots are in the 
presumption that hierarchy is a necessity, and in the 
dynamics of capitalism. "Owing to its inherently competi­
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tive nature, bourgeois society not only pits humans against 
each other but also pits the mass of humanity against the 
natural world."32 We see how we have set ourselves against 
the natural world in problems of wastefulness (the consumer 
society) and waste disposal. Bookchin's alertness to these 
linked consumption and disposal issues was unusual in the 
60s —  this analysis would not become mainstream for another 
twenty years.
Bookchin argues against great urban centers because 
they destroy quality of life, and against the simplification 
and chemicalization of modern agriculture because of it is 
ecologically destructive. He takes the physical form of 
society today be a "reversal of organic evolution," a 
reversal that is the result of contradictions between town 
and country, state and community, industry and husbandry, 
between the bureaucratic scale and the human scale.33 The 
ancient Greeks, he says, would have been horrifed by a city 
whose size would have precluded a face-to-face relationship 
between citizens. He believes that telephones, telegraphs, 
radios, TVs should be used as little as possible to mediate 
relations between people. Bookchin sees an "intuitive 
anarchism" among young people who react against the 
synthetic quality of urban life with a love of nature, 
against standardization with informal dress and manners, 
against centralization with a predisposition for direct
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action. In their tendency to drop out to avoid the rat
race, he finds a de facto decentralization of social life.
Bookchin notes that it is a principle of ecology that
stability is a function of diversity. Diversity was lost
when the industrial revolution overwhelmed and destroyed
regional energy patterns, which used different resources,
such as wind and water power, and a variety of fuels —
wood, peat, coal, animal fats. The industrial revolution
replaced these fuels first by coal and then by coal and
petroleum. "Regions disappeared as models of integrated
energy patterns.1,34 If we are going to make ecological use
of energy resources, he argues, we're going to have to
decentralize and have truly regional social organization.
The diversity that is a part of natural ecology
suggests for Bookchin the "free interplay" of elements,
which in a social situation, means diverse possibilities for
the individual to develop his potential.
"Just as the ecologist seeks to expand the range 
of an ecosystem and promote a free interplay 
between species, so the anarchist seeks to expand 
the range of social experience and remove all 
fetters to its development."35
In our schizoid society, Bookchin observes, some goals 
seem mutually exclusive, such as urban and agrarian life, 
physical and mental activity, sensuality and spirituality, 
communal solidarity and individual development. However, it 
is our social logistics that divide these things, not
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inexorable contradictions.
In the ecological community to come,
"the cast of mind that today organizes differences 
among humans and other 1ife-forms along 
hierarchical lines, defining the external in terms 
of its 'superiority' or 'inferiority', will give 
way to an outlook that deals with diversity in an 
ecological manner. Differences among people will 
be respected, indeed fostered..."
"Freed from an oppressive routine, from paralyzing 
repressions and insecurities, from the burdens of 
toil and false needs, from the trammels of 
authority and irrational compulsion, individuals 
will finally, for the first time in history, be in 
a position to realize their potentialities as 
members of the human community and the natural 
world."36
Technology. Biology. Society
Bookchin's utopianism is coupled with a well-informed 
analysis of the causes of environmental crisis. His thought 
is directed toward social justice and harmony with the 
natural world as the certain outcome of human spontaneity 
and human-scale living and working. He has a harsh critique 
of modern society and economy.
By comparison, Commoner criticizes the choice we have 
made of technologies, but does not critique (in Science and 
Survival) the fundamental goal of our captialist economy —  
endless growth and profit. He offers a solution suiting the 
prevailing circumstances. Ehrlich ignores social and
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economic structure almost entirely —  he sees our 
environmental problems as the outcome of a basic biological 
activity, reproduction. Bookchin does not rely on 
quantitative data and appeals to scientific fact, as do the 
Commoner and Ehrlich, but he does share with them a holistic 
view about inter-relationships —  in his case, in society 
rather than in the natural world.
Commoner's argument is about technological choices, 
Ehrlich's is about biological behavior, Bookchin's is about 
social structure. Bookchin defines the root of the 
environmental crisis differently from those, like Commoner 
or Ehrlich, who single out particular aspects of economic or 
social activity as the ones that get us most into trouble. 
These aspects, for him, are just surface phenomena of the 
underlying social structure, whose dominative basis, unless 
changed, will continue to produce environmental and social 
problems even if (or especially if) controls of various 
kinds are placed on particular activities.
Bookchin criticizes the liberalism which hides the 
structure and dynamics of hierarchical and ecologically 
destructive bourgeois society. He allies his argument with 
Marx on the dialectic of change through development by 
opposition, and in his critique of propertied society, but 
does not agree with Marx that the domination of man by man 
is fundamentally necessary for the productive use of nature
317
(although he allows it a historical role). His desired 
world is (as expressed in later writings) that of 
"libertarian municipalism" —  a return to face-to-face 
citizenship, but with the recognition that there is a new 
possibility of abundance through technology that can make 
the natural world flourish.
The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis
Another non-scientist, Lynn White, Jr., then Professor 
of History at UCLA, writing in 1967, finds a different 
reason for environmental problems. In his much cited essay, 
"The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,"57 he traces 
the ecological crisis to the Christian view that Nature was 
made to serve man.5® This view, White claims, provided 
ground for a Nature-dominating technology in medieval Europe 
even before the scientific revolution, at a time when the 
Christian religion shaped thought. Because the 
environmental crisis is rooted in a religious worldview, it 
cannot be solved simply by the application of more science 
and technology. Instead, a religious change, or a 
rethinking of values is needed.
"People have often been a dynamic element in their own 
environment," White observes. He is commenting on Aldous
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Huxley's description of the loss of grassy English glades to
unsightly brush because the rabbits that kept them clear
have been killed by a disease purposefully introduced by the
local farmers. The grassy glades themselves are a human-
influenced artifact, however, White notes, since rabbits
were introduced in the 12th century to improve the diet of
the peasants. The Romans and the Crusaders denuded
Mediterranean hills of forests; the Egyptians tamed the
Nile; the Frisians and Hollanders pushed back the North Sea.
"...but in the present state of historical 
scholarship we usually do not know exactly when, 
where, or with what effects man-induced changes 
came. "39
We have an "ecologic crisis" and many calls to action, but
we don't know what to do.
"Specific proposals... seem too partial, 
palliative, negative: ban the bomb, tear down the 
billboards, give the Hindus contraceptives and 
tell them to eat their sacred cows... The 
'wilderness area' mentality invariably advocates 
deep-freezing an ecology... as it was before the 
first Kleenex was dropped... But neither atavism 
nor prettification will cope with the ecologic 
crisis of our time."40
To begin with, White suggests, we should take a 
historical look at "the presuppositions that underlie modern 
technology and science." The fusion of science, previously 
aristocratic and speculative, with technology, lower class 
and action-oriented (in White's summation), is related, he 
says, to "democratic revolutions which, by reducing social 
barriers, tended to assert a functional unity of brain and
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hand."41 What is historically noticeable are two things: 
the certainty that "Both modern technology and modern 
science are distinctively occidental." despite borrowings 
from China and the Islamic world; and the less-recognized 
fact that
"the leadership of the West, both in technology 
and in science, is far older than the so-called 
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century 
or the so-called industrial revolution of the 
eighteenth century."42
Water power was applied to "industrial processes other than
milling grain" as early as A.D. 1000; wind power was
harnessed in the late 12th century; the weight-driven
mechanical clock, "the most monumental achievement in the
history of automation," was a 14th-century development.
Alongside this technological progress there was an
intellectual movement:
"The distinctive Western tradition of science, in 
fact, began in the late eleventh century, with a 
massive movement of translation of Arabic and 
Greek scientific works into Latin. A few notable 
books... escaped [notice]... but within less than 
200 years effectively the entire corpus of Greek 
and Muslim science was available in Latin, and was 
being eagerly read and criticized in the new 
European universities.... By the late thirteenth 
century Europe had seized global scientific 
leadership from the faltering hands of Islam."43
Since it was the Middle Ages that saw this development, it
is the Middle Ages we must examine for assumptions
underlying science and technology.
Both technological developments and religious thought
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supported the exploitation of nature in the Middle Ages.
The 7th-century invention of a plow that cut and turned over 
the soil, rather than just scratching it, made possible much 
more efficient and extensive cultivation and meant that 
"Man's relation to the soil was profoundly changed.
Formerly man had been part of nature; now he was the 
exploiter of nature."44
Judeo-Christian teleology gave the West an "implicit 
faith in perpetual progress" that still dominates our daily 
actions (or at least seemed to do so in the late 1960s when 
this essay was written). Christianity, White asserts, is 
the world's most anthropocentric religion, especially in its 
Western (as compared to Eastern/Greek) form. Man is not 
just part of nature, but is made in God's image, and so 
shares in God's transcendence of nature. Besides having 
"established a dualism of man and nature," Christianity 
"insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for 
his proper ends."45
Nature, having been made by God, could reveal His 
purpose, and White notes that the study of this purpose in 
the discipline of "natural theology" turned away from the 
symbolic —  "the ant is a sermon to sluggards" —  to the 
empirical investigation of how the natural world operates, 
by the 13th century. Yet the connection to divining God's 
purpose was sustained into the 18th century, and though one
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can wonder whether such claims are "real reasons or merely
culturally acceptable" ones, White says, still
"The consistency with which scientists during the 
long formative centuries of Western science said 
that the task and the reward of the scientist was 
'to think God's thoughts after him' leads one to 
believe that this was their real motivation. If 
so, then modern Western science was cast in a 
matrix of Christian theology."
And further, since "somewhat over a century ago science and
technology... joined to give mankind powers which, to judge
by many of the ecologic effects, are out of control," then
"Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt."
"Despite Darwin," reflects White, "we are not. in our
hearts, part of the natural process. We are superior to
nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our
slightest whim."46
"The fact that most people do not think of these 
attitudes as Christian is irrelevant. No new set 
of basic values has been accepted in our society 
to displace those of Christianity. Hence we shall 
continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis until 
we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no 
reason for existence save to serve man."47
Saint Francis, "the greatest spiritual revolutionary in
Western history," tried to replace this view with one in
which all creatures are equal; though he failed, his purpose
should be taken up again.
"Since the roots of our trouble are so largely 
religious, the remedy must also be essentially 
religious, whether we call it that or not. We 
must rethink and refeel our nature and 
destiny.1,48
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The call to rethink, to change our attitudes, has 
become a ubiquitous chorus in the environmental literature 
in the twenty-five years since White offered his analysis. 
Others, too, in the 60s, were making similar judgments of 
(Western) society's imperious bent on technological progress 
without regard tc other values —  human and/or ecological. 
Jacques Ellul and Herbert Marcuse became available in 
English; Barry Commoner and Murray Bookchin critiqued 
American science, economy, and social goals.
Linking Action and Thought
White, a historian, is as aware of the complexity of 
ecosystem interrelationships as are the scientifically- 
trained Carson, Commoner, Ehrlich, and Hardin. Historians, 
like ecologically minded scientists, are inclined to see 
multitudinous causes and effects playing off of each other 
in a larger system. But (like scientists) they also try to 
link a particular cause and a particular effect. Unlike 
scientists, they can carry out their investigations at a 
high level of generality. Writing large (or doing macro 
analysis, in today's terms) White links Christian theology 
to the domination of nature and the consequent environmental 
crisis. White has a different version of the out-of­
control argument —  we started steering in this direction, 
not with the atomic bomb, not after World War II, not at the 
onset of the Enlightenment, but in the Middle Ages, and 
because of the Church. He, like the scientists, has a 
warning —  it will get worse —  but his is not a specific 
and detailed warning; it doesn't name pollutants and their 
quantities, or count population and its geometrical growth. 
He does not lay out inescapable facts; he offers what will 
certainly be seen as an interpretation subject to argument 
and competing interpretation. Although scientific data is 
also open to interpretation, as different evaluations of 
environmental danger show, there is at least theoretically a 
resolution point at some future time. Not so with such 
matters as whether Christianity must bear the guilt of 
responsibility for environmental destruction.
But just as the success of an argument does not depend 
on the successful realization of its recommended course of 
action (as in the case of Carson), neither does it depend on 
its provability —  at least not outside the narrowest 
confines of science. Carson's argument succeeded because it 
uncovered and explained a world of actions unknown to most 
of the public but vitally important to all of them, and did 
so in a way that engaged both intellectural concern and 
emotional attachment to nature. White's argument provided 
an explanation for academics of relationships between the
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social and the natural world at a level of generality that 
made it useful across a variety of concerns. It linked 
action and thought in a historical framework and tied them 
to present consequences that were a frequent topic of 
investigation and debate. At a time when alternative 
lifestyles and Eastern religion were providing Americans 
with an implicit critique of the Western approach to life 
and nature, White had a compelling explanation of where the 
loss of our connection to nature (and thus ultimately to 
self) came from.
It helped that White's analysis was itself in the 
tradition of philosophizing about the relationship between 
man and nature, of wondering how and when we had lost our 
Edenic self. It could even be said that White's analysis 
was in the Christian tradition of reflecting on the 
expulsion from paradise, of turning back on to Christians 
the maxim that in Adam's fall we sinned all, and turning it 
into a historical account of Christianity's responsibility 
for, and thus guilt for, the wrong behavior in the garden. 
(It thus had a ready made audience in both guilt-accepting 
Christians and anti-religionists.) The success of White's 
article must also rest on its being one of the most clearly 
presented and skillfully condensed arguments for the 
influence of ideas ever made available for the general 
reader.
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In an article written six years later, White comments
on his earlier essay:
When I published this hypothesis in 1967, a bishop 
wrote to me: 'I agree with you completely, and I 
am deeply troubled by it.' Others were less 
acquiescent. I was denounced, not only in print, 
but also on scraps of brown paper thrust 
anonymously into envelopes, as a junior Anti- 
Christ, probably in the Kremlin's pay, bent on 
destroying the true faith. The most common charge 
was that I had ignorantly misunderstood the nature 
of 'man's dominion' and that it is not an 
arbitrary rule but rather a stewardship of our 
fellow creatures for which mankind is responsible 
to God....
The Christian wants to know what Scripture 
says to him about a puzzling problem. The 
historian wants to know what Christians in various 
times and places have thought Scripture was saying 
to them.... So, if one points to the fact that 
historically Latin Christians have generally been 
arrogant toward nature, this does not mean that 
Scripture read with twentieth-century eyes will 
breed the same attitude."
White cautions that "no sensible person could maintain that
all ecologic damage is, or has been, rooted in religious
attitudes...." but maintains that "a man-nature dualism is
deep-rooted in us" and that it is "a change of value
structures that will make possible measures to cope with the
growing ecologic crisis. One hopes that there is enough
time left."49
The 1960s
Besides Silent Spring. Science and Survival, and the
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works mentioned in this chapter, the 1960s saw the 
publication of many other books about environment, 
technology, man and nature, and ecology. It was not until 
the 1970s, however, that many such works would be indexed 
under the heading "environment" in standard reference 
guides; "environment" was still an emerging category in the 
1960s. Notable books included Marston Bates' The Forest and 
the Sea (ecology and the biosphere for the ordinary reader) 
in 1960, and the Sierra Club's Wilderness: America's Living 
Heritage (promoting wilderness preservation) in 1961; these 
books present nature as it was before the environmental 
warning.
Ninteen-sixty-two saw the beginning of environmental 
warnings with Carson and Bookchin, followed by Stewart 
Udall's The Quiet Crisis (a statement by the Secretary of 
the Interior) in 1963, Rudd's Pesticides and the 
Environment. Leo Marx's Machine in the Garden (technology 
and the pastoral ideal), Herbert Marcuse's One Dimensional 
Man (man dominating nature means man dominating man), and 
the English translation of Jacques Ellul's The Technological 
Society came out in 1964. By this time the warning was 
gaining acceptance; Commoner had summarized the warnings in 
1966, and there was a search for underlying causes, heralded 
by White's article in 1967. That same year saw Roderick 
Nash's Wilderness and the American Mind (history of ideas of
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nature and wilderness) and Clarence Glacken's Traces on the 
Rhodian Shore (nature and culture in Western thought)•
There was a mass-market hit in the combination of Eliot 
Porter's photography with Thoreau's words in In Wildness is 
the Preservation of the World (the aesthetics and scarcity 
of wilderness, also published in 1963, but now made popular 
in a coffee-table format).
In 1968, Ren£ Dubos responded to the critical trend in 
the man-nature argument by emphasizing the benefits of human 
activity to the environment in So Human an Animal. That 
year, Ehrlich and Hardin reintroduced Malthus and offered 
lifeboat choices as a result of population pressures; Lynn 
White published essays on technology and Western values in 
Machinia ex Deo: Aldo Leopold's classic of nature writing, 
Sand Countv Almanac, which sets the terms of a land ethic, 
was reissued after some twenty years; and a new type of 
nature writing appears in Edward Abbey's Desert Solitaire, 
to become a classic on wilderness solitude for the dropout 
generation. The change continued in 1969 in Theodore 
Roszak's Making of a Counter Culture (youth against 
technocracy), Ian McHarg's Design With Nature (the 
aesthetics and practice of being in tune with nature), and 
Gary Snyder's Earth House Hold (New Age alternative 
lifestyle nature poetry) .50
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The 1970s saw environmentalism ascendant as an issue and 
increasing in reach as a social movement. April 1, 1970, 
Earth Day —  an environmental celebration, protest, and 
teach-in —  brought the environmental movement to nation­
wide notice. In 1970, Charles Reich wrote about youth, 
alternative lifestyle, and a new consciousness transcending 
technology in The Greening of America; Scott and Helen 
Nearing, from the previous generation of alternative voices, 
rejected technologized society, went to live self- 
sufficiently in the country, and told others how to do the 
same in Living the Good Life.
In 1971, Francis Moore Lapp£ connected the environment 
and personal decisions through a critigue of the production 
and consumption of food in Diet for a Small Planet, a guide 
still in print in the 1990s; Stewart Brand's marriage of 
technology and caring for nature in The Last Whole Earth 
Catalog started on its way to becoming a best-seller; 
Commoner and Bookchin reiterated the need to rethink economy 
and society —  Bookchin in Post-Scarcitv Anarchism. Commoner
in The Closing Circle: economists entered the picture with 
Kenneth Boulding's The Economics of Pollution.
The global dimension of the environmental crisis was 
detailed in Barbara Ward and Ren£ Dubos' Only One Earth, and 
the industrialized nations were startled by the predictions 
of Meadows et al in The Limits to Growth, both books 
appearing in 1972. In the remaining years of the decade, 
E.F. Schumacher went against the political and technological 
current with Small is Beautiful; Herman Daly rethought 
economic growth in Toward a Steady-State Economy; William 
Leiss examined attitudes toward nature and critiqued 
theories about them in The Domination of Nature; Horkheimer 
and Adorno's critique of instrumental rationality was 
published in English as Dialectic of the Enlightenment: 
Ernest Callenbach imagined the political and lifestyle 
consequences of the emerging environmental movement in 
Ecotopia: James Lovelock gave a new vision and a scientific 
explanation of the earth as a living system in Gaia. 1
The Circle of Life
The Closing Circle; Nature. Man. and Technology 
(1971)2, was Commoner's best known book until his recent 
Making Peace With the Planet.3 In it he argues that it is
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the type of productive technology we have that causes our 
environmental problems. Commoner begins by listing the 
different ways in which the blame has been laid for the 
environmental crisis: on population, on affluence, on 
poverty, on the public's demands, on man's innate 
aggressiveness, on learned inhumanity, on profits, religion, 
technology, politicians, capitalism.
At the same time, he identifies some of those who gave 
the warning on the environment while attributing the crisis 
to different causes; several are biologists, as is Commoner. 
But cause, Commoner points out, is not a simple linear 
phenomenon: "in the ecosphere every effect is also a 
cause...." This cyclical nature of events in the ecosphere, 
however, has become unfamiliar to us in a technologized age; 
in synthesizing new products we have converted natural 
cycles into man-made linear events, at the end of which are 
toxic chemicals, sewage, and heaps of rubbish. "We have 
broken out of the circle of life," he says, and the purpose 
of his book is to try "to discover which human acts have 
broken the circle of life, and why." He indicates that he 
will trace "ecological stresses... to... faults in 
productive technology —  and in its scientific background... 
and finally to... economic, social and political 
forces...."4
To explain what he means by the circle of life,
Commoner offers a brief version of the basic scientific 
account of life: An organic soup developed out of 
atmospheric gases billions of years ago under the influence 
of light and/or heat. The first living things simply used 
the store of organic food; this would have been a 
nonrenewable resource (and no future for life) if 
photosynthetic organisms had not evolved to convert 
inorganic matter and carbon dioxide to fresh organic matter 
using sunlight. With this development, the circle of life 
is established —  the materials of the planet can be cycled 
through different states to sustain life. All living things 
are now part of an interdependent network, and have within 
them other interdependent networks. But science is not 
dealing with this complexity, Commoner asserts; it is 
atomistic in outlook and method. Its specializations and 
disciplinary divisions do not foster an ecological outlook. 
There is the simple example of soil humus. This one 
substance can have two roles: it supplies nitrogen (a 
nutrient) to the plant; it gives porosity to the soil, which 
aids the efficient absorption of nitrogen by the plant. One 
of these cycles describes the movement of nitrogen atoms; 
the other is a more abstract set of dependencies.
Biologists may be experts on plant nutrition or on soil 
structure, but do not specialize in both. But
"the natural tendency to think of only one thing
at a time is a chief reason why we have failed to
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understand the environment and have blundered into 
destroying it." 5
The Laws of Ecology
Commoner names the three "great global systems" —  the 
air, the water, and the soil —  and calls the study of their 
relationships to life the "young science" of ecology.
Ecology does not have the same kind of cohesive 
generalizations about the processes it studies as physics 
does, but Commoner offers an "informal set of 'laws of 
ecology'."
First Law: Everything is connected to everything else.
8econd Law: Everything must go somewhere.
Third Law: Nature knows best.
Fourth Law: There is no such thing as a free
lunch.6
For examples of the first law, the connectedness of 
everything, Commoner briefly describes the theory of 
cybernetic systems: energy whicn precipitates a certain 
behavior is counterbalanced by effects of that behavior. 
(Standard engineering examples are simple feedback systems 
like thermostats and steam-engine governors.) A classic 
example in a natural system is predator-prey fluctuations of 
population. When there are many rabbits, their predator,
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the lynx, prospers; in time, there are so many lynx that 
there are not enough rabbits to feed them; the lynx begin to 
die off, the rabbits begin to increase as their predators 
decrease, and the cycle begins again. Oscillations that 
swing too far, however, may destroy the balance of the 
system and bring about its collapse. (Too many lynx or too 
many rabbits die to be able to reproduce on the next swing 
of the cycle.) This is particularly likely to happen with 
effects introduced from outside the system, for then the 
cycle's self-governing mechanisms will not apply to the 
effect. Effects from outside the system become new and 
ungovernable causes in the system. This is an important 
recognition in cases of technological intervention into 
nature.
The second law, everything must go somewhere, is 
another version of the "matter is indestructible" of 
physics.
"One of the chief reasons for the present 
environmental crisis is that great amounts of 
materials have been extracted from the earth, 
converted into new forms, and discharged into the 
environment without taking into account that 
'everything has to go somewhere'."7
Harmful materials accumulate.
On the third law, Nature knows best, Commoner observes
that if you take the back off your watch and poke a pencil
into it with your eyes closed, you will almost certainly
damage the watch. This is because the watch is a very
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restricted selection of a large number of possible
arrangements, most of which do not work as well as the
chosen one. Any random change in the watch will probably
fall into the large class of non-useful or harmful
arrangements. So it is with nature's ecosystems.
"The third law of ecology suggests that the 
artificial introduction of an organic compound 
that does not occur in nature, but is man-made and 
is nevertheless active in a living system, is very 
likely to be harmful."8
The fourth, no-free-lunch law, Commoner says, comes 
from economics. Every gain has a cost, and whatever we 
extract from a natural ecosystem must be repaid to it. 
"Payment of this price cannot be avoided; it can only be 
delayed."9
The four laws express ideas that have been widely held 
by non-scientists, Commoner notes, including poets and 
writers. But while in an earlier time, understanding of the 
natural world could be gained from personal experience (the 
Walden type), now, with nuclear bombs and pollution, 
understanding "needs help from the scientist."10
Air. Soil, and Water
Having given a basic description of life and of the 
ecological study of it, Commoner goes on to a discussion
339
organized by ecosystem categories: air, soil, water. A
chapter on "Nuclear Fire" recounts how awareness of the
danger of radiation grew during the 1950s. Nuclear
explosions were being made in the atmosphere at the time,
with resulting fallout and the deposit of strontium 90 in
human bones. Until this time Commoner, though a biologist,
had "taken the air, water, soil and our natural surroundings
more or less for granted."11 He had no training in
ecology. Word of high "background" radiation counts first
circulated among scientists; then an accident in 1954 in
which Japanese fishermen in their boat got a high dose of
fallout from a U.S. test, some dying from it, made the
danger known to the public.
"It became clear that tests of nuclear weapons had 
unwittingly set off the first global environmental 
experiment in human history."12
Scientists spoke out repeatedly about the dangers of 
fallout, and the need for citizens to get involved in 
evaluating their risk. Commoner refers to the St. Louis 
Committee for Nuclear Information, the beginning, he says, 
of the scientists' information movement, in 1958. In 1963, 
unexpectedly, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Limited Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty was approved by the Senate; Commoner considers this a 
result of the scientists' efforts to inform the public. He 
calls it "the first victorious battle in the campaign to 
save the environment —  and its human inhabitants —  from
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the blind assaults of modern technology."13
To explain air pollution, Commoner traces the history 
of Los Angeles air pollutants, beginning in the 1940s with 
dust from smokestacks. The later occurrence of smog was 
caused by the interaction of nitrogen oxides (from 
automobile engines, power plants and oil refineries) with 
other organic compounds already in oil, gasoline, or coal 
(hydrocarbons, also in car exhaust-pipe emissions) when 
activated by sunlight. The main polluter was automobiles, a 
major industry in both consumer and military sectors, and 
politically difficult to bring under control. After 
emissions controls were placed on new cars in 1966, (yellow) 
smog went down, but (brown) nitrogen dioxide pollution went 
up, because auto exhaust controls were on hydrocarbons, but 
not on nitrogen oxides. The nitrogen oxides that had 
combined with hydrocarbons still had to go somewhere, and 
the result was smog in another color. Commoner uses this 
course of events to illustrate the inadequacy of studying 
chemical reactions in isolation. "Nevertheless," he says, 
"'scientific method' is, at present, closely bound to the 
notion of a singular cause and effect, and most studies of 
the health effects of air pollution make strong efforts to 
find them." The poor, young, and old suffer most from air 
pollution, Commoner observes, and therefore "air pollution 
destroys social progress."14
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A chapter on "Illinois Earth" explains how fertilizer 
nitrates in the soil were becoming poisonous nitrites in the 
body, especially in infants, in the 1950s and 60s. As news 
of pollution and health hazards came out in the late 60s, 
there was much controversy over the use of fertilizers, and 
agricultural scientists who had developed fertilizers did 
not like the criticism. Commoner emphasizes that the 
objectivity of science can not come out of personal 
objectivity when a lifetime of research has been spent in a 
certain direction; it must come from open discussion and 
publication, and from more data (which in this case was the 
chemical analysis of nitrates in the water supply to 
determine if their origin was natural or synthetic).
The agricultural consequences of fertilizer were higher 
yields, but the ecological consequences (to make Commoner's 
distinction) were damage to water supplies. Why weren't the 
ecological consequences foreseen? Scientific research, 
Commoner says, is not directed toward finding out. The 
problem with research in agricultural universities is that 
it is aimed at agricultural rather than ecological gain.
The problem with basic research in other universities is 
that, (as of the early 70s), it has gone to finer and finer 
detail, which in biological research, cannot be studied in 
living systems, but only in test tubes. But this molecular 
biology approach may be "inapplicable to the actual
biological processes that occur in nature."15 In fact, at 
the independent university where the Illinois nitrates were 
studied, there were departmental objections that "pure" 
research was not being done in this work.
Commoner's example of the environmental state of water 
is Lake Erie, "the most blatant example of the 
environmental crisis in the United States."16 Algae- 
clogged and mucky water, and dead fish decaying on the shore 
are the (early 70s) symptoms of its impending death. The 
lake is so polluted that one of its tributary rivers caught 
fire after an oil spill. A huge, glacier-created lake that 
used to have clear waters, just enough algae to support a 
variety of life, and many kinds of fish, Lake Erie began 
changing at the turn of the century. A complex interaction 
of waste disposal (industrial and agricultural) into the 
waters, the stratification of waters in the lake, and 
chemistry of algae growth resulted in an oxygen deficit in 
the lake, and in the lake's becoming a waste trap rather 
than a channel for taking wastes to the sea. Some said Lake 
Erie was naturally "aging"; Commoner disposes of this 
argument. "Human intervention, " he argues, is responsible. 
"The guilt is all ours."17 He then recounts instances of 
people trying to find first one and then another possible 
single cause of algal growth as a way of evading 
interconnected responsibility among detergent manufacturers
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(phosphates), agriculturalists (fertilizer nitrates), and 
producers of carbon dioxide in the air. At the time of 
writing, no one knew if Lake Erie could be restored; it 
seemed it might become an example of irreversible 
environmental degradation.18
Ecosphere and Social Sphere
Commoner argues that the environmental crisis is not 
only an ecological problem, but a social one. We inhabit 
both an ecosphere and a social sphere.19 In both the 
ecosphere and the sphere of human activities, modern science 
is poorly prepared for the task of finding the cause of the 
crisis, because the task is "the analysis of an 
intrinsically complex system."20 In the ecosphere, 
production depends ultimately upon the ecosphere itself. 
Since the ecosphere doesn't grow, human activity must 
accomodate to it.21
Some of a chapter on "Population and 'Affluence'" is a 
response to Ehrlich's arguments about population.
Commoner's basic position is that pollution is not primarily 
a problem of too many people unavoidably fouling too small a 
nest. Instead, it is a problem of how we manage our 
productive system. He reminds us that "Many pollutants...
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made their environmental debut during the war years: smog... 
man-made radioactive elements... DDT... detergents... 
synthetic plastics...." There was a postwar revolution in 
science and technology preceded by a prewar "revolution in 
basic science, especially in physics and chemistry, upon 
which so much of the new productive technology is based."22 
In physics, understanding of the atom led to nuclear weapons 
and the hazards of radioactivity, and also to solid state 
electronics and thus computers. In chemistry, understanding 
of the molecular composition of natural organic substances 
led to their synthesis in the lab, and then to the further 
synthesis of theoretically possible combinations not found 
in nature.
"Only later was the potentially fatal flaw in the 
scientific foundation of the new technology 
discovered. It was like a two-legged stool: well 
founded in physics and chemistry, but flawed by a 
missing third leg —  the biology of the 
environment.1,23
The burst of technological innovation and the upsurge 
in environmental pollution both came in the postwar years, 
and so Commoner puts the question: "Is it possible that the 
new technology is the major cause of the environmental 
crisis?"24 The asking of this question indicates a 
difference between the 70s and now, when this idea is too 
commonplace to appear as a question.
Besides technology, Commoner allows, another possible 
major cause is increase in population. However, pollution
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has risen much more sharply than population since the war, 
and Commoner argues that it has not risen as a result of 
demands on production by greater numbers of people.
Although the country produces more pollution for the size of 
its population than it used to, it is misleading to think of 
this as pollution produced per person, as if it were greater 
affluence per person that is responsible. GNP per person 
has increased, but not as much as pollution, and per capita 
production of food, clothing and shelter has increased 
little; per capita energy use is up, but again, not enough 
to account for the rise in pollution. So it is neither 
population nor affluence that explains the environmental 
crisis.
It is how the economy has grown that has made 
environmental problems. For instance, the product with the 
highest postwar growth rate, as of 1970 (Commoner's 
analysis, with others) is the nonreturnable soda bottle, up 
53,000%. Synthetic fibers are up 5,980%, mercury for 
chlorine production up 3,120%, fertilizer nitrogen and 
electric housewares both up a little over 1000%, etc.
Growing more slowly than the population, or declining, are 
railroad freight, cotton fiber, wool, soap, work animal 
horsepower. It is kinds of goods, and technologies used to 
produce goods that have changed drastically, not overall 
output. Detergent replaces soap; truck freight replaces
rail freight; synthetic fibers replace natural ones; 
aluminum, plastic and concrete replace lumber and steel; 
nonreturnable bottles replace returnable ones. Herbicides 
replace the cultivator for controlling weeds; feedlots (and 
their waste disposal problems) replace range feeding.
"This pattern of economic growth is the major reason 
for the environmental crisis."25 Its sudden emergence is 
no longer a mystery, Commoner states, if you look at postwar 
technology pollutant by pollutant. Levels of environmental 
pollution have increased about ten times faster than growth 
of GNP (itself about 126% in postwar years). Agribusiness 
has been a big contributor to the crisis: inorganic 
fertilizers, synthetic pesticides, feedlots. Its economic 
success has been ecological failure. Thus Commoner sets up 
the theme of ecology vs economy.
Feedlots, detergents, and fertilizers pollute; the 
production of synthetic fibers does also, because chemical 
processes at high temperatures release pollutants to the 
air. Also, the fibers do not biodegrade like natural ones, 
and they come from nonrenewable resources. Automobile 
emission pollution is the outcome not just of more 
automobiles, but of engine design, fuel typo, political 
preference to roads over rails (railroads require heavy 
initial capital investment, but haul freight much more 
cheaply and with more energy efficiency). The energy cost
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of producing aluminum and concrete is far higher than that 
for steel and lumber. Additionally, overpackaging of 
consumer goods results in a waste disposal problem.
Commoner concludes we are "blind... about the environmental 
effects of modern technology."26 The "chief reason" for 
the postwar environmental crisis is the postwar change in 
productive technology.
Scientific Knowledge. Public Knowledge
The environmental crisis, Commoner argues, is not the 
result of natural catastrophe or human biological activities 
(population growth and nest-fouling behavior) but is social 
in origin. "[The] same fault lies behind every ecological 
failure of modern technology: attention to a single facet of 
what in nature is a complex whole."27 (Among examples of 
such failures, Commoner cites the building of the Aswan dam 
and the resultant schistosomiasis contracted from snails in 
waters deprived of free flow.) It is not inadequacies in 
the new technologies that has produced problems, but their 
successes. If the failure of technology lies in its 
success, then the fault, Commoner reasons, is in its aims. 
But it is not that we need to abandon technology; rather, 
technology needs to be derived from an appropriate
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scientific analysis. Technology's present fault derives 
from "the fragmented nature of its scientific base."28
The fault in science is reductionism. Molecular 
biology is an example; it tries to understand life by 
finding a molecular event that is the mechanism of a 
biological process. Soil biology or the nitrogen cycle, 
"which are not reducible to simple molecular mechanisms, are 
now often regarded as uninteresting relics of some ancient 
craft." Reductionism is not limited to biology but is "the 
dominant viewpoint of modern science as a whole." It 
results in isolated specialties that cannot communicate with 
one another. Science is also isolated from society's 
problems because scientists are attempting to maintain their 
intellectual independence by avoiding "all problems that do 
not arise in their own minds."29
But scientists must make known information that bears 
on society's environmental problems. "Public knowledge is 
essential to the solution of every environmental 
problem."30 The hidden costs of our technologies are 
social, they are met by the public. In the attempts to 
balance benefits and hazards of technology, who will do the 
balancing? Scientific experts can evaluate benefits and 
hazards, but scientific principles cannot guide moral 
choices. "No scientific principle can guide the choice 
between some number of kilowatt hours of electric power and
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some number of cases of thyroid cancer...." These are value 
judgments, matters of morality. "In a democracy, they 
belong not in the hands of 'experts', but in the hands of 
the people and their elected representatives." Scientists 
must get and give information to the public; that is their 
"unique responsibility."31 Here, the conventional 
scientific separation between fact and value is affirmed.
Commoner reiterates that scientist-citizen interactions 
can work. Successful scientist-citizen partnerships have 
helped lead to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963; 
the detoxification of nerve gas in Colorado which was at 
first stored near the Denver airport and then slated for 
transport to the Atlantic Ocean; the abandonment of 
biological weapons production; the end to the use of DDT in 
the U.S.; the defeat of the ozone-layer-threatening U.S. 
version of the SST; various local environmental watchdog 
victories; legal actions by various conservation groups, 
Ralph Nader's consumer protection information.
Concerning the idea that the public can't evaluate 
risks, Commoner says the public already has a notion of what 
risks it wants to take —  it doesn't like to take 
involuntary risks from pesticides, fertilizers, power 
production, air pollution, etc. Involuntary and voluntary 
risks, some studies indicate, fall on separate curves of 
similar shape, but with the acceptable level for involuntary
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risks 10,000 tines lower. The public now rejects a risk 
from environmental pollutants that it previously accepted 
because, Commomer believes, it now understands that it is 
not only involuntary living victims who suffer, but future 
generations.
Commoner questions the rationality of an economic 
system that forces people to fight for jobs to support 
production processes that can damage their health and the 
health of their children. The influence of Marxist and 
critical analysis can be seen in this stance. Environmental 
crisis is not just a safe "motherhood" issue (motherhood was 
still a safe issue in the 1970s) or a diversion from social 
problems; it is linked to war and peace by nuclear weaponry, 
by the use of herbicides (ecological warfare) in Vietnam; it 
"reach[es] to the core of our system of social justice and 
challenge[s] basic political goals."32
Population
When Commoner was writing, concern about worldwide 
overpopulation was high. Paul Ehrlich's 1968 book, The 
Population Bomb, had published the message that too many 
people was the single most influential cause of 
environmental deterioration. Commoner, however, argues that
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technology has a much greater effect on the crisis than 
population does. Conservatively, he estimates, technology 
has five times the effect of rising population on pollution. 
To prevent the postwar rise in pollution we could have 
allowed population to grow (as it did from 1914 to 1968) by 
43%, while reducing the environmental impact of productive 
technology by 30%. On the other hand, if we allowed the 
environmental impact to increase (as it did) by about 600%, 
to prevent the rise in pollution would have required an 86% 
reduction in population. (Since the environmental impact of 
production has increased six-fold, population must drop by 
about five-sixths if total pollution level is to remain 
constant.)
Clearly, Commoner argues, technology is the more 
effective factor. Reducing the population would help, but 
that argument can be used for all social problems, Commoner 
says: with fewer people we could have less unemployment, 
more adequate jails, etc. Reducing births is an alternative 
to altering the economic, social and political priorities 
that have led to our problems. However, if birth control is 
not voluntary, population control can only be by political 
repression, a solution that is no advance over the misguided 
politics we already have. Commoner asserts that the 
environmental crisis penetrates the screen of "evasions, 
excuses, and... technical details" that has long obscured
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the social crisis of the United States —  its inability to 
use its great wealth to give all citizens a decent life.
We have an environmental crisis so extreme that the 
guestion has become, how much time do we have? Commoner's 
own judgment is that if the present course (1970s) of 
environmental degradation continues, civilized human society 
will not be possible. This is a strikingly pessimistic 
warning.
Commoner reiterates that population control is often a 
political rather than a scientific response to social 
problems. The view that the United States should insist on 
population control in the poor countries it aids is not 
simply a scientific judgment, but is also a political 
judgment about relationships between rich and poor nations. 
Population growth in the third world was encouraged under 
colonialism for a supply of labor to extract raw materials; 
the extracted wealth was transferred to the colonial powers, 
which were then able to undergo the "demographic transition" 
of lowered birth rates that accompany a raised standard of 
living, while the colonized countries were not able to reach 
this transition (Commoner's example is the Dutch and 
Indonesia). Commoner calls this "a kind of demographic 
parasitism."33 Now former colonial powers use synthetics 
rather than raw materials, further limiting the chances of 
the third world for wealth and transition. But a change in
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productive technology for ecological reasons could change 
this. Then we would require the third world's natural 
products rather than their requiring our technology.
Population control looks like an easy solution,
Commoner says, but it is another reductionist attempt to get 
around complex problems, this time social ones, that will 
not work. It is an attempt to solve a social problem with a 
biological process —  the control of reproduction. War is a 
similar biological solution, Commoner points out, another 
kind of population control. Neither form of population 
control is an acceptable goal. Commoner sees the main 
lesson of the environmental crisis and population problem to 
be that to survive and maintain our humanity we must solve 
social problems by social means.
Ecology and Economics
Environmental concerns have been far removed from the 
"central problems of conventional economics," Commoner 
observes, and only now is a change occurring.34 
Environmental factors have been referred to as "external 
economies and diseconomies" (benefits or harms received). 
"Externality" is a concept for dealing with exchange that is 
neither mutually beneficial nor voluntary (i.e., not meeting
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the paradigm of the basic economic process of the market). 
The critique of externality is that the cost-benefit 
analysis which decides that the beneficial outcome "growth" 
has occurred, fails to measure actual costs. Furthermore, 
the costs are "shifted to the shoulders of others... [and] 
the traditional cost-benefit calculus serves as an 
institutionalized cloak for large-scale spoliation...."35
Pollution is linked to profit through the productivity 
of modern technology. And profit accrues especially to 
innovation, because of the innovative producer's early- 
stages monopoly over process? when competition increases, 
edge decreases, price drops, and a new innovation must be 
found. In general, new technologies have been more 
polluting than old, and pollution costs have not been borne 
by producers but by society as a whole, so private free 
enterprise is free but not private. These relationships, 
Commoner affirms, must be changed. Economics should pay 
attention to its own 'no free lunch' law. Production 
processes will have to be governed by social thrift —  which 
will conflict with private gain. Ecology gives a logic of an 
economic system where production meets social rather than 
private criteria. However, the need for new, ecologically 
acceptable technologies could transform reductionist 
science/technology and in turn speed the transformation of 
the productive system.
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The economics of ecology will require radical change. 
Economic readjustment would have to spread beyond the 
industrialized nations; thus there would have to be sweeping 
political changes. The huge capital resources needed will 
not be available unless we give up our large-scale military 
spending.
"The lesson of the environmental crisis is, then, 
clear. If we are to survive, ecological 
considerations must guide economic and political 
ones.”
"The world will survive the environmental crisis as a 
whole, or not at all."36
The Closing Circle
While the environmental crisis is palpable in the air,
water, and rubbish heaps, it has a kind of unreality,
Commoner says, because the ecological explanation of all the
interconnections that cause it remains in the realm of
concepts. The inertia of the economic and political system
is, in contrast, real in our lives.
"Everywhere in the world there is evidence of a 
deep-seated failure in the effort to use the 
competence, the wealth, the power at human 
disposal for the maximum good of human beings.
The environmental crisis is a major example of 
this failure."
"The present system of production is self­
destructive; the present course of human 
civilization is suicidal."
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"Now that the bill for the environmental debt has 
been presented, our options have become reduced to 
two: either the rational, social organization of 
the use and distribution of the earth's resources, 
or a new barbarism."37
These are severe warnings, but Commoner still finds 
cause for optimism in the new view that ecology will give 
us, offering new solutions for productivity and 
international economic relations. Another source of 
optimism is that the cause of the environmental crisis is 
not the product of our biological capabilities (which could 
not change in time to matter) but of our social actions. 
Commoner refers back to the beginning of the book, and the 
beginning of life, which was at first embarked on the linear 
course of consuming its nutritive base as it grew, but then 
evolved into a new life form, which instead of converting 
organic matter into unusable wastes, converted wastes into 
fresh organic matter. "By closing the circle, they achieved 
what no living organism, alone, can accomplish —  survival." 
The parallel is clear: "Human beings have broken out of the 
circle of life.... to survive, we must close the circle."38
* * *
In The Closing Circle. Commoner contrasts linear and
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cyclical views of how things work. He quickly establishes 
that, cyclically, effects are causes. Yet science takes an 
atomistic approach to the study of the world, suited to a 
linear notion of cause and effect, not a cyclical one. 
Another type of science, however, shows us that life is a 
cycle of interdependencies. In his examples of 
interdependencies in the living world, Commoner consistently 
refers to "the environment," saving "nature" for occasions 
when he wants to make a contrast with artifice. This 
structuring of the living world as "environment" is, I would 
argue, a scientific approach, whereas calling it "nature" 
recalls a tradition of essential relatedness to living 
things that pre-dates science. Environment is an object of 
scientific study; Nature is a subject, something with being 
that resists being made an object.
The environment, in Commoner's writing, is an ecosphere 
lawlike in its behavior; its laws, like all laws of science, 
are immutable, and though the system described is complex, 
the laws are simple. We must change our scientific approach 
to the environment; science in the lab cannot take the place 
of science in the field.
In this book, which follows Science and Survival. 
Commoner makes a more extensive analysis of the economy than 
he has before. The emphasis shifts from science to the 
ecosystem. Concerning the ecosystem, science is incomplete,
358
but the economy is incompatible. Saving the environment is 
a battle against economic and political interests; it is 
ecology against economy. The environmental crisis is a sign 
of our inability to use our wealth and power for the good of 
all. The environmental crisis and social justice are 
linked; the environmental crisis and the fate of 
civilization are linked. The environmental crisis is a 
social problem; while it needs scientific solutions, these 
must be socially initiated.
The postwar change in productive technology is the 
immediate cause of damage to the environment. The fault of 
this technology —  its damaging effect —  lies in its 
scientific basis, in the linearity of scientific assumptions 
and the atomism of scientific methods. And yet Commoner has 
more to say about changing this technology than changing the 
science that, in his analysis, lies at its base. Perhaps 
this is because he evaluates the need for new social choices 
as the more pressing one, since scientific principles in any 
case cannot guide moral choices. Science is in this sense 
amoral; however, scientists need not and should not be.
They have a responsibility to the public to speak out —  
Commoner himself is consciously acting on this 
responsibility.
Economic and social systems have not recognized any 
limits to growth; ecosystems are known to have such limits.
Ecology, Commoner says, must now subsume economy and 
politics. By ignoring the wholeness of systems, with their 
limits to total growth and the circularity of cause and 
effect within the whole, we have broken out of the circle of 
life. To survive, we must return to and close the circle 
which, when unbroken, continually renews our existence.
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18. The damage to Lake Erie has not been irreversible.
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19. The idea that we belong to two worlds —  nature and 
society —  dates at least to the time when society became an 
object of investigation, around the 18th century. Another 
environmental book of the early 70s, Only One Earth, by 
Barbara Ward and Ren£ Dubos, repeats the same idea.
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The previous chapter discussed a book that connected economy 
and ecology, and gave specific examples of how choices on 
productive technology have environmental effect. This 
chapter reviews a book that makes the economy-ecology 
connection more generally, and on an international scale.
Summarizing Issues
Only One Earth; The Care and Maintenance of a Small 
Planet, by Barbara Ward and Ren6 Dubos, was published in 
1972.1 It is an unoffical report, originally intended as a 
kind of working document, commissioned by the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, which was held in 
Stockholm later that year. The book was to provide a 
conceptual framework for conference participants and the 
general public. The two authors, one an economist (Ward), 
the other a biologist (Dubos), prepared their summary of 
issues with the assistance of 152 corresponding consultants
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in 58 countries: scientists, engineers, industry executives, 
academics, institute directors, clergy, bankers, lawyers, 
writers, journalists and diplomats. The book was published 
simultaneously in Arabic, Danish, Dutch, English, French, 
Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and Swedish. The conference, 
and its associated book, gave official notice to the 
emerging global perspective on environmental problems. It 
was the first major international conference, and it set the 
tone for many such meetings, on a smaller scale, for years 
to follow.
Two concepts that are now familiar are noted as word 
coinings in this book: one is the earth as a spaceship - an 
idea presented by Adlai Stevenson in 1965 to the Economic 
and Social Council of the U.N. in Geneva2? the other is the 
biosphere - a term invented by Vladimir Ivanovitch 
Vernadsky, for the emergence on a lifeless planet of the 
covering of living things.3 "Spaceship Earth" conveyed the 
fragility and vulnerability of life on a planet suspended in 
space, whose inhabitants have no recourse to anything other 
than what they are already supplied with. The "biosphere" 
came to stand generally for the recognition that life on the 
planet is one interrelated whole, and as much a matter of 
concern as the atmosphere. While pollution of the 
atmosphere was evident in the early 70s, a potential crisis 
of the biosphere was not.4 Ward and Dubos explain that the
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experts consulted for criticisms of and suggestions for the
preliminary draft of the book differed greatly on what
should be stressed and how material should be presented.
(Some seventy comments were received.) Some felt the
proposed text was pessimistic, a "'fear story'." "One of
them, indeed, sees in the style all the defects he violently
objects to in Silent Spring —  'emotional and non-factual'."
Others wanted a more forceful warning, and one urges against
just a "mere recital of facts because salvation will
ultimately depend on an emotional awakening."5
In commenting on the process of summarizing and
weighing many different arguments, Ward and Dubos take the
conventional scientific position on the separation of fact
and value, using as an example nuclear energy:
"Experts rarely disagree on the validity of facts 
themselves; they differ only with regard to the 
interpretation and use of these facts...
But while all scientists agree on [certain] facts 
[about mutations resulting from radiation], 
individually they differ as to the levels of 
radiation [from nuclear power plants] they 
consider tolerable, because this involves social 
considerations based on value judgments. For 
example, the biological hazards... must be
balanced against the advantages... from...
economic development."6
When a scientific fact enters the social arena, it 
mutates into something else, something that is now arguable 
because it is subject to values. Ward and Dubos will try to 
recognize values but provide only facts, not 
recommendations. The authors were in fact required not to
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suggest any policy actions, as these could "prejudge the 
work of governments of the United Nations."7
Social and Natural Worlds
The scheme of the book is to present a picture of a 
world of social unities and of a world of natural unities, 
and then to show how technological and economic developments 
affect them both. There is a unity of social, economic and 
political interconnections; and a "unity of science" —  
characterized both as a unity of matter and energy, and a 
unity of the physical world and its laws. The social, 
economic, and political unity the authors refer to is the 
unity of a system with interdependent parts —  it is not the 
unity of agreement. This is a holistic sense of unity.
Man, the authors say, (sharing Commoner's observation), 
inhabits two worlds - natural and social. Ward and Dubos 
take a scientific view of the social world —  it is the 
"extraordinary" development of man's brain that separates 
him from his animal ancestors and that "is at the root of 
his creativity and his destructiveness."8 The authors' 
argument is that we live in both worlds, but on only one 
earth, and we need to recognize that the two worlds join 
whether we intend them to or not.
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"Something fundamental and possibly irrevocable is 
happening to man's relations with both his 
worlds... Men seem, on a planetary scale, to be 
substituting the controlled for the uncontrolled, 
the fabricated for the unworked, the planned for 
the random."9
This technoprogressive theme is notably at odds with the 
out-of-control critiques of Carson, Commoner, and Ehrlich. 
Ward and Dubos make their case mostly by concentrating on 
the substitution of "the fabricated for the unworked."
They sketch in a few pages the rise of man by means of the 
use of nonhuman energy and technology. More or less 
chronologically, major achievements are the use of fire, of 
animal power, of metals; the development of river valley 
civilizations and bureaucracies; money, commerce, 
mathematics, astronomy, and alphabets. The tempo of 
development increases in the 17th century, and "in the 
twentieth century... every index takes off for the 
stratosphere. Energy use, the consumption of foodstuffs and 
raw materials, urbanization, above all, population...."10
The authors now give the warning that they have been 
leading up to. Though there are different evaluations of 
the possible benefits and disadvantages of this great 
change,
"What is certain is that our sudden, vast 
accelerations —  in numbers, in the use of energy 
and new materials, in urbanization, in consumptive 
ideals, in consequent pollution —  have set 
technological man on a course which could alter 
dangerously and perhaps irreversibly, the natural 
systems of his planet upon which his biological
367
survival depends."11
As an example of consumption pressures, the authors ask,
"Suppose seven billion [the projected population for the
year 2010] try to live like Europeans or Japanese?"
"The two worlds of man —  the biosphere of his 
inheritance, the technosphere of his creation —  
are out of balance, indeed potentially in deep 
conflict. And man is in the middle."’2
Science. Technology, and the Market
After the 16th century, say Ward and Dubos, there was a
change in western Europe to an emphasis on useful knowledge
(they cite Bacon), thus on repeatable controlled experiment,
and on analysis (as specifiec by Descartes —  reducing
fields of study to discrete objects or ultimate elements),
on observation, and measurement and mathematics. Knowledge,
economics, and political power "became more interrelated,
powerful, and self-reinforcing with each advance in
technology and organization."13
"The vast range of scientific achievements that 
has flowed from the precise measurements of energy 
and the study of closely delineated 'discrete 
objects' makes up one of the most remarkable 
odysseys of the human mind."
"[These achievements have] reduced the crushing 
burdens of physical work... freed men for other 
pursuits, and extended to millions a wealth and 
opportunity formerly enjoyed by the smallest 
elite."H
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The authors do not mention the new burdens of these 
achievements, the crushing work in mines that this 
technology first demanded, or the work in its factories near 
dangerous mechanical equipment. Their understanding of the 
individual's gain or loss from science and technology (as 
compared to society's or the planet's) is almost entirely 
positive.
Ward and Dubos also present their triad of knowledge,
economics and political power as science, the market, and
the nation. It is this triad that rest of the book
analyzes. Knowledge is thus equated with science, economics
with the (free) market, and political power with the nation,
as if these were their natural identities.
Science, the authors say, has emphasized division and
specialization; only recently has it attempted to explain
wider relationships; it still risks making too little of
connections and relationships.
"On the one hand, it [science] is dedicated to the 
highest standards of objectivity and enslaved to 
the sternest mistress —  the spirit of truth. But 
once the results are known —  the horsepower 
measured, the atom bombarded, the nucleus split —  
vastly increased powers of use and misuse fall 
into men's hands. Energy and matter have, as it 
were, been torn out of the restraints imposed upon 
them by the natural system."15
It now seems old fashioned, at best, to say that science is
enslaved to the truth; the authors hold an idealistic view
of science, which allows as criticism only the possibility
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that it has overstepped its boundaries.
Scientific advance requires us to have more wisdom, to 
be able to provide checks and balances on this released 
energy and power, but "It has not been restraint or 
reflection that has chiefly presided over the emergence of 
the new scientific, technological order." "The new 
technological order," the authors assert, "is solidly rooted 
in man's desire for goods and his willingness to work and 
plan and invest to get them."16 Ward and Dubos are saying 
that though technology is an achievement of science, it is 
sustained by desire. This bases the technological order on 
individual acquisitiveness (although the authors include 
nationalism as an influence) as if this acquisitiveness were 
universal, equally practiced and equally available as an 
option, even though the authors' later comments on rich and 
poor nations show that they know this is not so. As a 
theoretical stance it is inadequate, because it lacks 
recognition of structural supports for technology and of 
power relations that impose technologies.
Ward and Dubos briefly review mercantilist commerce, 
and the shift of investment from financing long journeys to 
building factories and workforces once steam engines and 
other tools became available. They quickly outline the 
raising of capital, and the large scale production and 
distribution of goods, and conclude that "As a decentralized
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way of satisfying a million different tastes and needs, the 
market system could hardly be matched."17 Demand (need) 
balances supply and prices. Again, individual 
acquisitiveness is considered to be the basis of the system; 
nothing is said about how the needs of the buyers (e.g., 
urban housing) are themselves produced by the constraints of 
a system over which the individuals have no power.
The authors acknowledge that the market system has also 
had "unintended, fragmented, and destabilizing side 
effects," particularly "the gap between rich and poor." 
Another effect has been damage to the environment. Ward and 
Dubos observe that economic theory, growing out of the early 
conditions of the growth of capital, inclines toward 
accepting this damage. Since the early entrepreneurs took 
high risks, they did not want any unavoidable costs laid to 
their account, and "The definition of costs... took on a 
minimum content which it has to some extent retained. Costs 
were what the entrepreneur could not avoid paying." Slag 
heaps (one of which, in Wales, slid downhill and buried a 
schoolhouse with its children a century later —  a 
contemporary incident for Ward and Dubos), air pollution, 
water pollution, dangerous machinery —  the remediation of 
any of this was a cost the entrepreneur would not accept. 
"Natural systems were treated as 'free goods'...." and the 
poisoning of the water that affected someone else downstream
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was considered an "external diseconomy."18
The Nation
In the "trinity of forces —  science, the market, the
nation," the market has been decisive as "a stimulus to the
development of our disturbed, fragmented, and powerful
modern order," but the nation state has been still more
potent as an agent of change. The
"modern nation-state has developed the authority, 
the organization, the will and the energy to do 
three critical things": create an internal market; 
create, with other nation states, a world market; 
"[bring] science and state together in the pursuit 
of war."19
Though all this has impacts on the human environment,
statehood has not been reconciled with a shared planet. No
nation's infrastructure is designed to deal with the
environmental effects of production and consumption.
"If all man can offer to the decades ahead is the 
same combination of scientific drive, economic 
cupidity, and national arrogance, then we cannot 
rate very highly the chances of reaching the year 
2000 with our planet still functioning safely and 
our humanity securely preserved."20
It is time, Ward and Dubos say, to rethink the triad. We
have to rethink science (make it more integrative), the
nation (it must fit into a morally and socially responsible
world order as well as a world that is physically one), and
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the economy (revise management of incomes, environments, 
cities).
Scientific Knowledge
Like Commoner in The Closing Circle, the authors feel 
that it is necessary for the reader to take in some basic 
science. They have already evaluated the contribution of 
science as a whole, and reiterate its influence for unity. 
Science, in its "dissection of the seamless web of 
existence" and its increasing precision and specialization, 
has paradoxically given a vision of the unity of the entire 
cosmos.21
Ward and Dubos begin their account of life with physics 
and the knowledge gained within the last century that energy 
and matter are interchangeable. Like many others at the 
time, they grapple with the subject of atomic power and its 
dangers, which they try to convey with a scientific 
comparison. The thermonuclear fusion process at the heart 
of the sun is what releases the energy which comes to the 
Earth —  but Earth receives just one two-billionth part of 
it.
"We can, it is clear, stand only so much of the 
sun's vast radiance. Yet we have already repeated 
on earth the process which flings it forth... The 
hydrogen bomb... first exploded in 1952...
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releas[es] the kind of energy which is generated 
by the sun. All other environmental risks, it is 
clear, fade into insignificance compared with the 
possibility that this terrible weapon might ever 
come to be used in all-out war."22
Having described the basic constituents of matter, the
authors turn to the appearance of life, occuring in stages
over great periods of time. As the Earth developed,
mechanisms took shape to "protect it from the
destructiveness of solar radiation, yet enable it to use its
life-giving energy." First there is a lifeless planet on
which solar radiation pours down "through unimpeded space";
then the covering of living things —  the biosphere —
emerges over billions of years. First a molten globe, then
one surrounded by clouds, then a cooling of the crust,
whereupon the clouds turned to water and
"The rains began to fall. They fell for years, 
for centuries, for millennia in a continuous, 
global downpour, filling the crevices and the 
gulfs. They covered the lower lands. They 
climbed up the mountains. They all but filled the 
Southern Hemisphere. The oceans were born and 
became the cradle of life."23
With this description, Ward and Dubos convey the immensity
of time that passed in preparation for life, and give a
sense of how impossible it would be to retrieve the
conditions for life if we damaged it severely on a planetary
scale.
The rains ended about three billion years ago; 
chemicals combined under the influence of the sun's
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radiation and electrical discharges in atmosphere; carbon
compounds appeared; then primitive bacteria; then living
cells capable of photosynthesis (sea plants at first) —
transforming light energy into carbohydrates, pulling in
carbon dioxide and letting off oxygen.
The reader's scientific education continues through the
"random process" of evolution. DNA is mentioned. Plants
creep up onto rocks, fish creep up onto the land, in a
"flood" of land life about 350 million years ago; everything
begins to adapt. The energy chains of food-giving and food-
getting develop, ecosystems form. About 100,000 years ago
begins "the unexplained and unparalled enlargement of the
human brain, which resulted in Homo sapiens, thus bringing
into play on earth a type of force different from other
natural forces. . . .1,24
This long-in-the-making balance of life is a delicate
one. Though ecosystems are self-repairing, they can be
overloaded and damaged to the point of no return. But how,
ask Ward and Dubos, can we achieve the necessary caution
toward the environment in an age of extreme nationalism and
extreme material expectations? (Or put another way, how can
we integrate state and economy with scientific knowledge?)
The authors find hope in science. Knowledge of the
atom and of evolution are
"master intellectual achievements of modern times 
[and] have provided a solid basis for a completely
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new appreciation of the unity, interdependence, 
and precariousness of the human condition. And 
since this reality comes to us with all the weight 
of scientific proof and cogency, we can hope that 
it will be more convincing than was the earlier, 
less scientifically substantiated knowledge."25
"There is... something clarifying and irresistible in plain
scientific fact," they conclude.
So there is a paradox. Scientific knowledge gives us
both the power to annihilate ourselves and the perspective
to avoid this suicide. All traditions have warnings against
"arrogant and unheeding power" but they are particularly
urgent in Western tradition, Ward and Dubos note, perhaps
because the West is "responsible for opening up the furnaces
of nuclear power and for penetrating to the most intimate
mechanisms of life." Thus the legends of Prometheus,
punished for stealing fire, and of Faust —  "the man of
science who sells his soul to secure all knowledge and
power." This does not mean we should retreat from science.
In fact, we need to know more about the interconnections of
the environment. "But the warning remains... If man
continues to let his behavior be dominated by separation,
antagonism, and greed, he will destroy the delicate balances
of his planetary environment. And if they were once
destroyed, there would be no more life for him."26 Here
Ward and Dubos establish a moral basis for the environmental
problem, yet they use the remoteness of the subjunctive to
express it —  perhaps as a way of appearing scientifically
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dispassionate. For them, it is scientific dispassion that 
promises to overcome the passions they see as the problem.
The Balance of Resources
In this world of accelerating change, the availability 
of resources is a major uncertainty. There are many 
problems of calculation: in projecting population, 
resources, and consumption when trying to figure out if 
there's enough to go around; they are all interdependent. 
Projections of population growth are based on current rates 
of increase. A small rate of population increase can result 
in rapid total population growth. A 1% increase will double 
a population in 70 years (other things being equal); 2%, 35 
years; 3%, 2 3 years. While population is growing fastest in 
the underdeveloped countries, resource use grows fastest in 
the developed ones. Thus the sufficiency of resources 
cannot be estimated from total world population alone. The 
American child in his lifetime will "run through the 
biosphere's available supplies at least five hundred times 
faster than an Indian baby." "Developed lands [do not] 
escape the dilemma. Something has to give —  family size, 
standards of living, or the biosphere's survival."27
"But," the authors observe, ".... all modernized
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societies conduct their economies on the basis of rising
material standards for all citizens."28
"Where along the escalator is the exit to a level 
floor? Is there a kind of biological limit to man's 
desire for food, shelter, leisure, entertainment, 
talking by telephone, moving about in a motor car, 
flying in airplanes, visiting distant lands?... We do 
not know. But clearly we have not reached it yet."29
Once again, the authors see individual acquisitiveness
driving the economic system.
The availability of resources is not simple to predict,
because nothing stays the same —  for example, the
possibility of use of low grade ores changes with
technology; there are new uses for existing materials; new
materials are synthesized. All such transformations,
however, require energy, and so we can try to estimate
energy availability. The world relies greatly on fossil
fuels —  coal, oil, and natural gas —  and Ward and Dubos
review questions about reserves, political problems,
pollution, and as-yet unharnessed alternative energies.
Nuclear energy ("Promethean Fire," as the authors call it)
is the most immediate alternative. But
"To generate this power on earth is, almost 
literally, the Promethean act of stealing fire 
from the gods. And we should remember with an 
uneasiness born of a sense of sacrilege that the 
first use of this fire was to wipe out two cities, 
without care for individual guilt or innocence, 
man or woman, youth or age."5"
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Citizen and Science
Is this energy worth its hazards, including cancer? It
is here, well into the book, that the citizen (not much
noticeable before) is introduced as a risk assessor.
"In all this debate, one thing is certain. The 
ordinary citizen cannot judge the scientific 
facts. What he can and must do is bring his 
reason and common sense to bear on his country's 
whole approach to the problem."31
The citizen gets very busy using common sense to protest
nuclear stations near big population centers, to insist on
monitoring systems set to the lowest contamination rate
possible, to make sure that reprocessing fuels and
transporting and disposing of them are closely inspected.
Then, "Should the citizen go further and simply say that he
prefers to do without the Promethean fire? That nuclear
energy is simply too risky and too expensive?"32 The
question is left unanswered.
We can't go on with economic growth, population growth,
and inadequate controls on pollution and untrammeled energy
use without ending in ecological disaster. But "Growth and
environment are not in necessary opposition."
"If population becomes stabilized, basic 
injustices are redressed, effluent charges 
imposed, new technologies of nonpolluting 
technologies evolved, the pressure of arms 
relaxed, and citizens persuaded, by education and 
example, to widen the range of their 
nonconsumptive joys, societies can still 'grow', 




A section on developing regions ties the global economy 
to the impending environmental crisis and social problems. 
The authors offer a profile of the developing nation: annual 
per capita income is low; investment comes largely from 
abroad; exports are primary materials, imports are machines 
and skills; population is heavily rural; school enrollment 
and literacy rates low; population growth rate is high. 
"Population and work force explode ahead of industrial­
ization"34 instead of behind, as in the 19th-century West.
The exit from poverty requires greater productivity, which 
means impact on the environment (agriculture by new methods, 
industrialization, urbanization).
Population:
Developing nations have about 2 5% of the resources of the 
global economy, and 75% of its population. The 20th 
century's control of major epidemics —  yellow fever, 
smallpox, plague, malaria —  has brough death rates down 
sharply. "The general rate of population increase —  of 
over 2.5 per cent a year —  is... unprecedented in human
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history." Two billion peoples in the developing world at 
writing must reach 5.5 billion by the year 2000. (These 
projections remain approximately the same twenty years 
later).
Productivity can't increase if consumption claims on 
resources (population growth) outstrip it. There are two 
important factors in slowing down birth rates: 'population 
transition' (the shift to lower birth rates) due to 
attainment of modern industrial productivity and lifestyle, 
and government policy.
Policies for Growth:
Agriculture is the basis of everything else in developing 
countries. Calorie intake is usually less than 2000 
calories a day, and protein intake is low, sometimes 
deficient. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, population 
growth means more people to feed per acre; less land lies 
fallow as acreage is increased, but this means that this 
traditional method of restoring soil fertility is bypassed; 
abandoned land erodes, deserts form. Overgrazing has a 
similar effect.
Green revolution rice and wheat strains (since 1967) 
grow fast and successfully with fertilizers, increasing 
crops in some places at a rate faster than the increase in 
population. But there are special environmental problems in
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much of the third world: soils are thin, dependent on rain
forests for humus. When forests are cleared to increase the
cultivation area, rain leaches out soil nutrients; when the
rain ends, the wind blows away topsoil or the sun bakes it
to brick. Tropical climate has extremes of rain and heat;
regular water supply is a problem; irrigation is necessary,
but must be kept in balance with the water table and
evaporation rates.
Also, the green revolution requires heavy fertilizer
and pesticide use, and is a monoculture method not related
to local conditions; it is thus susceptible to environmental
challenges. The green revolution is capital intensive
rather than labor intensive, as agriculture traditionally is
in Asia; people will get turned off the land, migrate to
cities, increase urban problems.
"it is not only the balance of nature that will be 
endangered. It is the balance of the villages, 
the balance of the cities, the balance of the 
whole social order."35
Djakarta has a population of five million but is basically
"a vast agglomeration of rural villages" without sewage
systems, reliable drinking water, transport links. The
shantytowns surrounding Rio grow by 5000 migrants a week.
So the green revolution needs a framework of land reform,
extension services, cooperatives, and traditional
(ecological) local wisdom. Unfortunately, the authors note,
the necessary trained people are not available.
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The development of industry also has such "social 
diseconomies." Debt is owed to foreigners; reinvestment 
benefits elites, not the national economy; exports are 
primary materials which do not bring in enough foreign 
exchange (except oil); technology is imported and not suited 
to local conditions, especially the abundant labor 
condition, so unemployment goes up.
On the other hand, developing countries have energy 
options that the industrializing West did not; they can 
decentralize industry, and could learn from mistakes of the 
West concerning urbanization and its social and 
environmental problems. Yet the environmentally acceptable 
technologies and strategies demand high capital inputs, and 
scientific skills. The special problems of the third world 
will be very hard to overcome. All strategies for 
improvement face the guestion of population growth. To 
mobilize for this growth requires something like a nation­
state. For developing countries the nation-state is also a 
symbol of escape from servitude, but it is inadequate where 
the nation is "too small for effective sovereignty"36 or 
lacks the necessary resources for change and growth —  a 
common condition of developing countries. Also, separate 
sovereignties but interdependent technosphere and biosphere 
present problems for unity.
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The Shared Biosphere:
Interdependence of nations and of technosphere and biosphere 
is especially evident in the atmosphere. The authors 
discuss the possibility of a greenhouse effect from carbon 
dioxide gases —  on the rise in recent decades because of 
the burning of fossil fuels and of deforestation (fewer 
leaves are available to remove carbon dioxide). This 
combines with what may be a natural warming period at the 
end of an ice age (the Pleistocene). We need global 
decision-making; local decisions are inadeguate.
Oceans are another area of interdependence. They 
provide the water vapor which becomes rain; their 
phytoplankton provide oxygen; they cool warm regions and 
warm cold ones; they provide protein (fish); they dissolve 
mineral and biological debris. But they are not endless.
All refuse dumped into the sea accumulates there in one way 
or another; the sea has no outlet. Biological life is 
concentrated near the surface of the ocean, and concentrated 
near land, where it is most vulnerable to human activities: 
runoff pollution; oil spills; toxic dumping; sewage dumping.
Coexistence in the Technosphere:
We also have an interdependent technosphere, "the 
constructed world order of technological innovation, 
investment flows, and commercial exchanges."37 To keep
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pace with population growth, national economies need to grow 
at 6% per year in developing countries. Aid or trade 
concessions from developed countries are needed; half the 
amount spent on arms would be sufficient. Some nations are 
still testing nuclear weapons in the air at the time of Ward 
and Dubos' writing. Environmental problems are not 
unsolvable, but "fear and doom are truly appropriate" when 
it comes to warfare.
Strategies for Survival
Once again the authors rely on the power of science as 
truth:
"If men have not hitherto realized the extent of 
their planetary interdependence, it was in part at 
least because, in clear, precise physical and 
scientific fact, it did not yet exist."3®
There are three fields in which to act: science, markets,
nations —  matching the "thrusts" which have brought us to
our present predicament.
1) Knowledge (science): "Nations [should] accept a 
collective responsibility for discovering more" about 
human/nature interactions. This would involve monitoring, 
research, study, exchange of information.
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2) Sovereignty and decision-making: Intergovernmental
institutions are necessary. (International organizations,
conventions, and forums have already multiplied rapidly, the
authors note.) Air and ocean pollution, climate are obvious
areas to start environmental cooperation.
"A strategy for planet Earth must, then, 
explicitly take account of the fact that the 
natural resource most threatened with pollution, 
most exposed to degradation, most liable to 
irreversible damage is not this or that species, 
not this or that plant or biome or habitat, not 
even the free airs or the great oceans. It is man 
himself. "39
"The first global environmental agreement [was] the Test-Ban
Treaty [of] 1963."
"We have lacked a wider rationale of unity. Our 
prophets have sought it. Our poets have dreamed 
of it. But it is only in our own day that 
astronomers, physicists, geologists, chemists, 
biologists, anthropologists, ethnologists, and 
archaeologists have all combined in a single 
witness of advanced science to tell us that, in 
every alphabet of our being, we do indeed belong 
to a single system, powered by a single energy, 
manifesting a fundamental unity under all its 
variations, depending for its survival on the 
balance and health of the total system.
If this vision of unity —  which is not a 
vision only but a hard and inescapable scientific 
fact —  can become part of the common insight of 
all the inhabitants of planet Earth, then we may 
find that, beyond all our inevitable pluralisms, 
we can achieve just enough unity of purpose to 
build a human world."40
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* * •
Ward and Dubos want their readers to care about the 
scientific account of the biosphere and the technosphere; 
the ecology of production, consumption and waste; a global 
perspective on economy and politics; the positive 
possibilities of science and technology, and the cautions 
against their misuse; science-based unity.
Their main argument is that the world is an inter­
connected whole —  physically, economically, and politically 
—  and that we cannot ignore the facts of the physical world 
that science shows us (ecological danger), nor ignore global 
imbalances in economic and political power. They both 
praise and criticize science but never fail to eguate it 
with truth, even in its overspecialization and its 
overreaching technology.
More than any major book that has gone before, this one 
gives a global definition of the ecological crisis. In 
preparation for a United Nations conference the authors 
extend environmental concerns planet wide, and connect 
political policy, economic action, and scientific and 
technological developments to one another. The conference 
was on the human environment, and Ward and Dubos keep this 
emphasis, harldly mentioning wildlife or problems of species 
extinction.
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This emphasis is common to Commoner, Ehrlich, and 
Hardin as well. It was the threat to human life that 
galvanized their science-based environmental arguments. 
Bookchin shares this human-oriented concern. Commoner and 
Ehrlich are aware of, and indicate threats to, fish, plant 
life, and some mammals, but give them limited space in their 
arguments. Carson alone among the much-read authors giving 
environmental warnings in the 60s and 70s starts from the 
loss of nature. Yet a deep felt concern for nature may 
drive much of the public's voiced support of 
environmentalism. The connections of environmental crisis 
to choices of production technology and international 
politics and economics, by which the fate of nature is 
played out, requires an analysis that contrasts with the 
empathy of relating with nature. The analysis and the 
empathy combine in the movement of environmentalism, but 
successful environmental arguments were increasingly framed 
by rational calculation, whatever individual motives might 
have been.
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The global interconnections of economy and environment were 
detailed in the book reviewed in the previous chapter; this 
chapter reviews the book that put numbers on the global 
limits of natural resources and a time limit on the capacity 
of the environment to support the world's growing 
population.
Modeling the World System
The Limits to Growth, published in 1972, was based on a 
report made for the Club of Rome's Project on the 
Predicament of Mankind.1 The Club, founded in 1968 by 
Aurelio Peccei, an Italian industrialist and economic 
consultant, had as its purpose to understand interdependent 
world problems, bring them to the attention of policy 
makers, and encourage action. Its members were businessmen, 
scientists, educators, and national and international 
government professionals. What the Club termed the "world
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problematique" included poverty, environmental degradation, 
urban sprawl, insecurity of employment, inflation, alienated 
youth, and the rejection of traditional values. The Limits 
to Growth dealt only with the economic and environmental 
aspects of the problematic. The team who worked on the 
report began at MIT in 1970, where Jay Forrester had used 
systems theory to develop a global model of economic and 
population trends.
Dennis Meadows, a former graduate student of 
Forrester's, led the project. Donella Meadows, one of its 
members, along with Jorgen Randers and William Behrens, 
prepared the book on the findings for a general readership. 
The authors don't explain that the mathematics of their 
model are run on a computer, perhaps because this technique 
was not familiar to a general readership in 1972.2 But it 
is the power of the computer that gives systems theory, and 
Forrester's system dynamics, the capacity to make such 
models workable. The model is itself an outcome of the age 
of technology which generates the problems that the model 
studies.
The MIT project team constructed a mathematical model 
in which economic, population, resource use, and other 
trends intersect and interact. It sets assumptions, 
manipulates data, lets development run, and then reads out 
the results. The results, as interpreted and reported by
392
the MIT group, showed that allowing capital and population 
to grow to their 'natural' limits would produce a pattern of 
overshoot of environmental carrying capacity and collapse of 
further growth, within the next century. They conclude that 
human-determined limits must be set in order to preserve a 
functioning world system. Five basic factors were 
identified as those that "determine, and therefore, 
ultimately limit, growth on this planet"3: population, 
agricultural production, industrial production, natural 
resources, and pollution.
The Limits to Growth was first published in 1972; a
second edition came out in 1974, and millions of copies were
sold in many languages/ The Introduction quotes U Thant,
head of the United Nations:
"I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only 
conclude from the information available to me as 
Secretary-General, that the Members of the United 
Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to 
subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global 
partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human 
environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to 
supply the required momentum to development efforts.
If such a global partnership is not forged within the 
next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I 
have mentioned will have reached such staggering 
proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to 
control."5
The authors comment little on this strong warning, 
stating only that U Thant refers to long term problems that 
concern us all. They stress the necessity to extend our 
perspective beyond the next few months or years, to decades
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and centuries, and introduce the idea of using a model (an
"ordered set of assumptions about a complex system") as a
means for sorting through information as it increases in
quantity and complexity of interactions.6 The model, the
authors say, is unavoidably "imperfect, oversimplified, and
unfinished," but it is the only formal model they know of
"that has a time horizon longer than thirty years, 
and that includes important variables such as 
population, food production, and pollution, not as 
independent entities, but as dynamically 
interacting elements, as they are in the real 
world."7
Their assumptions about the five factors of growth are 
that they show these trends: rapid population increase, 
widespread malnutrition (agriculture), accelerating 
industrialization, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and 
a deteriorating environment (pollution). All the data on 
growth trends in population, food, capital, nonrenewable 
resources, and pollution are combined in a "world model."
The effect of numerical changes in the basic assumptions is 
tested on the world model to see what behaviors or 
interactions result.
There was strong reaction to the publication of this 
report, both accepting the conclusions and rejecting them. 
There is still argument about the practical impact of 
limits, and resistance to any economic program of scaled- 
down growth. But it is no longer unusual to have an 
economic projection time-span of over thirty years, or to
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compute multiple interactions instead of discrete paths of 
projected change. The Limits to Growth startled people in 
the same way that Silent Spring did, and like Silent Spring 
became an exemplar for subsequent accounts.
The conclusions of the study, as summarized in the 
introduction are: 1) If present trends continue, the limits 
to growth on the planet will be reached in the next one 
hundred years, with a consequent sudden decline in 
population and industrial capacity? 2) The trends can be 
altered toward a state of global equilibrium which satisfies 
each person's basic needs and offers each person equal 
opportunity; 3) The sooner the world's people start toward 
such a goal, the greater are the chances of success. The 
authors foresee "a period of great transition —  the 
transition from growth to global equilibrium."8 Many 
critics associated Limits with the goal of "zero growth"; 
this term is not used in the book, but the equilibrium it 
recommends comes to that. The Club of Rome, for whom the 
report was made, never recommended zero growth, but was 
linked with the idea anyway.9
Exponential Growth
Exponential growth is a key idea of the Limits report.
All five elements of the model —  population, food 
production, industrialization, consumption of nonrenewable 
resources, and pollution —  are growing exponentially. 
Instead of a linear increase by the same amount each year —  
as in adding one hundred dollars at regular intervals to 
one's savings —  there is an increase by a constant 
percentage, as in adding to savings or investment earnings 
by the same percentage each year.10 The authors give two 
examples of the surprising results of exponential growth.
One comes from the story of the game of chess, newly 
invented and presented to a Persian king. In return for 
devising the game, the inventor asked only that he be given 
one grain of rice for the first square of the board, two 
grains for the second, four grains for the third, and so on 
through the 64 squares. This doubling reached more than 500 
grains at the tenth square, more than a million at the 
twenty-first square, a million million at the fortieth 
square. The rice storehouses of the king were exhausted 
before the last square was reached. (This example is more 
instructive, in the 20th century, with pennies. If pennies 
are substituted at the rate of one-fiftieth of a penny for a 
grain of rice —  approximating the retail price —  the 
inventor has 200 million dollars by the time the fortieth 
square is completed.)11
The other example is a riddle: You have a pond on which
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a lily is growing, doubling in size each day. If the lily 
is allowed to grow unchecked it will cover the pond, choking 
all other life, in thirty days. For a long time the lily 
seems to remain small, so you decide not to cut it back 
until it covers half the pond. On what day will that be? 
(The twenty-ninth —  you will have just one day to save the 
pond.)12
Exponential growth is not difficult to understand, but 
when many different elements grow concurrently, at different 
rates, and in interaction, analysis becomes complex. The 
dynamic behavior of a system is marked by positive and 
negative feedback loops; with positive feedback there is an 
increase in quantity? with negative feedback a decrease. In 
population, which grows exponentially, the positive feedback 
is births; the negative feedback is deaths. If fertility 
(the percentage of the population that gives birth each 
year) remains constant at a level above replacement, and 
mortality remains constant, then the larger the population, 
the more babies are born, making a still larger population 
from which still more babies are born. If there are no 
births, and mortality remains constant, population 
diminishes, but slowly, since each year there is a smaller 
base quantity on which the percentage of deaths operates.
The decrease is not linear, but instead of the change in 
quantity being faster for not being linear, as in the case
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of growth, it is slower. Other things being equal, reducing 
the positive feedback of births to zero acts like taking 
your foot off the gas pedal, not like putting on the brakes.
With population, there is a delay in each feedback 
loop, since the age of giving birth is many years away from 
the time of being born, as is the age of death on average. 
For this reason, the authors of this 1972 report noted that 
population could not level off before the year 2000, when it 
would reach about 7 billion, since the majority of that 
year's prospective parents had already been born. (As of 
the 1992 United Nations Population Fund report, the most 
likely level-off year has been moved to 2150, when 1992's 
estimated 5.5 billion people will have more than doubled to 
a projected 11.6 billion. This rate of growth is slower 
than the 3 5-year doubling period mentioned in Limits —  and 
in Ehrlich's Population Bomb —  but growth will still be 
steep for another 50 years after 1992, and will take more 
than a century to level off.)13
Growing even more rapidly than population, industrial 
output increased at 7% a year from 1963 to 1968, or 5% per 
year per capita.14 [p.45] (When the growth rate is 1% per 
year, doubling time is 70 years; when it is 2%, it is 3 5 
years; 7% gives a doubling time of ten years.) Positive 
feedback loops operate on industrial capital and output in 
very much the same way as they do on population, the authors
argue. Some fraction of output is investment; more 
investment makes for more capital stock, which makes for 
more output.15 Depreciation acts as negative feedback. 
Although industrial output is growing faster than population 
at the time of the report, distribution of wealth is 
unequal, and problems of poverty are not solved. Industrial 
growth is greatest where population growth is lowest; there, 
GNP per capita can increase. In developing countries, where 
population growth outstrips industrial growth, GNP per 
capita cannot rise. The gap between the rich and poor 
nations is widening. The rich get richer and the poor get 
poorer, and the authors ask whether this pattern of growth 
rates for industrial capital and population around the world 
can be sustained.
Resources
Much of the future will depend on physical resources, 
many of which are not renewable. (At the time of the 
report, non-renewable resources were thought of as 
extractives —  coal, oil, gas, minerals; it has now become 
evident that ancient forests are nonrenewable, as are other 
complex biosystems whose evolutionary synthesis can never be 
recreated.) There are renewable resources, such as food,
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but the arable land on which food depends is limited. Other 
resources are social —  social stability, education, 
employment, technology; Limits to Growth does not try to 
model these. Instead, it sets the assumption that either 
current or better social conditions prevail. For instance, 
if the best social conditions prevail, and all arable land 
is under cultivation; if 0.4 hectares is required to feed 
each person (the world average; eating at U.S. standards 
requires twice as much land); if population growth continues 
at the existing rate, then "desperate" arable land shortages 
occur before the year 2000. If agricultural productivity is 
doubled, the shortage occurs about 2 5 years later. The 
situation, the authors observe, is like that of the lily 
pond; for a long time, everything seems in balance, but in a 
very short period of time the whole system can fail.
The example of food production is illustrated with a 
graph that projects trends into the future. Beginning at 
the bottom left of the chart, one curve —  arable land 
needed at the present agricultural productivity level —  
begins to rise steeply after having been first nearly level 
and then only gradually climbing; similar curves, further 
displaced into the future, show land needed at higher 
productivity levels. A flat line above the climbing land 
curve shows total arable land; part of it drops off into a 
descending curve as land is taken for urban-industrial
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purposes. Where the available-land and needed-land curves 
intersect, need has outstripped supply —  there is no longer 
enough land to produce the food that the world needs. All 
the factors of growth analyzed in the book have such charts, 
and all are of this type —  rising and falling curves 
intersect, although not always with such simplicity —  and 
even if all supporting conditions are made optimistic beyond 
current conditions and anyone's expectations, the crash when 
growth meets its limits is only delayed about 25 years.
Depending on the factor under consideration, failure 
comes as early as 2000, or as late as 2070, but within a 
century of the date of the report. Exponentially growing 
industrial production depletes natural resources and 
increases pollution until the lack of land and materials, 
along with health damages from pollution, cause deaths which 
bring the population rapidly downward. Approximately 7 5 
graphs and other graphic devices in Limits show how this is 
so (given the assumptions of the model). The mathematical 
evidence of the limits to growth is before the reader's eyes 
every few pages.
The text is mostly an explanation of what is displayed 
on the charts; the language is simple and the argument is 
made easy to follow. A very brief summary appears in long 
legends below each graph. Explaining nonrenewable 
resources, the authors take chromium as a test case, because
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it has one of the longest static reserve indices of 19 in-
the-earth resources listed in the report. The legend below
the chart reads:
"The lifetime of known chromium reserves depends on the 
future usage rate of chromium. If usage remains 
constant, reserves will be depleted linearly (dashed 
line) and will last 420 years. If usage increases 
exponentially at its present growth rate of 2.6 percent 
per year, reserves will be depleted in just 95 years.
If actual reserves are five times present proven 
reserves, chromium ore will be available for 154 years 
(dotted line), assuming exponential growth in usage. 
Even if all chromium is perfectly recycled, starting in 
1970, exponentially growing demand will exceed the 
supply after 235 years (horizontal line)."16
The effect of the simplicity and irresistible factuality of
these presentations repeated throughout the book gives the
report an immediate impact. A blurb for the second edition
sums up this effect: "If this book doesn't blow everybody's
mind who can read without moving his lips, then the earth is
kaput."17
Limits is one long warning that says "watch out, slow 
down, change course," not with those words, but with one 
encapsulated trend report after another. Data and graphs on 
"Energy consumption and GNP per capita" complete the section 
on nonrenewable resources. Pollution is described with such 
examples as "Carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere; 
Waste heat generation in the Los Angeles basin; Nuclear 
wastes; Oxygen content of the Baltic sea; Lead in the 
Greenland ice cap; DDT flows in the environment; DDT in body 
fat." We have many such reports now, but there was nothing
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else like The Limits to Growth when it came out —  all the 
major elements of productivity and pollution brought 
together, projected into the future, explained in condensed 
form, and stating incontrovertibly that we cannot continue 
going on as we have been.
The authors caution that the output graphs that show 
values for population, capital, etc., from 1900 to 2100 "are 
not exact predictions of the values of the variables at any 
particular year in the future. They are indications of the 
system's behavioral tendencies only."18 They explain that 
knowledge of the causal relationships between the factors 
they consider varies in degrees of completeness. Per capita 
resource use, for example, is fairly well understood; 
fertility is not so well understood; and the effect of 
pollution on life expectancy is not well understood at all. 
The authors' basic stance on these difficulties is that we 
have to work with what we've got; "there is no perfect model 
available for use in evaluating today's important policy 
issues."19 They believe their model is useful despite its 
deficiences. It will, they hope, generate discussion and 
research and it can "generate valid basic behavior modes for 
the world system."20
All the computer runs of the behavior of the world 
system under varying conditions of productivity, resource 
availability, and population show some form of overshoot of
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carrying capacity and subsequent collapse. If the trends of 
1900-1970 don't change, collapse of growth comes before 
2100.
"Food, industrial output, and population grow 
exponentially until the rapidly diminishing 
resource base forces a slowdown in industrial 
growth. Because of natural delays in the system, 
both population and pollution continue to increase 
for some time after the peak of industrialization. 
Population growth is finally halted by a rise in 
the death rate due to decreased food and medical 
services. "21
The authors comment:
"The exact timing of these events is not 
meaningful given the great aggregation and many 
uncertainties of the model... We can sav with some 
confidence that, under the assumption of no maior 
change in the present system, population and 
industrial growth will certainly stop within the 
next century, at the latest."zz
A major change, such as doubling the resources allows
industrialization to reach a higher level, but pollution
rises so steeply that it increases the death rate;
industrial production still has to fall as resources do, and
capital-intensive agriculture can thus no longer be
sustained; population falls as food production does;
collapse occurs as before, and not much later than with the
no-major-change scenario. Even with "'Unlimited' Resources
(unlimited nuclear power doubles the resource reserves that
can be exploited, but there is still some actual limit to
the resources that can be mined from the earth), Pollution
Controls, Increased Agricultural Productivity, and 'Perfect'
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Birth Control," "industrial growth is halted, and the death 
rate rises as resources are depleted, pollution accumulates, 
and food production declines."23 There is no avoiding the 
limits that the planet places on our productive activity —  
the productive system that we now have cannot go on growing 
endlessly into the future.
setting Limits
"The unspoken assumption behind all of the model runs 
we have presented," say the authors, "...is that population 
and capital growth should be allowed to continue until they 
reach some 'natural' limit."24 The alternative is "man- 
determined limits," but if we wait too long, "the choice of 
limits will be gone."25 The authors recommend a change 
toward a world system that is "1. sustainable without sudden 
and uncontrollable collapse; and 2. capable of satisfying 
the basic material reguirements of all its people."26 To 
reach this goal, both population and capital must be 
stabilized. In the model that follows such policies, the 
economy is shifted away from goods and toward services, food 
production and soil enrichment is given priority, pollution 
is reduced and recycling carried out. With all this, the 
demand on nonrenewable resources is reduced. If such
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policies are instituted in 1975, stabilization is reached by 
2100; if we wait until 2000 to institute the same policies, 
the equilibrium state cannot be maintained, and food and 
resource shortages occur before 2100. Of the three 
alternatives, the authors conclude —  "unrestricted growth, 
a self-imposed limitation to growth, or a nature-imposed 
limitation to growth —  only the last two are actually 
possible. "27
In the the equilibrium state, "Population and capital 
are essentially stable, with the forces tending to increase 
them in a carefully controlled balance."28 The behaviors 
of population and capital that are necessary to maintain 
equilibrium depend on how long the equilibrium is to be 
maintained. With a time horizon of 70 years, the levels of 
population and capital of the 1970s could be maintained, but 
the rates would have to change —  birth rate and rate of 
capital investment and depreciation would have to drop.
For a long time-horizon, minimum requirements are: 
birth rate equals death rate, and the capital investment 
rate equals the depreciation rate; all rates are kept to a 
minimum; capital and population levels and their ratio "are 
set in accordance with the values of the society," and can 
be revised as "technology creates new options." "Population 
and capital are the only quantities that need be constant in 
the equilibrium state." "Education, art, music, religion,
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basic scientific research, athletics, and social 
interactions could flourish."29 There are two barriers to 
equality, the authors state; population is one. While the 
equilibrium state will keep population growth down, it will 
not assure equality of distribution of goods, but at the 
very least everyone could be maintained at subsistence 
level, which is not the case once overshoot and collapse 
happen. "The other effective barrier to equality —  the 
promise of growth —  could no longer be maintained.1,30
On the transition from growth to global equilibrium, 
the authors have little to say. "Neither the world model 
nor our own thoughts have been developed in sufficient 
detail to understand all the implications" of that change. 
But there is a "great need for more facts —  for numbers 
that are scientifically measurable but which have not yet 
been measured."31 "Every day of exponential growth," the 
authors conclude, "bring the world system closer to the 
ultimate limits of that growth. A decision to do nothing is 
a decision to increase the risk of collapse."32
criticism
Within about a year, the publication of The Limits to 
Growth was followed by the publication of Models of Doom; A
Critique of The Limits to Growth.33 The authors, who, like 
the authors of Limits. constitute themselves as a "project 
team," were members of the Science Policy Research Unit at 
the University of Sussex. Much is made of the computer 
model used by the MIT group; all the critics stress that you 
get out of a computer what you put into it. "The critique 
of a computer model is not just a question of looking at the 
structure, or conducting mathematical tests. Far more 
important is the examination of the underlying 
assumptions."34 A common objection is that the model 
doesn't model the real world becuase it deals only with 
physical limits and does not consider social limits and 
possibilities. Malthus is recalled, and his failure to 
anticipate technological progress is pointedly remembered.
A frequent criticism is that the authors of Limits are too 
"pessimistic.”35 The authors are compared to idealist 
reformers:
"Much of the moral idealism which in earlier times 
found expression in various movements of social 
reform appears now, particularly in the USA, to 
seek an outlet in the environmental movement. It 
is this environmentalist critique of 
industrialism, rather than the socialist critique 
of cupidity, which finds explicit representation 
in the MIT model. ',36
Further on, this author remarks:
"One is tempted to be persuaded by [their] 
predictions that Adam Smith's benevolent 'hidden 
hand' has been replaced by a malevolent 'hidden 
boot'. Today's dismal science is no longer 
economics but ecology. It is not surprising that
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the leading ecological Cassandras and the MIT 
system dynamics group quote each other with 
approval. "37
Another author says, "Surely one might have expected people
to be sceptical about such an apocalyptic thesis....," and
concludes that a "new pessimism" is at work. Also,
"Having abjured any particular political or 
ideological viewpoint, carefully dissociating 
themselves from politicians... it is quite clear 
how anxious [the authors] are to appear to be 
above politics... It is precisely because the 
world dynamics model says nothing about the means 
necessary to achieve the stable system ... that it 
appeals to the 'intellectual technologists' of the 
Club of Rome as well as to ordinary citizens."3®
As do other authors in the book, this one compare the MIT
team to Marxists:
"In common with other chiliasts, the new 
scientific chiliasts are Utopians at heart.
Like the great phrophet of world salvation through 
world breakdown, Karl Marx, their apocalyptic 
visions of the immediate future are tempered by 
the glittering image of utopia barely discernible 
through the fire and brimstone that rages in the 
historical foreground."39
Several authors complain that it doesn't take a computer to
reach the conclusion that limited resources will eventually
be used up.
In a response appended to Models of Doom, the Limits 
authors assert that their theory of growth has been made 
explicit, but that the Sussex authors' has not. "The 
training and professional expertise of the Sussex group is 
predominantly in economics and the physical sciences," they 
state.
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"Both of these fields have evolved modeling 
philosophy that is directed primarily toward 
precise, short-term prediction and is based on a 
reductionist view of the world... System dynamics 
models are general and holistic...[and are] 
designed for the exploration of the long-term 
dynamic properties of complex systems."™
"The Sussex criticisms apply micro reasoning to macro
problems," choosing selected evidence on local resources and
pollution, "while ignoring both the evidence for and the
causes of negative global trends."41 Furthermore, say the
MIT group, the Sussex authors don't really seem to
understand the basic dynamic properties of the world system,
which, as reviewed by the Limits authors are:
1. Exponential growth is an inherent property of the 
population and capital systems.
2. There are physical limits to population and capital 
growth.
3. There are long delays in the feedback processes that 
control the physical growth of the world system.
4. There are two possible social responses to the 
limits to growth: weaken growth forces or remove the 
symptoms of impending limits (build more highways, 
import more copper, build nuclear power plants, buy 
fertilizer).
5. The equilibrium state may be a desirable option, 
wherever the limits to growth may be.
Finally, the Limits authors say that they and the Sussex
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group have contrasting "concepts of man." While some would
call theirs "pessimistic," about mankind's technological
capacities, they simply call it "humble."42
In Bevond the Limits to Growth. Eduard Pestel, a
founding member of the Club of Rome, looks back on the
original book, criticizes some aspects of the model,
considers the problems of nationalism, North-South
differences, and the environment, and has both optimistic
and pessimistic things to say about the present. Pestel
says he has "been asked repeatedly when the Club of Rome
would again startle the world with a report like rLimits 1";
the Club would have liked to do so, he says. But
"there is a time for everything, and The Limits to
Growth came at the right time, when the first 
doubts were gnawing at the expectations for 
unceasing progress and prosperity, sooner or 
later, everywhere on earth. Once this time has 
passed, there will be no repeat performance for 
such an equally shocking message of monumental 
simplicity, be it by The Club of Rome or anyone 
else."43
Pestel is probably right. Donella Meadows, Dennis 
Meadows, and Jorgen Randers have written a sequel, titled 
Bevond the Limits, published in 1992. It has not been much 
noticed, although it is mentioned in a Business Week cover 
story on "Growth vs. Environment" which appeared about a 
month before the June 1992 meeting of the United Nations 
Conference on Economics and Development —  the "Rio 
conference." "In 1972," the article begins,
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"Donella and Dennis Meadows set off a furor with 
their book Limits to Growth. They argued that the 
earth's resources and its ability to absorb 
pollution and regenerate are finite. Using 
computer models, they also predicted that 
population and growth would bump up against these 
constraints within a century... The book sold 9 
million copies. But the subject was guickly 
eclipsed by more pressing concerns and derision of 
their Malthusian alarms. Now the Meadowses are 
back... [and] they argue that human activity 
already has overshot earth's ecological limits, 
and that unless corrective steps are taken soon, 
their original scenario is more certain."44
In Bevond the Limits, however, the authors temper the
flatness of their findings somewhat, and are careful to
emphasize that disaster is not foreordained. Some options
have closed since the 1972 report, but others have opened.
A sustainable society can still be built, they say, if the
changes begin now, in the 1990s.
* * *
The Limits to Growth is the culmination of the 
scientific presentation of environmental arguments that 
began, in a much different form, with Silent Spring, ten 
years earlier. It follows the scientific model of 
hypothesis and test, with evidence in the form of 
mathematical expressions. It is almost devoid of social 
comment or sociological observation; it conveys no emotion, 
and offers no political criticism.
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Its authors would fit well on a profile of "new class" 
techno-bureaucratic professionals derived from Gouldner's 
description of those who share the "culture of critical 
discourse," in which arguments are putatively self-grounded 
and do not rely on the status of the speaker for authority. 
Gouldner contends that although such self-grounding makes 
the discourse 'scientific' (letting the facts speak for 
themselves), critical discourse is also ideological, because 
it does what ideologies do: presents a map of 'what is' in 
society; a 'report' of how it is working or failing; and a 
report on how it could be changed that functions as a 
'command' or call to action.45
Donella Meadows, now a professor in Environmental 
Studies at Dartmouth, has a Ph.D. in biophysics, and is 
described as a systems analyst in the publicity for her 
recent book. Dennis Meadows has a Ph.D. in management, is a 
professor of Systems Management at the University of New 
Hampshire, and is the Director of the Institute for Policy 
and Social Science Research. J®rgen Randers has a graduate 
degree in solid state physics and a Ph.D. in management. He 
is chairman of the Norwegian Bank for Industry.46
Gouldner's new class is not exactly like Mannheim's 
socially unattached intelligentsia, but it shares the 
capacity to use its wordsmithing skills for either side of 
an argument; there is nothing in its social position, for
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instance, that inclines this 'class' of professionals toward 
one side or another of the environmental debate. (For 
comparison, consider industry executives or workers in 
extractive industries.) The Models of Doom group, who 
opposed the Limits argument, is similar in training and 
social position to the Limits group (despite the 
distinctions between them drawn by the Limits authors).
Limits has no particular argument about science; it is 
simply itself scientific in its presentation. Its analysis 
is not directed to the guestion of science and society; it 
is about limits, especially limits to capital and population 
growth in a finite world. The book's presentation is 
oriented toward systems and wholes; it is the first use of a 
computer model reaching a large public; it is global in 
outlook (appearing the same year as Only One Earth!; it 
gives a warning. The authors caution against technological 
fixes, but do not critique, only point out that technology 
just delays collapse, and sometimes complicates 
environmental issues.
Limits does not engage directly in the science-in- 
society argument, but it is a major book for the development 
of the environmental argument. It insists that resources 
are limited and damageable, and that we must think about 
them in a different way or suffer severe consequences. It 
links economy and environment in mathematical expressions
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and fact-laden but simple prose. It is as successful with 
its lack of emotion as Silent Spring is with its impassioned 
account of the destruction of balance in the natural world. 
Economic growth, not out-of-control science, is the problem, 
yet science/technology is not, as with many other analyses 
of growth problems, the taken for granted solution. Since 
so much of our scientific research is directed toward growth 
in productivity, however, the warning that we must change 
our productivity goals means that we must rethink the uses 
of science.
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CRITICIZING SCIENCE, SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT
This chapter presents general conclusions about the 
environmental argument made in the writings of the 60s and 
'Ttd which have been reviewed in previous chapters. The 
following chapter presents conclusions about the 
applications of Mannheim's method to the analysis of 
environmental thought.
Nature and Environment
It was scientists who made nature into the environment. 
Nature, the presence that had its own being, became the 
environment, the problem-place of human activity. The 
environmental style of thought gives nature another meaning, 
defines it differently from those who argue for the 
preservation and protection of nature from an empathetical 
standpoint.1 From 1962, when Silent Spring was published, 
to 1972 when The Limits to Growth was published, there was a 
tremendous increase in the range of what was covered by
discussion of environmental problems. When Carson's book 
came out, only experts in agricultural chemistry and some 
professional naturalists were discussing the problems of 
environmental degradation and threat to wildlife (and human 
life) stemming from the use of pesticides. The warning that 
Carson gave was startling —  because it was put in language 
that ordinary, non-expert readers could understand, and 
because for non-experts the information was new and the 
warning was sudden. Ten years later, the problems of 
pesticides and fertilizers were a commonplace topic in 
newspapers, magazines and books, along with myriad other 
topics relating plants, animals, insects, whales, people, 
air, soil, water, the atmosphere, forests, endangered 
species, industrial growth, agricultural practices, economic 
policy, energy production and use, all to one another. When 
Carson insisted that a whole network of effects followed on 
the spraying of pesticides, she was criticized for 
exaggeration. Ten years later, the range and intricacy of 
environmental problems in public view had expanded worlds 
beyond what Carson spoke of.
"Nature" has an ontological status; "the environment" 
does not. Nature is a subject, with its own quality of 
being; the environment is an object of study. With nature 
there is an empathetical relationship; with the environment 
there is an analytical relationship. One stands outside the
420
environment to study it as a scientific object, though 
recognizing —  analytically —  human inclusion. But we are 
part of nature —  we are inside of it and it is inside of 
us. It has long been recognized that human beings have a 
dual nature —  we stand both inside of nature and outside of 
it. We need, for our survival, both to be able to attune 
with nature, and to go beyond being entirely subject to it. 
We need both an analytical and an empathetical relationship.
The nature/environment distinction appears in the 
environmental movement as two different types of writing, 
two different types of argument, one oriented toward nature 
as spiritual sustenance, the other oriented toward the 
environment as a multiplicitous object requiring scientific 
understanding. Nature is spiritually sustaining because it 
is humanity's ancient home, even though a dangerous one, and 
to lose an empathetical relationship to it is to lose 
something that is part of our being. It is this concern, 
this sense of existing loss and greater impending loss, that 
motivates the nature-oriented part of the environmental 
movement. The science-oriented part of the movement, the 
writings that seldom mention nature, but examine the 
environment in detail, presents itself as more information- 
driven, more alerted to danger by the facts than by 
empathetical unease. What the motivations of individual 
writers are can hardly be determined, and must certainly be
421
a mix of fact and feeling, but in the arguments that are to 
be found in the environmental movement, there are two 
distinct types —  nature-oriented and science-oriented.
For scientists, nature is an object of scientific study 
—  it is the environment; for nature-oriented 
environmentalists, nature is a subject or a totality that 
has aspects of being if not absolute beingness.
In the United States, in the 1960s and 70s, an argument 
about the environment developed that reconceptualized the 
relationship between man and nature as the relationship 
between scientific society and the environment. It was 
scientists who brought what had been "Nature" to the 
attention of the public as the problem of "the environment." 
It was not that nature-oriented writers weren't writing, or 
that nature-oriented organizations weren't active. But it 
was scientific argument that captured public attention. It 
was when scientists sounded the warning that people 
listened. Science has become the signal of importance, the 
flag that alerts us to pay heed.
The Environmental Stvle of Thought
Environmentalism is a diverse movement in which there are 
many different arguments about environmental crisis and
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ecological balance. I have chosen to call one of these 
arguments the "environmental style of thought" because it is 
the one that dominates the current environmental debate.
This argument is as much about science as it is about the 
environment, and it is part of a developing science-in- 
society debate.
The environmental style of thought has particular 
characteristics. It is:
- holistic




- future oriented or aware.
The argument began taking shape in the 1960s and developed 
quickly in the 70s. Since then, even the nature-oriented 
groups have had to adopt the "science says so" stance of 
this argument. The nature arguers, though, place less 
emphasis on the critique of science, leaving this to 
scientists and Greens. Greens have tried to combine both a 
concept of nature and a critique of science, but their 
political efforts to further this vision, so prominent in 
Europe, have had limited effect in the United States, where 
third parties have no established place in the political 
structure. In the 60s, when the civil rights movement,
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countercultural revolt, and the Vietnam war disrupted 
politics as usual, enivronmental arguments were tied in to 
nuclear protest, which had a political intensity that 
environmentalism, for all its popularity, has not arrived at 
in this country. The dominance of the scientific form of 
environmental argument, with its claim to objective 
neutrality, may keep such intensity at bay until a Bhopal- 
scale accident afflicts the United States.2
In the 1990's the environmental argument remains highly 
science dependent; its critique of science sometimes seems 
blurred. Perhaps, then, the environmental style of thought 
is simply science-dependent, not science-critical. That is 
a simpler case to make; in fact, it hardly requires making a 
case at all. Warnings about the environment depend on 
scientific information —  the very construction of nature as 
"the environment" already shows the presence of science.
But the environmental argument, at the same time that it 
exemplifies the necessity of providing scientific evidence 
for a recommended course of action, is also the major 
example known to the public of the criticism of science.
Science Skepticism
The issue of environmental crisis polarizes attitudes
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of trust in and skepticism toward science. There are groups 
and individuals who reject all scientific intervention and 
who adopt a back-to-nature philosophy and lifestyle; there 
are scientists, businessmen and women, and technical 
professionals who are occupationally committed to trust in 
science.
Both trust and skepticism are expressed along three 
lines —
- the uses of science
- the direction of science as practiced and 
institutionalized
- the theoretical orientation of science.
While environmentalists display skepticism along any or all 
of these lines, it is a mistake to make a simple eguation 
between environmentalists and science skeptics. In any 
specific person or intellectual position there will be a mix 
of trust and skepticism. Scientists themselves may be 
skeptical or trusting and are usually both. The dichotomy 
of science-truster and science-skeptic cannot be understood 
simply as antagonistic actors located in specific 
occupational and social positions. Rather, the polarity 
stands for a division in thought. It is experienced by 
ordinary citizens wondering if their food is safe from 
pesticide residue, or indeed if anyone knows what is safe, 
while at the same time trusting that the body of chemical
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and biological knowledge which invents pesticides can also 
provide medical remedies for physical ills. The same people 
who distrust the scientists who proclaim the safety of 
nuclear energy may be convinced that if science is only 
turned in the right direction, better solutions for 
providing energy can be found.
The science trust/science skepticism polarity is not 
yet fully developed in public debate, but it underlies 
argument that has been going on for some time. The first 
doubt about science —  science that can be trusted to bring 
progress —  came with the atomic bomb, and further doubts 
about science as the source of truth have come with the 
environmental crisis.
Compounding our vacillation between trust in science 
and skepticism about it is the existence of two separate and 
non-congruent frameworks of thought for understanding what 
authority to use to legitimate social action. The 
conceptual framework for science does not include a place 
for politics, since fact and value must be kept separate; 
the one for politics does not include a place for science, 
since its philosophical foundations predate the 
institutional rise of science and the permeation of 
technology into every aspect of life. The inadequacy of 
either conceptual framework used alone, and the concern over 
how far to trust science, can be followed through the
environmental arguments of the 1960s and 70s.
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The Written Arguments
1962 Silent Spring : 
the argument from science
Silent Spring was the book that catalyzed the environmental 
debate by making a scientific argument that went beyond the 
plea for nature. It gave scientific documentation of 
environmental damage. It was a banner argument that 
environmentalists could display as the emblem of their 
cause. Like all the major subsequent works, it sounded a 
strong warning. The book was a media and political event 
that had enormous impact on public consciousness. Its 
science-based, technical content gave new legitimacy to the 
cause of protecting nature and safeguarding human health 
from new, synthetic products developed in scientific 
laboratories.
Carson criticizes science for its irresponsibility in 
failing to study the effects of its inventions, for its 
complicity with the profit-driven chemical industry, for its 
arrogance in asserting that we can control nature. In its 
application in the use of pesticides, goals are unexamined, 
the pace is heedless, the use is indiscriminate and without 
forethought. At the same time that Carson critiques
427
science, she is committed to science as a way of reaching 
the truth. She is skeptical of the way science is being 
carried out, but trusting of the value of scientific 
inquiry.
Carson's recommendations for citizen participation in 
deciding goals for the use of chemical pesticides fits into 
the political framework in which citizen and state are 
linked by rights and responsibilities. Yet such goals must 
include the natural world as a determining force in human 
behavior; the natural world becomes as important a reference 
point as human nature is in political thought. We are left 
with the problem that rights and obligations between science 
and its users are not determined by the natural world in the 
way that rights and obligations between citizen and state 
are presumed to be determined by human nature. There is a 
gap between science and its uses that is not bridged 
philosophically or practically. The dimensions of that gap 
only begin to be visible in Silent Spring.
1966 Science and Survival; 
science questioned
Science and Survival criticizes science for being out of 
control. Commoner argues that we have created technologies 
whose possible modes of behavior exceed our capability to 
predict that behavior, and that there is a biological 
aftermath of this failure. Part of the responsibility for
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damage to life can be traced to a crisis in biology, a 
theoretical conflict between molecular and classical, cell 
biology that has hampered research into and vision of the 
system-wide results of piecemeal interventions into the 
natural world. We have come to fear scientists who seem to 
be sorcerer's apprentices.
Besides this problem at the theoretical level, there is 
one at the level of institution and practice. The process 
of scientific discovery and free discussion is hindered by 
nationalism and by military demands. Patterns of research 
support limit scientists' choice of problems, and 
technological application outstrips scientific knowledge of 
outcomes.
Despite this extreme skepticism of science, Commoner 
trusts science as a method of inquiry, as truth-seeking at 
its base, and wishes to defend its integrity. He maintains 
the traditional separation of fact and value which keeps 
science per se outside of the political framework even while 
individual scientists fulfill their responsibility as 
citizens to provide information to the public. Scientists 
should not decide specific social goals, and should not use 
politics to reach scientific goals. When scientists engage 
in politics, Commoner says, citizens begin to doubt the 
connection of science with truth. Commoner tries to make a 
triad of citizen, science, and government, but must
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acknowledge that scientists are divided over their role in 
relation to government. Again, there is a conflict between 
two conceptual frameworks, one for politics and interests, 
one for science and objectivity.
1968 The Population Bomb: 
the logic of numbers
The Population Bomb offers the vision of a frightening 
future brought on by biological imbalance between population 
and environment. Ehrlich brought population into the 
environmental debate; he added to its "science says" 
content. Unlike Commoner, Ehrlich does not hesitate to mix 
science with social policy, to recommend specific social 
actions on the basis of his scientific judgment. The book 
does not critique science or analyze how science is carried 
out in society. On the whole, Ehrlich is a science-truster, 
trusting not only in science as objective inquiry, but in 
the application of science to social problems. His 
preference for direct government action fits into the 
political framework. He perceives no contradiction between 
scientific objectivity and political action because there is 
no dispute to resolve —  Ehrlich is convinced that the 
source of the environmental problem has been located and 
that the solution, population control, is clear. The 
difference between the conceptual frameworks becomes 
important only when one recognizes differences in scientific
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evaluations of the problem, and a need to resolve those 
differences in the political sphere.
1968 "The Tragedy of the Commons":
Hobbesian argument
"The Tragedy of the Commons" is too brief an essay to be 
used to characterize Hardin's position as science trust or 
science skepticism, although his reliance on quantification 
of social interaction and the use of mathematical 
calculation to explain social dynamics is scientific in 
tone. He states that there is no technological solution to 
the problem of overpopulation, but this is not because he 
doubts the value of technologies, but because technique is 
up against finite limits. This essay presents a concept of 
human nature as a scientific evaluation rather than as a 
philosophical judgment. Hardin calls for political 
solutions —  curtailing the freedom to breed —  and like 
Ehrlich presents his scientific judgment as if there were no 
contending scientific explanations and no conflict to 
resolve in a political sphere that has no established method 
for resolving scientific disputes. In not criticizing 
science or expressing doubts about it, Hardin is in a 
minority among environmentally concerned voices.
1971 Post-Scarcitv Anarchism: 
anarchist argument
Bookchin, in Post-Scarcitv Anarchism, doesn't accept the 
conventional political framework. Arguing that politics and 
economics structured around scarcity are outdated, he sees 
the ecological crisis as an example, one of "apocalyptic 
proportions," of the tension between the actual present and 
the potential future. In his judgment, there is no solution 
to the crisis within the bourgeois-capitalist framework —  
the framework that gives formal authority to government and 
pragmatic power to an exploitative economic system. The 
dichotomy science truster/science skeptic applies to those 
choosing between the conventional political framework and 
the conventional view of science; Bookchin's thought falls 
outside of these conventions. However, his thought is 
congenial to those who distrust science as a servant of 
industry or as hostage to politics.
1967 "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis": 
historical/ worldview argument
White's "Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis" finds 
these roots in the Christian view that nature was made to 
serve man. Both science and technology, says White, begin 
their development in the Middle Ages, in a context of the 
Judaeo-Christian faith in perpetual progress. Particularly 
in Western Christian thought, man is both part of nature and
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transcends nature; he can exploit nature. To avert worse 
ecological disaster than we have already brought upon 
ourselves, White concludes, we must change our values.
White is referring to a view of human nature in his 
argument, a view that is not entirely absent from the 
Enlightenment conception of human nature that influences our 
traditional political framework. In White's analysis, 
science is put to use according to our worldview. It is not 
so much that science is to be doubted as it is to be seen as 
a historical creature. It may discover timeless laws but it 
is not free of the influence of its time. This analysis 
denies the total separation of science from values which is 
part of the conventional scientific view, and contributes to 
a revised evaluation of science.
1971 The Closing Circle; 
technology questioned
In The Closing Circle. Commoner argues that the cause of our 
environmental problems is the type of productive technology 
that we have. In synthesizing new products, we have 
converted natural cycles into man-made linear events. 
Reductionism, the "dominant viewpoint of modern science as a 
whole," is unequipped to deal with natural complexity. The 
environmental crisis is both ecological and social, and 
science is poorly prepared for finding causes of the crisis 
in either sphere. The crisis is extreme, and Commoner
states that his judgment as a biologist is that if we 
continue on our current course, civilized human society will 
not be possible. Ecology, he says, must now subsume economy 
and politics.
In this conclusion, Commoner takes the science 
framework as the chief guide to deciding on social action. 
This does not mean that he would put science in the role of 
making social decisions, for he maintains the necessity of 
the separation between fact and value, and asserts that 
science is not a guide to moral judgments. But science is 
our check on reality, our point of reference for what will 
or will not occur given certain conditions. He remains 
critical of the uses, direction and theoretical orientation 
of science as it is now, while continuing to posit science 
(as ecology) as the source of solutions to our problems. 
Commoner aims for a less reductionist science and for joint 
scientist/citizen participation in deciding on the uses of 
science. He tries to connect the two conceptual frameworks, 
one for science, one for politics.
1972 Only One Earth; 
global perspective
More than any other book before it, Only One Earth brings 
the third world into the environmental equation, reviewing 
how its population, economy, and agriculture are linked to 
the industrialized nations. Barbara Ward and Rend Dubos have
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a technoprogressive theme rather than an out-of-control 
critique of science and technology like Carson and Commoner, 
or a behavioral emphasis like Ehrlich and Hardin. They 
recognize that the acceleration of technological progress 
now threatens life on the planet, but they explain this 
acceleration as the result of consumption pressure. The 
technological order, in their analysis, is rooted in the 
individualistic desire for goods.
They give little attention to structural connections 
between government and institutionalized science, even 
though they construct a triad of science/market/nation to 
explain the global nature of the environmental crisis. They 
find that the triad has to be rethought, but suggest 
individual solutions for each element of it, not 
rearrangement of their connections. Science should become 
more integrative, the market should factor environmental 
costs into its cost-benefit analyses, nations should 
recognize the imperative of a socially and morally 
responsive world order.
Ward and Dubos criticize science but hold it as the 
route to truth. Like Commoner, they maintain the separation 
between fact and value, but unlike him they don't try to 
connect the frameworks for science and politics. Citizens, 
they say, cannot judge scientific facts (although it is 
implied that they can evaluate risks revealed by those
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facts). They recognize the political complexities of global 
environmental crisis, but rely on the truth-giving power of 
science to indicate essential goals. They use both 
frameworks for their thought, but keep them separate.
They are very much science trusters, who envision that 
moral sense combined with scientific dispassion will 
overcome the materialist desires that are at the root of 
environmental excesses. Yet at the same time they harbor a 
deep doubt about the scientific enterprise, a fear of hubris 
that is discussed below.
1972 The Limits to Growth: 
finite world argument
The Limits to Growth presents economy and environment 
according to a mathematical model of growth trends in 
natural resource use, population, agricultural production, 
industrial production, and pollution. The authors make 
long-range predictions facilitated by computer calculations. 
This method, and the use of systems theory, made it possible 
to include complex interrelationships that had previously 
eluded systematic summary. Limits was as startling as 
Silent Spring and, like that book, became an exemplar for 
subsequent reports. Meadows et al concluded that if current 
growth trends continued, the natural limits to growth would 
be reached within 100 years. They explained exponential 
growth and introduced the notion of overshoot and collapse,
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with the resultant extreme difficulty or even impossibility 
of recovery under greatly reduced circumstances: smaller 
population, less production, less material well being.
Thus, they said, man-determined limits must replace natural 
ones in order to divert disaster.
Limits itself follows the scientific model of 
hypothesis and test with evidence in the form of 
mathematical expression; it is almost devoid of social 
comment. In its scientificity it is the culmination of the 
science-documented environmental arguments that began with 
Silent Spring ten years earlier. It is so neutral in tone 
that it offers no basis for classification as either 
science-skeptical or science-trusting. That style of 
neutrality is itself scientific, but it is not evidence of a 
position on science. For Meadows et al, as for all the 
authors, science is the route to truth about the natural 
world. Its argument is almost entirely within the 
scientific framework.
All the major environmental books of the 60s and 70s are 
warnings. Most are skeptical of some aspect of science in 
society —  its uses, its direction, or its theoretical 
orientation, but all accept the epistemological authority of 
science.
As the decade from 1962 to 1972 progresses, the
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argument about the environment expands from the relatively 
narrow issue of pesticide use to warnings about diverse 
technologies, multiple pollutions and health threats, 
environmental overload through population pressure, and 
finally to the planet-wide dangers of interventions into the 
environment.
With each warning about our current course and future 
danger, the complexities of matching an ideal scientific 
disinterest with the interests inherent in political and 
economic,action become increasingly apparent. The 
environmental argument tacks back and forth between reliance 
on science and criticism of how it is carried out in 
society, between trust in its power to get at the truth, and 
skepticism about the goals it actually serves. Inside the 
cool logic of science is perceived the heated impatience of 
the sorcerer's apprentice.3
The power that science gives us can now change nature 
itself; the first unequivocal recognition of this came with 
the splitting of the atom. Ward and Dubos compare this 
power to split the atom to Promethean fire. Prometheus (a 
Titan, son of Ge, the Earth and Uranus, the Sky) stole fire 
from Zeus (king of the gods) and gave it to men. The angry 
Zeus chained Prometheus to a rock where he endured what was 
meant to be endless torment until he was rescued by the hero 
Heracles. Zeus further retaliated with manipulations that
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caused Pandora to open the box that released all the ills 
that plague mankind; only hope remained in the box.
Promethean fire stands as a symbol of all the bold 
interventions into nature made possible by science ambitious 
for mankind. At a level deeper than reasoned argument, 
there exists a profound unease about the power and outcomes 
of science, along with a sense of the impossibility of ever 
again living without it.
At a more mundane level, the natural world that for a 
time seemed only a backdrop to our political activities is 
now felt as an uncertain terrain on which all our activities 
are played out. Its land may become desert, its waters 
poisoned, its atmosphere fail to protect us, but we can no 
longer blame capricious gods or unknown forces. The natural 
world has become the constant reminder that we must live up 
to our scientific knowledge.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIFTEEN
1. On the change in meanings given to nature that has 
accompanied the scientific and industrial revolutions, see 
Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women. Ecology and 
the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1980). Merchant chronicles the shift from an empathetical 
relation with nature to an instrumental relationship.
2. Bhopal, a city in central India, is the site of an 
industrial accident in 1984 which killed approximately 4,000 
people. Poison gas (methyl isocyanate, more toxic than 
cyanide) was released in an explosion at a Union-Carbide 
chemicals plant that produced pesticides; the escaping gas 
covered the slums and residential areas of the city.
Besides those who died as a result of exposure to the gas 
(about 1,500 within three days, the rest in the years up to 
1992), another 20,000-40,000 suffered injuries. (Sources: 
"Indian Court Seizes Union Carbide Dividend," (Reuters), The 
New York Times. 5/23/92, p.37; Sanjoy Hazarika, "Court in 
India to Seize Union Carbide Assets," The New York Times. 
5/1/92, p.D7.; Barnaby J. Feder, "Carbide to Sell India 
Assets to Build Hospital for Bhopal, The New York Times. 
p.Dl.; "Extradition Bid on Bhopal," The New York Times. 
3/28/92, p.40.; Edward A. Gargan, "Settlement on Bhopal is 
Accepted," The New York Times. 10/4/91, p.D4.)
3. The complexities of the relationship between the 
environmental movement and the scientific ecology which is 
emerging at the same time are explored by Wolfgang Sachs in 
"Environment and Development: The Story of a Dangerous 
Liaison," The Ecologist. 21 (6), November/December 1991. 
pp.252-57. Sachs notes that for those committed to 
development, "attributing absolute value to nature for its 
own sake... would have barred the way... to the exploitation 
of nature." (p.252) Both environmentalists and the 
"development elite" draw on scientific ecology, the 
environmentalists using it to make a case for holistic 
approaches, the development supporters using it to make 
claims for techno-control of the environment. Of 
environmentalism, he observes:
"As a movement highly suspicious of science and 
technical rationality, it plays anew the counter-melody 
which has accompanied the history of modernity ever 
since romanticism. But as a science-based movement, it
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is capable of questioning the foundations of modernity 
and contesting its logic in the very name of science." 
(p.254)
Sachs sees the environmental movement as basing its 
challenge on ecosystems theory, which gives it scientific 
credibility, but also "opens the way for the technocratic 
recuperation of the protest." (p.255) "Ecosystem 
technology," he concludes, "turns finally against ecology as 
a worldview." (p.256)





ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT AND CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT COMPARED
This chapter evaluates the use of Mannheim's style of 
thought analysis as applied in this study.
Mannheim's Method
Using Mannheim's terms, I have defined an environmental 
style of thought focused on science. I took Mannheim's 
"Conservative Thought" as a model to follow in analyzing 
environmental thought because that essay led me to see that 
the environmental debate does not fit easily into our 
conventional political framework. In following Mannheim, I 
found both similarities and differences between his case —  
conservative thought —  and mine —  environmental thought.
To review, Mannheim's method relies, he says, on the 
analysis of meanings: it does not judge the veracity, 
validity or accuracy of arguments. Whether or not Carson 
was accurate in her argument does not determine its
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influence on a developing style of thought or its success in 
capturing the experience of some group of people. The same 
holds true for Commoner, Ehrlich, and all the others. 
Furthermore, changed meanings are given to familiar terms; 
"science", "technology", and "scientific advances" are 
reconsidered in the environmental argument, and viewed from 
a skeptical angle which diminishes the positive value that 
postwar society has given these terms. Nature is 
reconceptualized as environment.
Mannheim identifies elements of the conservative style 
of thought by referring to the events, people, or ideas that 
contributed to the development of conservatism. I have 
abstracted out these elements, and take them to be general 
to any style of thought (as previously discussed in Chapter 
Six). These are in brief form below, with Mannheim's 
conclusions for conservative thought, and mine for 
environmental thought, compared. The key theoretical or 
epistemological problem, and the characteristics of "basic 
intention" are the major elements of Mannheim's aralysis.1
A polarizing event gives impetus to the style of thought: 
the French Revolution for conservatism, the atomic bomb for 
env i ronmenta1 thought.
An organizing center can be identified —  the center of 
contention around which groups develop their already
existing differences: politics for conservatism, the uses of 
science for environmentalism.
A polarity characterizes opposing styles of thought: 
conservative/liberal, science truster/science skeptic.
An effective group mounts an oppositional response to a 
prevailing mode of legitimating social action: the nobility 
for conservatism, relatively independent scientists for 
environmentalism.
A "basic intention” is articulated by the style of thought, 
a previously unarticulated purpose which comes out of the 
group's experience: harking back to an earlier way of life 
for conservatives, preserving and protecting the natural 
world and human health and life for environmentalists.
A "kev problem.” an epistemological issue, unifies the 
thought and shows how the group thinks things differently: 
opposition to natural-law thought for conservatives, 
opposition to reductionist thought for environmentalists.
"Basic intention" and "key problem" are Mannheim's 
central categories in his analysis of style of thought; each 
category contained characteristics specific to the thought 
style. The characteristics, or "authentic manifestations" 
of the basic intention of conservative thought were its 
preference for details rather than for overall structure, 
for concrete situations rather than abstract ones, for a
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qualitative (qualified) concept of liberty rather than a 
universalistic one. For environmental thought these 
characteristics are an emphasis on system complexity and 
interrelatedness, the frequent use of facts and 
quantification, the giving of a warning or stressing the use 
of prediction as necessary responsible action, and a moral 
imperative to speak out. "Authentic manifestations" are 
related to life experience —  in the case of the scientist 
environmental writers, to what we call occupational 
experience.2
The characteristics related to the key problem of 
conservative thought —  the opposition to Enlightenment 
thought —  were the substitution of History for Reason as 
the crucial force in human affairs, of the individual for 
the universal, of the irrational for the rational, of the 
dynamic for the static. For environmental thought, the key 
problem is the opposition to reductionism, and its 
theoretical characteristics are that wholes replace parts as 
elements of analysis, interrelatedness counters isolated 
elements, multiple or cyclical causes replace single or 
linear causes, time awareness replaces atemporality.
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On Basic Intention and Authentic Manifestations
Basic intention (Grundintention) and its "authentic 
manifestations" in the style of thought are related to a 
group's life experience in Mannheim's theory. I think of 
basic intention as the desire for a particular kind of world 
which underlies the argument or style of thought. For 
Kettler, Meja and Stehr it is the basic design of the 
argument. The difference between these two interpretations 
seems to me to be a matter of emphasis on either the 
motivation for or the intellectualization of the group's 
purpose. Mannheim can be read to include both meanings. 
Either way, the point is that social situation and style of 
thought are connected. The connection is not a strictly 
deterministic one; ideas reflect their place of origin, but 
class origin does not determine a predictable content 
independent of other circumstances.
As noted at the end of Chapter Five, while Mannheim 
makes a convincing connection between the life experience of 
the nobility and the conservative argument, he does not 
"prove" that the connection must occur or could not be 
otherwise. This is an inevitable outcome of an interpretive 
method.3 Like Weber, he finds that historical conditions 
make certain ideas relevant or not. Furthermore, the same 
ideas can be taken up by different groups, as when Marxist
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thinkers applied the concept of dynamic reason previously 
formulated by conservatives. A documentary analysis reveals 
the basic intention in the argument; a historical survey 
shows the conditions that make this intention of some 
moment. Documentary analysis was introduced by Mannheim as 
a method of describing worldview.4 We document (give 
evidence of) our understanding of a worldview with example 
"objects"; we illuminate the meaning of each object by 
seeing it as a "document" of the wider frame of reference of 
the worldview.5
Mannheim's analysis of the concepts of conservative 
thought is altogether deeper and more complex than mine of 
environmental thought. He had exceptional insight into the 
intellectual currents of social and political life, and in 
addition, he considers authors who were consciously 
ideological, who opposed specific conservative concepts to 
specific Enlightenment concepts. Of the authors I consider, 
only Bookchin is attuned to concepts in this way in his 
writing; the others are writing at a much more direct, 
empirical level. I am attempting to apply Mannheim's method 
beyond the consciously ideological type of argument that was 
his example.
Mannheim did not consider all aspects of the experience 
of the nobility in explaining the basic intention of 
conservative thought. He left out the militarism of
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Prussian life, and its crudity. Similarly, I have not 
considered all the aspects of the experience of being a 
scientist —  I have left out, for instance, what it is like 
to work in large, hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations. 
Mannheim offers no explicit criteria for selecting some 
experience over others. He may have done as I have, 
selected what fits by working back from the argument to the 
experience, and left out both some experience that fit and 
some experience that didn't.6 While some critics find this 
direction of analysis theoretically objectionable, it is in 
keeping with Mannheim's theory, in which the linking of 
ideas to experience is not a deterministic one. The link is 
historically specific —  without the French Revolution and 
Enlightenment thought, Prussian nobles would have had 
different arguments to make, different elements of their 
experience to emphasize. Content of a style of thought, as 
Mannheim points out, cannot be decided a priori from social 
circumstances. Again the example is that both the wealthy 
and later the working class made dynamic reason a conceptual 
element of their styles of thought.
The basic intention of the environmental argument is to 
achieve a world where there is a balance between humans and 
nature. Specifically, as argued by scientists, it is to 
preserve and protect both nature and humans through the 
knowledge of science —  a science that must be carefully
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watched so that its results are not misapplied. 
Environmentalists, like Mannheim's conservatives, want a 
world in which they feel at home. For the nature-oriented 
environmentalists, this is not just having nature preserves 
and better pesticide laws —  those would only be patchwork 
solutions. In the desired world there will be a whole 
different attitude toward nature. In the desired world of 
the scientist environmentalists, there will be a different 
attitude toward the uses of science and the philosophy that 
directs it.
The characteristics, or manifestations of the basic 
intention of environmental thought, to balance humans and 






- moral responsibility to provide information.
All of the scientist-authored works analyzed display 
these characteristics. Those of Bookchin, a social thinker, 
and White, a historian, do not emphasize system 
interrelatedness, quantification, or prediction. The 
systems-analyst authors of The Limits to Growth share in the 
scientific model of argument, but convey less sense of moral
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alarm than the sclentist-authors.
I have indicated that the scientific training and 
practice of the scientific authors is reflected in their 
environmental arguments, and I have thus related this 
experience to the "basic intention" of the argument. But 
Mannheim does not relate basic intention to the people who 
make the argument; he relates it to the class they argue 
for. Mannheim found a basic intention in the Prussian 
nobility, who had a predisposition to traditionalist views. 
Moser and Muller and others formulated the nobility's 
arguments but did not share their experience (although they 
may have wished to). Scientists, by comparison, act like a 
"new class" —  technical intellectuals who begin to 
formulate their own aims and speak for themselves.
Tc say that the characteristics of an argument for an 
ecological world, when that argument is made by scientists, 
share elements with arguments that scientists are trained to 
make is not surprising, but neither is it a given.
Scientists may argue in a humanistic mode, not a science- 
based one, as Rend Dubos did in his many books, or as C.P. 
Snow did in his essays. A scientific argument needs a 
scientific opportunity. The environmental crisis was the 
opportunity for this type of argument to reach a wide 
public.
Why did these scientific arguments of the 60s and 70s
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become best-selling books? It does not seem likely that it 
is their literary style that made them popular; all are well 
written but none is a "good read." And only the most 
environmentally committed of readers will attend to all 
their content. What made them sell? The simple explanation 
is that they had news, it was bad news, and bad news sells. 
Furthermore, they had unarguable bad news —  because it was 
scientific. (That, at any rate, is how the reports are 
presented; arguments of course followed.) While government 
and industry were pushing scientific good news, 
environmental authors told a different story. But there is 
more to the reception of the environmental argument than an 
interest in disaster. The response includes the very 
element that the scientists do not articulate —  a feeling 
for nature and a desire to keep nature whole. Though 
scientific arguments for the environment do not usually 
display this empathetical impulse, the holistic worldview 
that they express makes them resonant with the concern for 
the wholeness of nature.
The Effective Group
Mannheim does not go into detail about what I call the 
"effective group," the group that stands behind the style of
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thought. In Mannheim's example, the effectiveness of the 
group exists potentially, because of its social position; 
the group does not necessarily achieve its program. The 
effectiveness of scientists, I think, exists potentially 
because of their position in the social structure of 
knowledge; they have a voice of authority, not on a 
political or class basis, but on epistemological grounds. 
They too, do not necessarily achieve their goals. The 
danger of pesticides is acknowledged after Carson's book, 
but the use of many pesticides increases; the ecological 
crisis is recognized but production technology does not 
change and exploitation of nature continues; 19th-century 
German conservatives do not keep reforms from going ahead.
It is not yet clear who the effective group is (or will be) 
in the environmental movement overall, but the effective 
group for making the environmental argument has been 
scientists —  life scientists holding relatively independent 
research positions.
Mannheim's conservatives were not only effective in 
getting their argument into public discussion, they were 
those primarily affected by what they opposed. The same is 
not exactly true of the scientists who oppose environmental 
destruction. In fact, part of the environmental argument is 
that we are all equally affected, in the end, by what 
happens in the environment. The social reality is that some
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are more affected than others —  those too poor to be able 
to change how their environment is treated and too 
uneducated to recognize dangers to themselves. Yet, if 
scientists can be said to be making an argument for a larger 
class affected by the environmental crisis, then like Moser 
and Muller they are an educated class (an intellectual elite 
though not a social one) articulating the case for those who 
cannot fashion the argument themselves.
In what way can scientists be considered greatly 
affected by the environmental crisis? One possible answer 
is that their specialized knowledge of its extent and 
effects puts them in the front line of awareness, if not 
necessarily of vulnerability, to its dangers. Another way 
to answer the question is to see if the environmental crisis 
was an opportunity to respond to something else that was 
greatly affecting them. In the case of biologists, this 
could have been the change in biology that shifted research 
from the cell as a unit of analysis to the molecular 
structure of its chemical components. This change has been 
seen by those involved, and others, as a contest between 
holism and reductionism as methodological imperatives.7 
Just as the Prussian nobility was in danger of losing the 
rights and status of hereditary lordship, the non-molecular 
biologists were in danger of losing the tradition in which 
they had been trained and a future direction for research
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which would recognize their holistic goals. In the holistic 
tradition, behavior constitutes structure; in the 
reductionist approach, structure determines behavior. These 
are two very different ways of looking at the world.
Class
In Mannheim's theory, groups with opposing styles of 
thought should have opposing social positions. But this 
does not seem to be true for (holist) environmental 
scientists and (reductionist) non-environmental scientists, 
for they are similarly situated in a professional class.
The groups are opposed on theoretical grounds within the 
world of science, but not socially opposed within the wider 
society. (A social opposition may be true of 
environmentalists and non-environmentalists generally, as 
studies by Dunlap, Van Liere, Cotgrove, and Milbrath 
indicate.)8 It is also now the case that conservatives and 
liberals may be of the same class, although that was not the 
case at the time of the formation of the opposed arguments. 
Styles of thought express already-existing differences among 
social groups, said Mannheim, and he construed these 
differences as class differences, but this dynamic may be 
particular to an era of class formation.
One of the most noticeable differences between 
Mannheim's example of conservative thought and mine of 
environmental thought is that the 20th-century United States 
does not have a class structure remotely comparable to 19th- 
century Prussia. The United States did not ever have the 
equivalent of the 19th-century European class system with 
its clearly marked divisions and clearly divided interests. 
Our classes are more amorphous, more numerous, more 
overlapping, more mobile, less identified with, less 
antagonistic to one another. Class differences would always 
be significant differences in the European society which 
Mannheim knew, and major differences on what society should 
be like would always be class differences. In our very 
diverse society, differences can have many more locations 
than are offered by a simple model of class structure.
There were already-existing differences between holistic and 
reductionist scientists when the environmental argument 
began, but they were not class differences. They were not 
even differences among class fractions. They were 
differences of theoretical and methodological approach 
within a skilled class.
One of Mannheim's propositions about distinctions 
between classes, however, suggests distinctions that are 
possible within them. Mannheim found that in class society 
there would be one class oriented toward the past, one
toward the present, and one toward the future.
Conservatives favored the past, the bourgeoisie the present 
(especially what was new in it), and the proletariat the 
future. These orientations were responses to actual or 
projected social change: conservatives wanted to hold on to 
their established position; the bourgeoisie, newly arrived, 
wanted to keep the new order going; the proletariat, with 
little in the present or past in their favor, wanted real 
change leading to a different future.9 Within the 
professional class of scientists now, there seem to be 
different orientations toward time, not as responses to 
social change, but as responses congruent with theoretical 
orientation. Ecology recognizes the future as part of the 
cyclical process of life; molecular biology concerns itself 
with the timeless factuality of molecular structure. This 
orientation to time is not a close parallel to the type 
Mannheim described, but the use of a time axis as a way of 
seeing distinctions in the thought of different groups is 
still revealing.
Difference and Parallels
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was directed toward 
showing the social origins of social and political
arguments, toward unmasking interests. This type of 
unmasking was done by Marx in his analysis of capital and 
capitalists. Mannheim was routinizing it and neutralizing 
the approach about three-guarters of a century later.
Today, about three-quarters of a century since Mannheim's 
early work, there is nothing remarkable about showing a 
connection between interests and arguments. People expect 
and recognize ideological bias, at least when it is not 
their own. But while finding interests in ideas is not 
remarkable in itself, actually making the connection in 
detail can point to unnoticed or untheorized implications of 
familiar arguments —  in the case of environmental thought, 
to the problems of integrating scientific and political 
frameworks of understanding. Another 20th-century 
difference is that ideas don't stay attached to their social 
origins as long as they did in 19th-century Europe. They 
move around more quickly, are widely communicated to 
different groups, are quickly modified and adopted for other 
purposes. Concepts can rapidly depart from their origins, 
and become attached to other interests.10
Mannheim gives a dialectical account of the development 
of thought style: Bourgeois rationalism suppresses 
traditionalism until that older view becomes relevant (under 
conditions of class differentiation of political interests) 
and takes the new form of conservatism. The parallel for
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environmental thought would be that scientific reductionism 
suppresses holism until the environmental crisis makes 
holism relevant, when holism takes the new form of 
environmental thought. This is a plausible reading of the 
course of events in postwar biology, but to establish this 
influence reguires more investigation than is possible here.
Like Mannheim's conservatives, environmentalists want 
not just to think different things, but to think things 
differently. As conservatives gave a different meaning to 
liberty, environmentalists give a different meaning to 
scientific progress. But even more significant, they give a 
different meaning to cause and effect by positioning that 
action in a cyclical rather than a linear context. 
Philosophically, this is another parallel to a return to 
older modes of thought —  to ancient Greek thought, in this 
case.
Just as Romantics and conservatives had to rationalize 
the Romantic view by making it self-conscious, though they 
were reacting against a highly rationalized view of the 
world, the nature-oriented environmental thinkers must make 
use of science, though they oppose its mechanistic approach 
to life. Mannheim observed that "It is the fate of 
irrationalism, as of everything else, to be comprehensible 
only upon the plane on which the age rests."11 Even 
irrationalism, then, had to be rationalized —  to be
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counterposed to reason using reason's terms. Our age rests 
on the plane of science (a particular form of rationalism), 
and even objections to science must be made comprehensible 
in scientific terms.
Mannheim found that the conservative "tendency" 
generated historical thinking (the emphasis on specifics of 
time and place, and on the metaphysics of history rather 
than of reason). What does an environmental tendency 
generate? Not holism (the emphasis on wholes rather than 
parts, and on emergent properties which cannot be reduced to 
constituent elements), which is already developed. Rather,
I think the important thing is time awareness opposing 
atemporality —  another version of a resistance to timeless 
universals. This is another possible parallel to Mannheim. 
His concern about "historical and political ways of 
thinking" is part of a larger question about "how long we 
have had (or, at least, have seen as problematic) a 
disjunction between ^nature' and ^history'." That is, a 
philosophical and methodological distinction between the 
natural sciences and the historical cultural sciences. 
Mannheim wanted more than a history of ideas explaining this 
distinction; he wanted to know what social forces accounted 
for the split between nature and history. He recast the 
development as
"a contradiction between two worldviews and ways 
of thinking, borne by social forces: the
I
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disjunction between liberal and conservative 
thinking which arose at the turn of the nineteenth 
century in direct connection with the concrete 
political and philosophically self-reflective 
debate about the French Revolution."12
This distinction between "natural-scientific and historical
thinking... prevails today in the sphere of methodology,"
Mannheim affirms.13 One element of the natural-law
thinking of the Enlightenment is timeless universality;
scientific law follows in the same vein. Environmentalism
dependent on scientific ecology cannot fully resist the
timeless abstractions of science, but it can draw on that
area of scientific thinking most responsive to the time
element that defines living organisms. In environmentalism
time awareness becomes an acute consciousness of the amount
of time we have left to solve our ecological crisis and
assure our survival.
In defining politics as the organizing center of
conservative thought, Mannheim asserted that "the political
factor must be autonomous and must become the primary
nucleus around which new groupings crystallize." This is
another way of describing the formation of class agendas in
the developing nation state. The environmental parallel
would be that science is autonomous (from political or other
influence, as politics was from religious influence), and
that groups define themselves around issues that have
science as their center. Mannheim's autonomy is an abstract
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autonomy, on the level of construction of theory, not of 
day-to-day affairs. Science has this kind of theory-level 
autonomy, but there are not yet major groups crystallizing 
around it, around disputes over what science should be, as 
there were around disputes over what the state should be. I 
believe that the possibility of such disputes is growing, 
and that the science-skeptic argument will continue to 
define itself.
One Style of Thought or Two?
Since the environmental argument has two major strains:
- science oriented, information driven
- nature oriented, empathetically driven,
applying Mannheim's method of analysis to this distinction 
raises the question, Do they combine in one style of thought
-  "environmental" —  or are they two separate styles of 
thought?
Style of thought differences, Mannheim says, are most 
noticeable at the level of definition of the problem. 
Different styles of thought bring forth different 
ontological levels.14 Enlightenment thought hypostatized 
Natural Law; conservative thought hypostatized History. So 
if nature-oriented environmentalists hypostatize Nature, and
scientific ones hypostatize Science, are they two different 
styles of thought? Is the tendency of nature thinkers to 
respond empathetically and the tendency of scientific ones 
to respond analytically parallel to the abstract tendencies 
of liberal thought and the concrete tendencies of 
conservative thought —  again suggesting two separate styles 
of thought? On the side that answers "yes” is the 
recognition that the yearning for reunion with nature is an 
already established type of thought; the scientific 
environmental argument is a new type. There is a parallel 
here to feudal (already existing) and Romantic (new) thought 
opposing Enlightenment thought. On the "no" side is that 
this distinction is, by itself, not enough to establish a 
style of thought; there would also have to be different key 
problems and basic intentions, along with the other elements 
of a style of thought.
Science Criticism
There are many forms of science criticism:
- Frankfurt School criticism of instrumental reason
- critiques of technology
- holistic life sciences critiques of reductionist science
- feminist criticism of masculinist bias and
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overobjectification of the world
- social construction of knowledge critiques of scientific 
objectivity
- environmental critiques,.
Environmental criticism and the criticism of science 
intersect. I realize that because environmental voices are 
so diverse, that to name the scientific type of 
environmental criticism the "environmental style of thought" 
may seem unfair or inaccurate. But because the science- 
based argument is what made the environment a public issue, 
and is a departure from the nature-oriented arguments that 
preceded it and must now to some extent include it, I have 
decided that calling the science-based argument the 
environmental style of thought is correctly descriptive.
This argument scientifically legitimates the vision of all 
human life as part of nature (the inclusive environmental 
view), and thus will be an indispensable argument for that 
vision so long as science remains central to our lives.
Mannheim notes that a new word is often the sign of a 
new social phenomenon, and that though traditionalism and 
conservatism overlap, the appearance of the term 
"conservatism" indicated its social and political 
appearance.15 Similarly, environmentalism and traditional 
concern for nature overlap, but the appearance of the term 
"environmentalism" indicates a new, scientific version of
nature appearing in social and political life.
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Content and Context
The plan of the the study was to take the environmental 
movement as an area where a clear case could be made that 
science legitimates social action, and to determine, using 
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, if there was a coherent 
argument focused on the uses of science and thus meeting a 
preliminary condition for the development of a style of 
thought —  having a center of contention around which there 
are opposed arguments. The opposed arguments, which appear 
on the surface to be environmentalist and anti­
environmentalist, would then hypothetically have been about 
the nature and uses of science. This opposition was 
observed to exist between environmental and anti- 
environmental arguments and within environmental arguments. 
Environmental arguments alone were then analyzed to see if 
indeed their science skepticism was extensive enough to 
support the existence of a polarity around science in which 
environmentalists actively oppose a status quo of science in 
society. This presence was found and was located among 
environmentalists who were also scientists.
There was a two-fold purpose in the study —  to give
examples of scientific legitimation (implied by arguments); 
to describe arguments for social action according to a 
method which makes distinctions in content that can be 
related to the differing traditions and conditions of 
opposing groups. As with Mannheim's "Conservative Thought," 
much is left undone in relating content to social context. 
This bias is built into the method, I now realize, which 
concentrates on key epistemological problem first, and basic 
intention second, both of which are arrived at by a 
documentary analysis of texts. The historical research 
which is necessary to establish social context is not 
provided for in the method. What the method does do is show 
where that historical research must take place —  what group 
to look at, what conditions to investigate, what events to 
measure the impact of. This means that at the end of this 
study, there is a whole other work to be done —  an 
investigation of post-World War II scientific endeavor in 
the life sciences and in the developing field of ecology, in 
combination with an account of the environmental crises of 
the time and the responses to them by scientifically trained 
persons.
Frameworks
The use of "Conservative Thought" as a model for this 
study was an experiment. Could an early 20th-century 
analysis of early 19th-century thought be applied to late 
20th-century thought in the late 2 0th century? One 
difficulty would be having little historical distance from 
which to make the analysis. The change in the center of 
contention (from politics to science) added complexity to 
the analysis, and required the identification of new 
characteristics contained by the categories basic intention 
and key epistemological problem. Besides this difficulty of 
internal analysis, there was a problem in applying 
Mannheim's analysis of social context.
For environmental thought, as compared with 
conservative thought, not only was there not a simple class 
structure to work with as context (as in 19th-century 
Germany), there was not a good fit of arguments to the 
political framework that gave meaning to conservative 
thought, and that addresses problems of class interests and 
social location. Science and technology doesn't threaten 
political position and class interests as directly as it 
threatens the body —  its health, possibilities for 
longevity, and genetic constitution. Science is now seen to 
be a double-edged sword that can harm as well as help (and
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in its asocial relevance it is like religion —  religion 
offers heaven or hell regardless of class position). 
Environmental interests do not neatly fit into the political 
framework.
In discussing this shift from politics as reference 
point to science as reference point I have concentrated on 
environmental arguments, linking environmental thought to 
the critique of science. But of course not all critique of 
science is environmental, and not all environmentalism is 
critique of science. The observation that environmental 
issues don't fit the political framework, and do fit a 
science one, may be (exactly) the outcome of scientists 
framing the issue. Against the conclusion that it is only 
because scientists made the environmental argument that it 
doesn't match political concepts, is the fact that 
politicians didn't frame environmental issues well, not only 
because of anti-environmental interests, but because they 
didn't have the language that captured the problem. The 
arguments of scientists provide the same sort of 
paradigmatic delineation of issues for today's society that 
political theorists did for the 19th-century society studied 
by Mannheim.
It is my contention: 
that there is an un-named style of thought emerging 
which I have called environmental thought
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—  that its center of contention is science
—  that this signals that there is a conceptual shift 
occuring collectively in our society, from understanding and 
legitimating from within a political framework (state and 
citizen with rights and obligations determined by a 
philosophy of human nature) to doing this within a 
scientific framework (science and its users/recipients 
without clearly established rights and obligations; facts of 
nature replace philosophy of human nature; politics remains, 
but with a changed identity).
The following step (using Mannheim's method) should be:
—  that there is a new, or newly conscious, social group 
that bears the environmental style of thought (for example, 
some studies characterize environmentalists as a knowledge 
class not tied to the production sector of capitalist 
society). Such a group would be Mannheim's effective social 
group. But this group is not so easily found.
The Problem of the Effective Social Group
There are so many strands to environmentalism that its 
proponents cannot be squeezed into one class. In 
restricting my analysis to arguers/writers, I am in part 
saying that an elite group is skilled in certain kinds of
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discourse —  an observation that is nothing new. More 
specifically, the group is scientists who are relatively 
independent of funding and politics (academic or 
governmental). They are relatively free to make the 
critical argument, and this distinguishes them from other, 
equally competent and knowledgable scientists.
Environmentalism is tremendously inclusive as an 
attitude; that's part of its strength. Practicing 
environmentalists are a much smaller group than attitudinal 
environmentalists, but they still are spread around the 
middle class. And some practicing environmentalists are 
from poor communities resisting the use of their backyards 
for dumps or incinerators. Environmental allegiance 
expands, so the professing group grows larger. The 
effective group is another matter, but wherever the 
questions are scientific, there will be a knowledge elite 
involved.
Mannheim puts much more effort into analyzing the 
content of his conservative style of thought than he does 
into analyzing its effective group. And he emphasizes 
historical currents leading to conservatism more than he 
does a specifc group project to get it going. However, if 
there's a style of thought, then there's a coherent argument 
which comes from a specific location in society no matter 
how diffuse the many contributing strands. That, at least,
is how I understand Mannheim's premise for conservatism, 
although it's possible that this is a dynamic peculiar to 
politics and modern class society. The more general premise 
that there are social origins for knowledge does not 
disallow multiple origins so long as some group(s) are 
specifically excluded from origination. That is, the 
argument can't come from just anywhere. In the case of 
environmentalism, industrialists, growth-oriented 
businesses, resource-exploiting occupations, are 
excluded.16 I have found the origin of the science-based 
environmental argument among holistically-inclined life 
scientists but I have not investigated in detail how the 
conditions these scientists perceived could incline them to 
make their argument.
In Mannheim, class society and political thought go 
together. It is the differences in life experience in 
relation to the elements of the political framework, 
structured by class division, which result in different 
intents/tendencies and then in different political arguments 
(styles of thought). Today, differences in experience n 
relation to elements of the science framework result in 
different tendencies and arguments about the direction of 
science in society and environment. If Mannheim's analysis 
applies (arguments come from specific social locations), it 
seems to me that for critique to arise, there must also be
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some events in social structure —  openings or closings —  
following on the polarizing events that are an impetus to a 
new style of thought.
What was the social-structural opening (and/or closing) 
for the (oppositional) response to the scientific/ 
technological aspect of the environmental crisis? The 
event-opportunistic opening was the environmental awareness 
following on Silent Spring and various disasters, but this 
is not the same as a social-structural opening/closing.
Both scientists and nature-oriented groups responded to 
these events, but they were not events that affected social 
structure (as did the French Revolution).
For the argument to come forth, something had to have 
happened —  to be perceived to have happened —  to the world 
of those who put forth the argument. The nature group saw 
wild nature disappearing. Scientists in certain life- 
science disciplines, it is possible, saw the natural world - 
- the subject of their studies —  being disrupted; they saw 
a balanced and functioning environment endangered.
Was the opening/closing for scientists specifically 
within the organization of scientific activity? I believe 
it may have been the increasing dominance of the 
reductionist molecular biology approach that appeared to be, 
to traditional biologists, the closing of opportunities and 
the ending of a tradition, while at the same time the
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environmental crisis offered an opening for anti­
reductionist theorizing.17
The growing critique of science follows on science's 
greatest "successes," just as the critique of the 
Enlightenment followed on the "success" of the French 
Revolution. It has taken shape among scientists themselves, 
and among feminists, environmentalists, and constructivist 
theorists of knowledge. Scientists and non-scientists 
combined in the 1960s and 70s in the United States to bring 
the environmental movement to the point where it became 
politically visible. Both were concerned with the being of 
science, with the implications of its traditional separation 
from the sphere of values. Could science remain autonomous 
in this way? Should it be allowed to if it could? These 
questions underlay the more immediate problem of what to do 
about the environment.
Science as a Center of contention for Styles of Thought
Since we are in the midst of a conceptual shift from 
politics to science, both types of arguments and 
legitimations are used. With science as a center of 
contention, arguments can be developed around actions 
oriented toward the practical world —  science and
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technology —  or around epistemological issues —  science 
and objectivity: is science our most objective knowledge, is 
our most objective knowledge our most valuable knowledge, is 
there any objective knowledge outside our definitions of it?
With science and politics both being centers of 
contention, two changes in the centrality of politics are 
possible over time:
A) Science replaces politics as ideologically central:
If science replaces politics as a center, commitment to 
science replaces political commitment for characterization 
of thought. "Progressive" and "conservative" become 
analogies rather than accurate descriptors for these 
commitments, and there is a spectrum of opinion on what 
science is/should be that ranges from traditionalist to 
radically revolutionary. Scientists and philosophers of 
science, and also the layperson, will contribute to the 
defining of this spectrum. There will be Popperians 
(classicists) and Feyerabenders (radicals) in the scientific 
community, flat-Earthers and amateur scientists among the 
public.
A growing debate on scientific programs for the future 
could resemble religious arguments more than political 
ones —  ecology and environment vie for importance of place 
with the state, and both camps make allegiances to non­
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political entities (to objective science or to the global 
environment) while trying to construct a morality that can 
encompass genetic engineering and backpack nuclear weapons.
B) Science takes equal place with politics as ideologically 
central: Since science and politics are now inextricably 
linked, and since the (ideal) objectivity of science and the 
partiality of politics are in basic contradiction, the 
continuing difficulty of discussion over issues like ozone 
layer damage, drug-induced abortion, pre-conception 
biological engineering, prolonged machine-supported life in 
hospitals, AIDS, the scientific possibility but political 
impossibility of ending the starvation of millions, the 
allocation of resources to the exploration and 
militarization of space, the reliance of poltical decisions 
on scientific expertise —  all these may contribute to new 
types of thought-styles, centered not just on politics, but 
on science as well.
If the legitimacy of social action must be 
scientifically as well as politically validated, this 
worldview will separate the industrialized and technologized 
nations still further from the poorest part of the third 
world, where nationalistic movements and political 
allegiances continue to dominate. In the West, science has 
been so successful in establishing a position as superior
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knowledge that politics must often cover itself with the 
mantle of science. This raises the question whether science 
can 'free' itself from politics (as it earlier 'freed' 
itself from religion), as its ideals require, or whether it 
will just become another form of politics. An equally 
important question is whether a science free of politics 
would be a more even-handed guide to common good because 
less partisan than politics, or a totalitarian rule because 
of its total claim to the best method of decision making.
Science and Values
As new styles of thought develop around these 
questions, the difficulties that they raise bring the 
discussants inevitably to the question of values. If the 
objectivity of science is to be tested, we must see if 
science favors some values over others. If we can't 
establish objectivity free of values, then what values does
science have? If science has values, how is it better as an
ideological guide than politics, which has long given us a 
way of dealing with our values? (Politics is a limited and 
imperfect way of dealing with values, but an important one.)
If the values of politics are only competing interests, none
of which can establish ethical superiority, do the values of
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science offer a way out, or are they only another interest?
What values will guide our use of technology if science 
does no more than proclaim itself a self-evident value (like 
truth), and if politics confines itself to competing self- 
interests?
And, for the sociology of knowledge, if what that 
discipline does is show both scientific and political values 
to be only self-interests, is it performing a needed 
critical role or, rather, a nihilistic one?
This study, of course, does not answer all of these 
questions. It attempts to clarify the science/politics 
tension and indicate the shift occuring from one set of 
explanations and legitimations to another. The final 
outcome of that shift is not yet determined. Legitimation 
could conceivably be redistributed fairly equally between 
the two frameworks of explanation, or science may win, as I 
think it will, superior authority.
Postscript
The Earth Summit conference in Rio (the United Nations 
Conference on the Environment and Development) took place in 
June 1992 as I was writing the final chapters of this work. 
It is one of many signs that the central political issue for
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Western societies has changed. For centuries of nation­
state building, that issue was how to govern, or what makes 
government legitimate. Now it is how to use science, and 
not misuse it, to keep from destroying life on the planet. 
Global environmental threat is an issue for all societies, 
but it has a special status in the West, whose nations 
cannot claim they need to play catch-up in economic 
development before they act to protect the environment. The 
old political problems have not gone away for Western 
nations; they remain. But politics is taking on a new 
identity, structured around science and technology instead 
of around theories of government and of the rights and 
obligations of citizen and state.
In the past twenty years environmental arguments have 
been extended to social and economic problems, and are 
changing our understanding of what it is that makes actions 
to solve these problems acceptable or not. The old 
political framework of argument ranked opinions on how to 
solve society's problems along a conservative/liberal 
spectrum. It is being replaced by a scientific framework 
that ranks them on a spectrum of stances toward how science 
operates in society. On the one hand are those who trust 
that the practice and outcomes of science will work to the 
general good; on the other are those who are skeptical, who 
find the direction of scientific research and technological
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development is too often a threat to the ecological balance 
of people and nature. A new polarity is forming, one of 
science-trusters and science-skeptics, and it is likely to 
replace the old conservative/liberal polarity as we enter 
the next century.
It is not the validity of science that science-skeptics 
doubt, but its direction and uses. Nuclear radiation, 
pesticides, toxic effluents, are seen to endanger life from 
the genetic level on up. The environmental type of argument 
equates scientific knowledge with both creative and 
destructive power that must be kept in hand. It has become 
another way of looking at political, economic, and lifestyle 
choices, one that does not first call on democratic 
political concepts.
The new kind of argument about social and economic 
problems is fact-based and scientifically oriented; the old 
kind is based on theories of government and human nature.
The new kind of argument weighs, calculates and predicts; 
the old kind invokes principles and ideals, traditions and 
utopias. The new kind of argument, in its environmental 
form, was developed by scientists —  especially those in the 
life sciences —  who gave a warning about the environment 
which was also a warning about science.
At a time when repressive governments are being 
replaced by new democratic ones, and racial and economic
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may seem absurd to say that the old politics is no longer 
the issue. But it is not that pressing political issues 
don't count or that politics is being eclipsed —  it is the 
philosophical and theoretical basis of politics as we have 
understood it that is coming to an end. We have as much 
trouble integrating our current hold on values with politics 
as we do integrating our understanding of science with it. 
And science, values and politics intersect when, for 
example, sexual orientation or teenage sexual activity are 
judged to be matters more biologically than socially 
influenced. Increasingly, it will be scientific opinion 
about the environmental outcome of productive technologies 
and market choices that will be used to justify political 
action taken to effect the environment both directly and 
indirectly, not concepts of citizen and state, based on 
political theory. Even those who are skeptical of the 
benefits of science must rely on science to provide 
information and to give confirming or disconfirming 
evidence. Science dominates our institutions as a form of 
knowledge, and as a source of legitimation for their 
actions.
If the Rio conference, and other efforts in the same 
direction, do not advance us toward a solution of the 
environmental crisis, questions about political forms and 
theories will be moot. Equally, if political mechanisms
theories will be moot. Equally, if political mechanisms 
cannot be found for working toward ecological balance, 
arguments about the right uses of science will be hollow. 
Politics and science are inextricably linked, and politics 
can no longer be the same; nor can science retain its 
traditional aloofness from political process as we undergo 
the shift from one framework of argument and justification 
to another.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIXTEEN
1. Mannheim does not summarize individual works, as I do, 
but analyzes their conceptual content. I give a detailed 
account of environmental arguments because they are not 
established as a category of thought in the way that 
conservative arguments are.
2. For Prussian nobles, life and occupation, i.e., 
hereditary lordship, were the same.
3. Mannheim does discuss the problem of "imputation" of 
political and social tendencies to concepts in Conservatism, 
pp. 37-43.
4. In "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung" in From 
Karl Mannheim.
5. The documentary method was adopted and modified by 
Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodoloav (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967) as a basic technique and 
tenet of ethnomethodology: We all treat actions and 
statements in our everyday world as documents of other 
meanings beyond the immediate one, and these other meanings 
help explain the immediate event to us. Garfinkel applied 
this method to social interaction; here I again apply it, as 
Mannheim did, to written arguments within their social and 
historical context.
6. The beginning of a style of thought is a "mode of 
relating to the world." The method is to work back from the 
thought to its intention (which derives from a mode of 
relating) to the group who has the tradition.
7. Commoner refers to the divergent purposes of moleular 
and organism-centered biology in Science and Survival. For 
an account of reductionist and antireductionist arguments in 
the philosophy of biology, see Alexander Rosen,
The Structure of Biological Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), a basically reductionist treatise 
written for biologists about the issue of biology's autonomy 
from or provincial relation to the physical sciences. 
Biological reductionism is critiqued from a Marxist point of 
view in Steven Rose, Molecules and Minds: Essavs on Biology 
and the Social Order (Milton Keynes, England: Open
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University Press, 1987). Biochemist Erwin Chargaff, a 
prominent defender of the old, pre-molecular school, is 
quoted in Horace Freeland Judson, The Eighth Dav of 
Creation: Makers of the Revolution in Biology (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1980) as saying: "My main objection to 
molecular biology is that by its claim to be able to explain 
everything it actually hinders the free flow of scientific 
ideas. But there is not a scientist I have met who would 
share my opinion." (p.222).
8. These studies indicate that environmentalists are more 
likely to be employed in the service sector than the 
production sector. Being young, female, and white also 
increases the tendency toward environmentalism. so do left 
politics, but Milbrath finds that political orientation does 
not explain environmentalism. See:
Riley E. Dunlap and K. Van Liere, "The New Environmental 
Paradigm," The Journal of Environmental Education. 1978 (4); 
K. Van Liere and Riley E. Dunlap, "The Social Bases of 
Enivronmental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations 
and Empirical Evidence," Public Opinion Quarterly. 1980, 44 
(2); Stephen Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia; The 
Environment. Politics and the Future (Chichester/New York: 
Wiley, 1982); Lester W. Milbrath, Environmentalists:
Vanguard for a New Society (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1984).
9. From Karl Mannheim, pp.169-71.
10. Such movement of ideas is recognized in Weber's 
"elective affinities."
11. Conservatism, p.65.
12. Karl Mannheim, in Conservatism, pp. 33-35. The editors 
discuss this formulation of the question in their 




16. See note #8 above.
17. In The Eighth Dav. Judson says of the change in 
biology:
"As understanding of the cell was invaded by new kinds 
of molecules, biology was invaded by new kinds of
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scientists, most famously the physicists.... For 
biochemists, molscular biology also represented a 
painful loss of control of the century-old continuity 
of their tradition —  a break which became irreparable 
as the number of students entering research doubled and 
doubled again in the fifties." (p.215)
The biologist E.O. Wilson has commented that "Someone said 
not long ago, 'Pollution will do for the study of ecology 
what cancer did for molecular biology,.,, Quoted in Anne 
Chisholm, Philosophers of the Earth: Conversations with 
Ecologists (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1972).
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